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Chapter 0
Abstract
The current return to protectionist measures coinciding with a rise of illiberalism
triggers the need for a more detailed understanding of the interactions of economic
and political dimensions. This thesis consists of four articles advancing our under-
standing of the complex interactions between trade, democracy, development and
conflict.
The first article, Boese (2015), asks: do revolutions lead to more democracy? The
revolutionary conflicts examined are positively associated with a country’s demo-
cratic path. In addition, the article introduces a new measure of democracy, the
(X-)Pol Index.
The second article, Boese (2019), compares measure validity and reliability of
Polity2, Freedom House and V-Dem democracy indices. The latter surpass the for-
mer in all relevant areas. The article provides an introduction to democracy mea-
surement, a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of each measure in
empirical analyses and several case studies to illustrate differences across the three
indices.
The third article, Boese and Kamin (2019), shows that in spite of standardization
efforts the problem of inconsistent country coding across and within disciplines per-
sists. This leads to sample selection bias as countries in conflict often undergo state
name and border changes. In turn, reliability of inferences drawn from statistical
analysis, in particular in conflict and peace economics, is limited. Detailed overview
tables of the gravest country coding discrepancies are provided.
The fourth article (with K. Kamin, CAU Kiel) examines the interactions of
democracy, development, trade and conflict. It employs a country-specific VAR
to study the effects of shocks in any of the four factors on one another. Results show
that these effects are vastly heterogenous across and within countries over time. The
article received the Michael D. Intrilligator Best PhD Student Paper Award at the
23rd International Conference in Economics and Security in Madrid, Spain (June
2019).
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0.1 German Abstract
Die derzeitige Wiederkehr protektionistischer Maßnahmen und des Illiberalismus
erfordert ein detaillierteres Versta¨ndnis der Wechselwirkungen zwischen wirtschaftlichen
und politischen Faktoren. Die vorliegende Doktorarbeit besteht aus vier Artikeln, die
unser Versta¨ndnis der komplexen Wechselwirkungen zwischen Handel, Demokratie,
Entwicklung und Konflikt voranbringen.
Der erste Artikel, Boese (2015), fragt: Fu¨hren Revolutionen zu mehr Demokratie?
Die untersuchten revolutiona¨ren Konflikte sind positiv mit dem demokratischen
Weg eines Landes verbunden. Daru¨ber hinaus fu¨hrt der Artikel ein neues Maß fu¨r
Demokratie ein, den (X-) Pol-Index.
Der zweite Artikel, Boese (2019), vergleicht die Demokratiemaße von PolityIV,
Freedom House und V-Dem. V-DemMaße u¨bertreffen die anderen in allen Bereichen.
Der Artikel bietet eine Einfu¨hrung in die Demokratiemessung, einen Vergleich der
Vor- und Nachteile jedes Maßes in empirischen Analysen und Fallstudien, um die
Unterschiede zwischen den Indizes zu veranschaulichen.
Der dritte Artikel, Boese and Kamin (2019), untersucht das Problem inkonsisten-
ter La¨nderkodierungen zwischen verschiedenen Makrodatensa¨tzen. Es fu¨hrt zu einer
Verzerrung der Stichprobenauswahl, da sich in Konfliktla¨ndern oft Name und Gren-
zen des Staates a¨ndern. Dadurch wird die Zuverla¨ssigkeit von Schlussfolgerungen aus
statistischen Analysen, insbesondere in der Konflikto¨konomie, eingeschra¨nkt. Detail-
lierte U¨bersichtstabellen der La¨nderkodierungsdifferenzen werden bereitgestellt.
Der vierte Artikel (mit K. Kamin, CAU Kiel) untersucht die Wechselwirkungen
von Demokratie, Entwicklung, Handel und Konflikt. In einem la¨nderspezifischen
VAR werden die Auswirkungen von Schocks auf einen der vier Faktoren untersucht.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass diese Effekte im Laufe der Zeit in und innerhalb von
La¨ndern sehr heterogen sind. Der Artikel erhielt den Michael D. Intrilligator Best
PhD Student Paper Award auf der 23. International Conference in Economics and
Security in Madrid (Juni 2019).
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Why Democracy Matters
A country’s system of governance (or its “level of democracy”1) matters for economists for two
reasons. The first is its relevancy due to current geopolitical developments. With the global rise
of illiberalism and the recent return to protectionist measures (for example in the United States
of America or China) the need for a more detailed understanding of the complex interactions
of economic and political dimensions has gained renewed importance. The second reason why
democracy matters is the inconclusiveness of results provided by the relevant literature. Several
scholars have examined democracy and economic variables and found evidence for significant
interactions between them. These results are, however, very mixed and therefore findings remain
inconclusive. Table 1.1 provides a short overview of the cross-country studies most closely re-
lated to the research carried out in this thesis. In light of the first reason this raises the question
why robust relationships between democracy and economic factors are so difficult to establish
and what is driving the system.
My thesis contributes to an understanding of these complex interactions in the following ways:
First, it shows that democracy is endogenous to economic factors such as trade openness or
socio-economic development, i.e. they are jointly determined. As such it can be assumed to
have direct effects on a country’s economic performance as well as indirect effects through other
variables (for example by decreasing the likelihood of conflict). To estimate the impact of inter-
national economic variables on each other (for example of trade openness on economic growth) it
is therefore essential to account for these endogenous interactions. Second, my thesis highlights
the complexity of conducting cross-national studies of observational data. Chapters 3 and 4
discuss in great detail the importance of measure validity and reliability as well as dataset con-
struction. Third, the results of my thesis suggest that models employed in such cross-national
studies need to account for economic and political factors being jointly determined and thus
impacting one another both directly and indirectly. In addition, my findings suggest that these
effects are very heterogenous across countries (and even within countries over time) providing a
plausible explanation for the absence of robust finding in studies with models assuming homo-
geneity of slope parameters.
In the following I will give a brief discussion of the channels linking a country’s system of gov-
ernance to its economic performance. The discussion is followed by an outline of each chapter
further detailing its contribution to the literature.
1For brevity, in this thesis the term “democracy” is used pars pro toto, i.e. synonymously to “system
of governance” unless noted otherwise. This implies some abuse of terminology as democracy is but a certain
realization on a spectrum of authority patterns. For a discussion thereof see Boese et al. (2019).
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Sample studies on interactions of democracy and...
development
education Murtin and Wacziarg (2014)
health (life expectancy) Baum and Lake (2003), Besley and Kudamatsu (2006)
income inequality Reuveny and Li (2003), Knutsen (2015)
income (GDP per capita) Acemoglu et al. (2008), Rigobon and Rodrik (2005),
Cervellati et al. (2014), Acemoglu et al. (2019),
Madsen et al. (2015), Murtin and Wacziarg (2014),
Narayan et al. (2011)
growth (GDP per capita growth) Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008), Rodrik and
Wacziarg (2005), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001),
Aghion et al. (2007), Barro (1996), Knutsen (2013),
Persson and Tabellini (2009), (democratisation and
growth:) Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008),
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005)
economic integration
trade openness Li and Reuveny (2003), Reuveny and Li (2003),
Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), Subramanian and
Satyanath (2004), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001),
Rodrik et al. (2004)
Table 1.1: Sample of recent studies on interrelationships of democracy and economic factors
1.1.1 The rules of the game
Rodrik et al. (2004) argue “what matters are the rules of the game in a society and their con-
duciveness to desireable economic behaviour”.2 To analyze the interactions between democracy
and economic outcomes it is central to understand these rules and how they shape said interac-
tions.
Assume a society consists of two groups, the comparatively poorer people and the wealthier
elite running the country. This is but an extension of the model developed in Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001) in that the poor are not necessarily disenfranchised and the elite is not neces-
sarily autocratic. In the spirit of Baum and Lake (2003) and Lake and Baum (2001) the elite
then functions as a local monopolist of public services, education etc. who “seeks to exploit
their market power to produce rents that can be redistributed to either the holders of the state
power”,3 i.e. the elite, or the people. In such a framework the optimal quantity supplied by an
unconstrained monopolist/elite is lower than the social welfare maximizing quantity.
In this framework the central argument shaping the rules of the game in a society is that
“democracy is a system in which parties lose elections” (Przeworski (1991), p.10). The degree of
contestation for office, judicial and legislative constraints placed on the elite and participation of
the people determines whether the monopolists produce in a contested or uncontested market,
i.e. whether the elites need to fear being replaced at regular intervals. In a perfect democracy
with competitive elections, full participation and constraints on the executive this will drive the
monopolist elite to produce the socially optimal quantity.4
2Rodrik et al. (2004) p. 132.
3Baum and Lake (2003), p. 336.
4See Lake and Baum (2001).
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1.1.2 Economic implications
This substitutability argument has far-reaching economic consequences (for example on devel-
opment, growth and trade levels) but also on conflict. Broadly speaking it implies that the range
of implementable policies in democratic countries is narrower that in autocratic ones. Competi-
tive negotiation processes in democracies make resource mobilization and policy implementation
more difficult. More autocratic leaders on the other hand are less bound by judicial or legislative
constraints and need to fear less for their reelection (Reuveny and Li (2003)). This introduces
a heterogeneity in expected policy outcomes: a strong autocrat can implement policies induc-
ing long-term development and growth not implementable in democracies (e.g. the substantial
economic growth in non-democratic China) but at the same time they can cause severe harm to
the economy and the country as a whole (see for example Baschar al-Assad in Syria).
With respect to development the substitutability argument implies that democracies are more
responsive to the poor who in turn push for more redistributive policies, egalitarian distribu-
tions of income and increased investments in human capital (public health and education).5 In
addition, the substitutability argument and the consequential comparative stability of policy
outcomes implies indirect positive effects of democratic institutions on investments (Tavares
and Wacziarg (2001)). This becomes apparent when separating the political from the economic
aspects of democracy (such as protection of property rights, business and labour market regula-
tions). These economic aspects of democratic systems are in itself growth conducive (Baum and
Lake (2003)). In addition, they raise the expectations about people’s returns to investments in
the future exerting another positive effect on growth through investments (Persson and Tabellini
(2009)).
The higher variation of policy outcomes in autocracies makes inferring a “net-effect” of a coun-
try’s system of governance on its economy difficult. Even within the range of democratic coun-
tries this effect remains unclear. Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), for example, find that the
increase in distributive policies in democracies comes at the expense of physical capital accumu-
lation in turn exerting a negative effect on economic growth. While it is hard to identify such a
“net-effect” the endogeneity between development and democracy is worth noting at this point.
Several scholars in favour of the “modernization hypothesis” (attributed to Lipset (1959)) argue
that a certain level of development acts as a prerequisite for democracy. Increased levels of
socio-economic development are both outcome and determinant of democracy (Acemoglu et al.
(2019), Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008), Madsen et al. (2015), Narayan et al. (2011)).
The “rules of the game” outlined above suggest that a country’s system of governance interacts
with its economy through multiple channels. Interaction here implies the possibility of causality
running both ways: from democracy to the economy and vice versa. Current developments
call for an increased understanding of the mechanisms how a country’s economy or system of
governance reacts to economic or political shocks in a globalized world. To achieve such an
understanding the above mentioned dynamic interactions need to be adequately modelled and
close attention needs to be paid to each of the variables included in the analysis (both in terms
of theoretical justification of inclusion as much as in terms of measure validity). This is pre-
cisely what this thesis does. The following section provides a short overview of each chapter and
highlights its central contribution to the literature.
5See Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008), Baum and Lake (2003), Besley and
Kudamatsu (2006)).
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1.1.3 Structure of the thesis
The above mentioned model derived in Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) provides a possible ex-
planation of how (threats of) revolutions, i.e. possible forced regime change, can force the elite
in autocracies to democratize. This is a starting point for chapter 2.6 It examines the effect of
revolutions on a country’s level of democracy. The chapter was written before the Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) indices became available. The problems caused by a democracy measure
endogenous to conflict discussed in this chapter constitute a major motivation for the research
carried out in chapter 3.
The validity of any cross-country study using observational data is based upon the data. There-
fore chapters 3 and 4 provide assessments of measure validity and reliability for the most fre-
quently employed democracy measures as well as assessments of sample selection problems occur-
ring when merging cross-country macro datasets in peace economics. It is standard to “control
for” democracy in empirical cross country studies. Nevertheless, most economics studies use es-
tablished yet (for certain purposes) outdated democracy indicators, such as Polity2 or Freedom
House Index. These indicators are unsuitable for precisely such types of analyses on various
levels (the Polity project even issues a cautionary note on the use of the Polity2 index in such
studies in their Codebook, Marshall et al. (2017a) p.16). While this is a problem well know in
comparative political science it has received little or no attention in economics. This is where
chapter 3 comes in.7 It compares measure validity and reliability of the established Polity2 and
Freedom House indices to the comparatively new V-Dem indices. The latter surpass the former
in all relevant areas. The central contribution of this chapter is its explicit and transparent
comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of each measure in empirical analyses and its
straightforward recommendation of using V-Dem data.
Chapter 4 discusses the implications of country naming inconsistencies between different data
sets going beyond pure spelling discrepancies.8 Properly joining economic, political and con-
flict data is not a trivial task as the perception of what constitutes a country/unit of analysis
differs across data sets. To conduct meaningful cross-country analyses, however, the unit of
analysis must be consistent across variables. The contribution of this article is twofold. First,
it shows that in spite of all country coding scheme standardization efforts and relevant software
packages and codes, the problem of inconsistent country coding in merging diverse macro panel
datasets persists. This can lead to substantial numbers of “missing” values in merged datasets
and possibly affect the reliability of inferences drawn from statistical analysis. This is of par-
ticular concern in empirical analysis in conflict and peace economics as inconsistent country
coding often affects countries in conflict. Second, detailed overview tables of some of the gravest
discrepancies in country coding across datasets are provided.
The last chapter constitutes a logical consequence of previous chapters. Several studies examine
the interactions of democracy, socio-economic development and trade openness (see Table 1.1).
Chapter 2 established an interaction between conflict and democracy. Chapter 3 and 4 provide
detailed information on the choice of democracy measure and dataset aggregation. Therefore,
chapter 5 estimates the interactions of democracy, development, trade openness and conflict. Its
central contribution is threefold, first, the model utilized accounts for indirect effects between
said factors and allows the effects to be potentially heterogeneous across countries. Second, its
findings show that the four variables simultaneously affect each other and third, the observed
effects are very heterogeneous across countries.
6Chapter 2 is published as Boese (2015).
7This chapter is published as Boese (2019).
8This chapter is joint work with Katrin Kamin, Christian-Albrechts-Universita¨t zu Kiel and is published as
Boese and Kamin (2019).
Chapter 2
Viva la revolucio´n, or:
Do revolutions lead to more
democracy?
There is a vast amount of studies on the origins of revolutions and armed conflict.
However, there is no empirical analysis of the political outcome of revolutionary
conflicts. A second branch of research focuses on waves of democratization. This
paper fills the gap and links the two fields by examining the importance of revolutions
as an explanatory factor for changes in systems of governance. Using a data set
covering 135 countries from 1960–2011, global changes in the level of democracy are
examined. The revolutionary conflicts examined in the panel had a positive influence
on a country’s democratic path. In addition the effect of selected variables on the
development of the system of governance is analyzed in more detail.
Keywords: conflict, democracy, democratization, polity, revolution
This chapter is published as: Viva la Revolucio´n, or: Do Revolutions Lead to More Democ-
racy? Boese, V. A. in Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 2015: 21(4), 541-551.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2015-0027
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2.1 Introduction
This paper attempts to answer whether and how revolutions affect countries’ democratic devel-
opment. Collecting macro-level data from a variety of open sources a cross-national data set
covering 135 countries and the period 1960-2011 was created. While the origins of revolutions
and civil conflicts have been studied extensively,1 little theory accounting for the empirical out-
come of revolutions is available. This paper uses the newly assembled data set to fill the gap by
analyzing the effect of revolutions on future levels of democracy.
Building on UCDP definitions the term “revolutionary conflict” in this paper refers to internal
armed conflict occurring between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition
group(s) with or without intervention from other states, in which the contested incompatibility
concerns the government, i.e. the type of political system, the replacement of the central govern-
ment, or the change of its composition, see Themne´r and Wallensteen (2014).
2.2 Revolutions and Democracy
This paper analyzes the development of governing structures of 135 countries over the 53 years.
Hence, a “system of governance” variable was needed. A new measure, the Pol Index, was
constructed based on the Polity2 Index.2 It ranges from 0 (total loss of central political author-
ity) to 21 (strongly democratic). Let pi,t denote the Pol Index of country i at time t. Then
∆pi,[t,t+k] := pi,t+k − pi,t is the change in Pol Index for country i between the years t and t+ k.
The paper examines how a number of factors in the base year t are connected to the level of the
Pol Index 2, 5 and 10 years later. It focuses on the periods k = 2, 5, 10 representing the short,
intermediate and long run.
When dividing the dataset into two groups, observations with and without revolutionary con-
flict, interesting results emerge. Table 2.1 depicts the percentage of observations with improve-
ments, no changes and deteriorations in the level of democracy 2, 5, and 10 years later for both
groups. Improvements (deteriorations) refers to “substantial” positive (negative) changes in the
Pol Index, i.e. changes with an absolute value larger than 3.3 For both groups the majority
of observations do not display a change in democracy level two years later. With time, the
percentage of observations experiencing improvements and deteriorations sharply rises. These
dynamics are even more prominent for observations with revolutions than for those without.
Table 2.2 depicts the differences between the percentage values of Table 2.1 for both groups.
Countries experiencing revolution had a higher volatility in their Pol Index than those without.
This begs the question whether revolution cases on average might have experienced higher or
lower changes in Pol Index. Using a two sample t-test it could be determined that the increase
in democracy was (significantly) higher for countries undergoing revolutions in the intermediate
and long run than for non-revolutionary ones, see Table 2.3.
The figures in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 raise the question whether there is a “general upwards trend”
in democratization independent of revolutions. In the early 1990s Samuel Huntington observed
that global patterns of democratization occur in waves.4 This led to a wave of research on the
topic.5 Jaggers and Gurr (1995), as well as Strand et al. (2012), find evidence for a “third wave”
1For example by Goldstone et al. (2010) or Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2017).
2Detailed information on the composition of the Pol Index can be found in section A.1 of the Appendix. Polity2
Index obtained from Marshall et al. (2013).
3Cf. Polity IV Manual, Gurr et al. (2013), p.14.
4See for example Huntington (1993).
5See Doorenspleet (2000), Przeworski et al. (2000) or Strand et al. (2012).
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Revolution at time t No revolution at time t
k = 2 k = 5 k = 10 k = 2 k = 5 k = 10
∆pi,[t,t+k] > 3 ⇒ improvement 9.72% 25.77% 44.73% 3.96% 14.09% 30.29%
−3 ≤ ∆pi,[t,t+k] ≤ 3 ⇒ no change 84.44% 64.67% 46.52% 93.67% 81.84% 64.54%
∆pi,[t,t+k] < −3 ⇒ deterioration 5.83% 9.56% 8.75% 2.38% 4.07% 5.17%
Table 2.1: Change in system of governance k years after time t, by percent of observations
k = 2 k = 5 k = 10
∆pi,[t,t+k] > 3 ⇒ improvement 5.76% 11.68% 14.44%
−3 ≤ ∆pi,[t,t+k] ≤ 3 ⇒ no change -9.23% -17.17% -18.02%
∆pi,[t,t+k] < −3 ⇒ deterioration 3.45% 5.49% 3.58%
Table 2.2: Difference between countries with and without revolutionary conflict in base year t
Mean change in Pol Index
Observation at time t from t to t+ k
with... k = 2 k = 5 k = 10
...revolution 0.2934 .9596 2.3574
...no revolution 0.1651 .4527 1.0739
Difference .1283 .5069** 1.2835***
***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05
Table 2.3: Results of two sample t-test of average change in Pol Index k years later
of international democratization starting in the early 1980s.6 In order to get an overview of
trends in democratization regional averages of the Pol Index for all countries from 1960-2012
are plotted in Figure 1. Here, evidence of a decline in levels of democracy until the late 1970s
and the “third wave” of democratization, is clear.
Given the positive difference in democracy changes between non-revolutionary and revolutionary
observations as well as the evidence for a trend/wave of democratization, this paper contributes
to the current literature by examining the importance of revolutions as an explanatory factor
for changes in systems of governance.
2.3 The Model
The panel used in this paper consists of 5,786 observations from 1960-2011 and 135 countries.
The explanatory variables of the model are chosen according to their established significance
for democracy and political stability in recent conflict and democratization research. A binary
indicator is used to mark “revolutionary” years. Countries experiencing anarchy or foreign
interruption (occupation) in the base year were also flagged using dummies. Another binary
variable was introduced to capture whether a country has experienced a democratic stage since
1960.7 Additionally a magnitude of armed conflict - score8 describing the destructive impact of
6See Jaggers and Gurr (1995), p.477.
7The threshold value of “democracy” here is defined as a score of at least 16 on the Pol Index.
8actotal, source: Major Episodes of Political Violence Dataset (MEPV), Marshall (2014).
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Figure 2.1: Pol Index by regions, 1960 - 2012
conflict on the country was included. In order to examine a “war weariness effect” a variable
measuring the duration of armed conflict was added to the model. It counts the number of
consecutive years a country has been experiencing any type of armed conflict prior to the base
year. Furthermore the number of armed conflicts in the given country year was incorporated. A
measure indicating the percentage of neighboring states undergoing major episodes of political
violence in a given year was included.9 To reflect the international framework, the “Affinity
of Nations Index” was used.10 Strezhnev and Voeten (2013), constructed it by using voting
patterns in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The voting behavior in the UNGA
is regarded to be largely symbolic. Consequently this index reflects alliances/affinities between
nations quite well. In particular, the index is an effective indicator of a country’s alliance to
superpowers. For each nation therefore its affinity to the United States, France and Russia was
examined.11 Life expectancy12 was chosen as a proxy for the socio-economic development of a
given country. From the Penn World Table, Heston et al. (2011), and the World Development
Indicators, The World Bank (2014), the annual change in real GDP per capita13 was acquired.
Annual population growth (in %)14 and primary school completion rates15 were taken as proxies
for societal conditions.
Several scholars, for example Gates et al. (2006), or Vreeland (2008), have pointed out that
the participations components of the Polity2 Index can lead to an endogeneity problem when
analyzing armed conflicts. This is because the participation subindices are coded with explicit
reference to conflict. The Pol Index used in this paper includes the participation components as
well. To show that the model’s results are not driven by the endogeneity stemming from these
components, the analysis was also carried out using the Pol Index without the participation
9Derived from NAC and NBORDER of the MEPV, Marshall (2014).
10s3un, source: Strezhnev and Voeten (2013).
11Due to high correlations and limited data avilability affinities to the United Kingdom and China were left
out.
12Source: World Bank, The World Bank (2014).
13PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Laspeyres), at 2005 constant prices.
14Source: World Bank, The World Bank (2014).
15% of complete primary schooling in the age group of 15-999, source: Barro and Lee (2013).
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Magnitude of 3.491159 2.6917 0 14
destructive impact
% of bordering states .3767415 .3219922 0 1
with armed conflict
Conflict Duration 11.5668 12.61065 1 63
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of conflict specific variables for cases with at least one conflict
per country and year
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Life expectancy, total 63.45713 11.44018 20.61488 82.93147
Population growth 1.864836 1.513716 -7.597309 17.48324
Primary school 17.8942 12.31884 .1857074 81.30415
completion rates
GDP growth 2.050837 5.848191 -64.81847 90.85391
No. of armed conflicts .2413206 .68836 0 9
in given country & year
Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics of economic and societal variables, including all observations
subindices. This truncated “executive-only”-version is referred to as X-Pol Index.
Table 2.4 displays the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for conflict specific
variables for country-years in which at least one type of conflict occurred. Summary statistics
for the socio-economic variables are presented in Table 2.5.
2.4 Analysis
The analysis was carried out using country and time fixed effects as well as robust standard
errors. First, a binary revolution variable was tested to examine the effect of the occurrence of
revolutions (yes or no) on future levels of democracy. The results are shown in Table 2.6. In a
second step the revolution dummy was replaced by a variable counting the number of years the
corresponding revolution had been ongoing. The outcome of the regression with the duration of
revolution variable is shown in Table 2.7. In both tables the three columns on the right represent
the analyses with the X-Pol Index.
Similarly to the findings of the t-test, in the fixed effects model revolutionary conflict seems to
have a “long breath”: countries with revolutions in the base year had a 0.9 higher Pol Index
ten years later than “peaceful” nations. A high socio-economic development in the base year,
i.e. high life expectancy and primary school completion rates, as well as low population growth,
has a positive influence on the system of governance 2, 5 or even 10 years later. Interestingly,
GDP growth does not have a significant effect for any number of years or in any model studied.
A country’s democratic lifecourse seems to be of utmost importance: those countries which had
previously experienced at least one year of “democracy” had a much higher Pol Index after
any number of years. An affinity to France has a very strong positive effect on the democratic
development, particularly in the short run. A close affinity to Russia has a slight positive effect
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Dependent Variable: Pol Index k years later X-Pol Index k years later
k=2 k=5 k=10 k=2 k=5 k=10
Revolution -0.106 0.061 0.861∗∗∗ -0.192 -0.068 0.431∗
(0.334) (0.339) (0.317) (0.229) (0.236) (0.221)
Prior Democracy 7.850∗∗∗ 6.300∗∗∗ 4.606∗∗∗ 5.171∗∗∗ 4.153∗∗∗ 3.038∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.285) (0.284) (0.176) (0.195) (0.197)
Socio-Economic Factors:
Life Expectancy (total in years) 0.049∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.025 0.032∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.017
(0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Population Growth (annual %) -0.060 -0.063 -0.191∗∗∗ -0.049∗ -0.052∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.047) (0.065) (0.028) (0.032) (0.044)
GDP Growth -0.008 0.002 0.014 -0.007 0.000 0.009
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
% Complete Primary Schooling 0.021∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
attained in agegroup 15-999 (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
International Factors:
Affinity to
USA 0.269 -0.093 -1.318∗∗∗ 0.085 -0.254 -0.916∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.393) (0.438) (0.241) (0.263) (0.295)
France 1.455∗∗∗ 0.949∗ -0.509 0.853∗∗∗ 0.572∗ -0.421
(0.457) (0.496) (0.496) (0.306) (0.326) (0.340)
Russia 0.624∗∗ 0.732∗∗ -0.012 0.473∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.202
(0.285) (0.299) (0.325) (0.193) (0.202) (0.220)
Conflict Specific Factors:
Conflict Impact -0.072 -0.068 -0.028 -0.052 -0.053 -0.014
(0.050) (0.054) (0.056) (0.034) (0.037) (0.038)
Number of Armed Conflicts 0.090 -0.142 -0.218∗ 0.076 -0.069 -0.106
(0.133) (0.125) (0.120) (0.088) (0.086) (0.084)
Conflict Duration -0.018 -0.015 -0.006 -0.004 -0.000 0.013
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
% of Bordering States 0.345 0.579∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗ 0.164 0.317∗ 1.044∗∗∗
with Armed Conflict (0.258) (0.260) (0.276) (0.170) (0.172) (0.183)
Anarchy -2.920∗∗∗ 2.014∗∗∗ 3.439∗∗∗ -2.317∗∗∗ 1.173∗∗ 2.291∗∗∗
(1.014) (0.755) (0.755) (0.685) (0.543) (0.566)
Foreign Interruption -3.036∗∗∗ 0.222 0.043 -2.380∗∗∗ 0.054 0.445
(0.992) (1.025) (0.790) (0.685) (0.708) (0.533)
Decade:
1970 -1.295∗∗∗ -0.323 0.991∗∗∗ -0.845∗∗∗ -0.264∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.208) (0.207) (0.133) (0.138) (0.137)
1980 -0.100 1.557∗∗∗ 3.275∗∗∗ -0.183 0.753∗∗∗ 1.818∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.280) (0.292) (0.175) (0.186) (0.193)
1990 1.176∗∗∗ 2.520∗∗∗ 3.783∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 1.273∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.310) (0.322) (0.197) (0.207) (0.214)
2000 1.489∗∗∗ 2.714∗∗∗ 3.808∗∗∗ 0.648∗∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 2.110∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.382) (0.396) (0.236) (0.256) (0.266)
2010 1.581∗∗∗ - - 0.771∗∗∗ - -
(0.393) (0.271)
Number of Observations 5,876 5,480 4,815 same observations used
% of Revolutions 10.50% 10.38% 10.34% as on left side
Adjusted R2 .810 .789 .788 .798 .775 .773
***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
Table 2.6: Regression results using a revolution dummy, decade dummies, country fixed effects
and robust standard errors (below in parentheses)
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Dependent Variable: Pol Index k years later X-Pol Index k years later
k=2 k=5 k=10 k=2 k=5 k=10
Duration of Revolution 0.037∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.019 0.046∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Prior Democracy 7.863∗∗∗ 6.313∗∗∗ 4.600∗∗∗ 5.181∗∗∗ 4.163∗∗∗ 3.036∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.284) (0.283) (0.176) (0.195) (0.197)
Socio-Economic Factors:
Life Expectancy (total in years) 0.050∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.028 0.033∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.019
(0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Population Growth (annual %) -0.062 -0.068 -0.198∗∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.056∗ -0.152∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.047) (0.065) (0.028) (0.032) (0.044)
GDP Growth -0.007 0.003 0.013 -0.006 0.001 0.009
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
% Complete Primary Schooling 0.021∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
attained in agegroup 15-999 (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
International Factors:
Affinity to
USA 0.286 -0.061 -1.318∗∗∗ 0.094 -0.233 -0.911∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.391) (0.435) (0.241) (0.262) (0.293)
France 1.449∗∗∗ 0.928∗ -0.548 0.857∗∗∗ 0.564∗ -0.442
(0.455) (0.493) (0.494) (0.305) (0.323) (0.318)
Russia 0.619∗∗ 0.715∗∗ -0.055 0.476∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.178
(0.286) (0.299) (0.323) (0.194) (0.202) (0.219)
Conflict Specific Factors:
Conflict Impact -0.076 -0.074 -0.023 -0.055 -0.058 -0.013
(0.049) (0.054) (0.056) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037)
Number of Armed Conflicts 0.016 -0.210∗ -0.051 -0.003 -0.142∗ -0.036
(0.116) (0.121) (0.121) (0.077) (0.083) (0.083)
Conflict Duration -0.032∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.012 -0.016 0.002
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
% of Bordering States 0.304 0.516∗∗ 1.626∗∗∗ 0.136 0.273 1.021∗∗∗
with Armed Conflict (0.259) (0.261) (0.276) (0.171) (0.172) (0.183)
Anarchy -2.951∗∗∗ 1.988∗∗∗ 3.537∗∗∗ -2.354∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗ 2.335∗∗∗
(1.006) (0.749) (0.766) (0.680) (0.538) (0.570)
Foreign Interruption -3.028∗∗∗ 0.358 0.387 -2.427∗∗∗ 0.100 0.656
(0.983) (1.011) (0.808) (0.681) (0.697) (0.545)
Decade:
1970 -1.300∗∗∗ -0.322 1.025∗∗∗ -0.853∗∗∗ -0.268∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.208) (0.206) (0.134) (0.138) (0.136)
1980 -0.097 1.576∗∗∗ 3.324∗∗∗ -0.188 0.760∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.279) (0.290) (0.176) (0.185) (0.192)
1990 1.173∗∗∗ 2.539∗∗∗ 3.866∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗ 1.276∗∗∗ 2.166∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.306) (0.319) (0.196) (0.204) (0.212)
2000 1.483∗∗∗ 2.732∗∗∗ 3.894∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 1.346∗∗∗ 2.156∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.376) (0.393) (0.235) (0.251) (0.264)
2010 1.560∗∗∗ - - 0.743∗∗∗ - -
(0.392) (0.270)
Number of Observations 5,876 5,480 4,815 same observations used
% of Revolutions 10.50% 10.38% 10.34% as on left side
Adjusted R2 .810 .790 .788 .798 .775 .773
***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
Table 2.7: Regression results using a duration of revolution variable, decade dummies, country
fixed effects and robust standard errors (below in parentheses)
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for the short and medium run. In this model, sharing strategic interests with the United States
negatively affects the democratic development in the long run.
Two years later countries occupied by foreign powers in the base year obtained significantly lower
levels of democracy than countries in charge of their own government. Those states which, dur-
ing the base year, experienced a state of anarchy obtained a 2.9 lower Pol Index than those
nations which did not. However, apparently “hitting rock bottom” helped in the long run: Five
years later the anarchy cases had recovered and received 2.0 higher Pol Indices than the other
countries. 10 years later the “anarchy” countries even had a 3.4 higher Pol Index. The findings
for anarchy and foreign interruption are particularly interesting in light of the “intervention
debates”. For the countries studied in this model anarchy would (theoretically) be preferable
to foreign interruption with respect to future democratic development. The results for the % of
bordering states with armed conflict point to a “pull towards the global mean”: in the long run,
countries with a high percentage of neighboring states undergoing armed conflict experienced
comparatively high changes towards more democracy.
Once the effect of a revolution’s duration is tested the results remain similar. Experiencing an
additional year of revolutionary conflict still has a positive influence on the level of democracy
in the long run - but now also in the 5 year model. Taking into account the results for the X-Pol
Index it becomes obvious that the models findings are not driven by the endogeneity embedded
in the coding scheme of the Polity2 Index. Rather, there is stability among the results. When
examining the decade dummies we find evidence for the third wave of democratization starting
in the mid-1980s.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of revolutionary conflict on the system of governance using a
panel of 135 countries from 1960-2011. The revolutionary conflicts examined in the panel had
a positive influence on a country’s democratic path. The results are very stable and hold even
when using a truncated democracy measure evaluating only the executive dimension and thus
avoiding the conflict endogeneity problem caused by the Polity IV Project’s coding scheme.
Additionally the model provides strong evidence for a wave of democratization starting around
1980. These findings constitute a first step in building a theory of revolution as a stimulant
for democratization. Developing such a theory and including data from 2012/the Arab Spring
remains an interesting task for further research.
Chapter 3
How (not) to measure democracy
Measures of democracy are regularly employed in the statistical analysis of eco-
nomic, political and social policy. This paper reviews the measures’ setup, strength
and weaknesses across the three most prominent democracy datasets: the PolityIV,
Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data. The measures developed
by the V-Dem project outperform Polity2 and Freedom House Index with respect to
the underlying definition, measurement scale as well as the theoretical justification
of the aggregation procedure. The three indices display a high level of agreement for
those observations included in all three datasets. The most substantial differences be-
tween the indices lie in the indices’ coverage, i.e. in their non-missing observations
(in Polity2 coding, for example, years during which a country is occupied by foreign
powers constitute missing values), the availability of disaggregate data and the above
mentioned key areas. This paper clarifies when to proceed with caution but for the
most part advocates the use of V-Dem in the statistical analysis of democracy.
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3.1 Introduction
The characteristics of a country’s system of governance are essential for the understanding of
basic questions in political science and economics.1 Over the past thirty years systems of gov-
ernance have been measured in several different ways. Numerous studies have demonstrated
that the results vary with the index used.2 Hence, it is of utmost importance to understand
the specific setup of the existing indices before deciding which index to use. This paper fa-
cilitates the decision which index to use when by examining the three most commonly used
democracy datasets: The PolityIV, Freedom House and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data.
The measures developed by the V-Dem project outperform Polity2 and Freedom House Index
(FHI) with respect to the underlying definition, measurement scale as well as the theoretical
justification of the aggregation procedure. This article illustrates under which circumstances the
three democracy measures code countries dis-/similarly and points out those frameworks under
which certain measures can/should not be employed.
The question of how to correctly quantify a state’s system of governance for statistical analyses
has been a highly contested subject in applied political and economic research.3 The discussion
in todays literature evolves around three central questions:4
1. Definition: along which components should a system of governance be defined?
2. Measurement: how to quantify these components and
3. Aggregation: how to combine them into a single index of democracy?
There is no consensus in current literature on any of these questions. Due to the multi-facetted
nature of the concepts “system of governance” or “democracy” a one-size-fits-all answer to the
first question is unlikely to exist.5 The characteristics of a system of governance relevant for
a study vary with the research question at hand. This has led to the creation of numerous
distinct democracy indices.6 Most of the democracy indices used in the empirical literature
rely on different definitions of democracy. They capture different aspects of a state’s authority
and decision finding structure. Several papers exist examining the strength and weaknesses of
democracy measures.7
The suitability8 of a democracy measure for a given statistical application depends on the re-
search framework. However, its internal validity and reliability can be examined independently.
1Hence, they have been frequently examined, for example by Acemoglu et al. (2014), Franco et al. (2004),
Przeworski et al. (2000).
2For example Bogaards (2010); Bollen (1980); Bollen and Jackman (1985), and Bollen and Jackman (1989);
Casper and Tufis (2003); Cheibub et al. (2010); Elkins (2000); Treier and Jackman (2008).
3Boix et al. (2013), give a detailed overview of the current debates on measuring democracy, Table 1, pp.1526.
Please refer to their paper for a more detailed listing of all available comments to the debate. This paper focuses
on the contributions concerning Polity2, Freedom House and the V-Dem indices.
4Compare Munck and Verkuilen (2002), Table 2, p. 8; Boix et al. (2013), pp. 1525; Coppedge et al. (2011),
p.248.
5Crick (2002), p.1, for example argues that the term ”democracy” might be impossible to define “because the
very definition carries a different social, moral or political agenda.”
6Munck and Verkuilen (2002), Table 1, p. 6, and Table 3, p.10, present a detailed lists of available indices.
7For example Cheibub et al. (2010); Coppedge et al. (2008); Coppedge et al. (2011); Coppedge et al. (2017b);
Elkins (2000); Gleditsch and Ward (1997); Ho¨gstro¨m (2013);Knutsen (2010); Munck and Verkuilen (2002); Munck
(2009); or Treier and Jackman (2008).
8Suitability here refers to whether the measurement level and the democracy definition are appropriate for the
given analysis.
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The question “does the democracy measure capture what it is supposed to?” is generally referred
to as the concept of validity. Note, that the “what it is supposed to measure”-part varies with
the underlying definition of each democracy measure. “How well/ how precise does the democ-
racy index measure what it is supposed to?” on the other hand refers to an index’s reliability.9
The two concepts are, by definition, highly interlaced. So how to assess and compare the validity
and the reliability of existing democracy measures? Both, validity and reliability, depend on
the underlying definition and measurement level, the data collection and aggregation procedure.
Consequently, these are the central quality criterions this paper will examine for Polity2, FHI
as well as for the V-Dem indices, in particular for their Electoral Democracy Index, Polyarchy.
Evaluating its implicit assumptions and definitions as well as their implications for statistical
analyses is crucial for choosing an appropriate democracy measure. To understand the concep-
tual differences underlying the definition and setup of the democracy measures each of the three
central questions stated above will be briefly summarized in the remainder of this section.
3.1.1 Definition of democracy
In current debates on measures quantifying of systems of governance (“democracy indices”) it
has become the norm to use the term ‘democracy’ pars pro toto, i.e. synonymously to “system
of governance”. This paper follows this convention. Nevertheless, from a theoretical point of
view it is important to acknowledge that the democracy indices are in fact measuring observed
levels of authority patterns or systems of governance. The word ’observed’ is key here: following
Dahl (1971), Goertz (2006) and Treier and Jackman (2008) this paper distinguishes between
the concept of democracy as a theoretical construct and its actual observable manifestations,
i.e. democracy is viewed as a latent, continuous quantity. A democracy measure’s validity
therefore can be thought of in terms of concept-measure consistency. To obtain a valid measure
of democracy, the well-defined concept should drive the methodology.10 A consequence of this
latency is the uncertainty/noise in coding of the empirical measures.11 In addition to noise in
the measures coding due to the latency of democracy several studies, such as Bollen (1993),
Bollen and Paxton (2000) or Elff and Ziaja (2018), show that method factors (i.e. coder-specific
systematic biases in each dataset) can provide further sources of uncertainty in democracy mea-
sures. To avoid false inference a precise definition of the concept of democracy12 guiding the
methodological construction of the empirical index is essential. Following Goertz (2006) and
Dahl (1971) perfect democracy and autocracy can be thought of as the poles between which a
continuum of polyarchies/authority patterns/systems of governance unfolds.
Even on a conceptual level the question of how to conceptualize a system of governance is an
entire field of research.13 Schumpeter’s minimalist definition14 captures the core trait of an in-
stitutional definition of democracy: a regime holding contested elections - contestation
and participation.15 It is worth noting, that these two democratic principles are complements:
a country cannot be considered democratic if there is full participation, but no contestation and
9For a discussion of validity and reliability see, for example, Coppedge et al. (2017b), pp.16; and Munck (2009),
pp. 23.
10See Goertz (2006), p.11.
11Treier and Jackman (2008) show this for the Polity index and Høyland et al. (2012) show it for index rankings
using (among others) the FHI.
12The point cannot be stressed enough that this precise definition of the concept might vary with application.
13See for example Schmitter and Karl (1991); Crick (2002); Huntington (1993), pp.5; Diamond (1999), pp. 7;
or Dahl (1971), chapter 1.
14“(...) the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” Schumpeter
(1976 [1942]), p.269.
15Participation here is used in an inclusiveness/suffrage sense.
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vice versa.
The central criticism of this minimalist institutional definition is that by acknowledging only the
electoral dimension other defining components of democracy are ignored.16 Instead of defining
democracy institutionally Dahl (1971) goes back to the word’s greek origin.17 He takes a sub-
stantive approach and views popular control over collective decision making as well as
political equality as core elements of democracy.18 He recognizes that to realize this demo-
cratic principle of popular rule and political equality a number of institutional guarantees have
to be met. These institutional guarantees are a necessary (not sufficient!) condition to ensure
the implementation of the two core institutional democracy traits of contestation and partici-
pation. In that sense there cannot be a democratic regime without holding contested elections
but at the same time not all regimes holding contested elections classify as democracies.19
On a conceptual level, a distinction between de facto and de jure attributes of a polity can be
made. This paper regards the formal institutional setup of a polity as its de jure framework.
Observable policy outcomes on the other hand constitute de facto elements. This concept of
de facto encompasses the way the institutions operate in practice as well as the performance
and practices generated by the actors in the system.20 Political violence carried out by non-
governmental actors for example can be an byproduct of the “institutional output” unintended
by the system’s setup and consequently be part of the de facto reality.
Lastly, it is not enough to identify components to include in a definition of democracy. The
theoretical relations of these components with each other need to be taken into account. Only
once a logical structure between these elements is established they can be aggregated into a
measure of democracy in a meaningful way.21 Not ordering the elements vertically by their level
of abstraction gives rise to problems of redundancy and conflation (joining elements which are
symptoms of distinct overarching attributes).22
3.1.2 Measurement Scale of the Democracy Measure
The question how to quantify the components and on what kind of scale to map the empiri-
cal distribution of cases should also be determined by the concept behind the measure. Most
polychotomous democracy indices, such as Polity2 or FHI, are coded on a nominal or ordinal
scale. However, in empirical research these indices are often treated as if they were coded on an
interval scale even though there is no numerical relationship between the categories. Doing so
implies that the differences between the values have a meaningful interpretation. This is a major
point of criticism of several of the polychotomous indices.23 While the definition and aggregation
procedure of the V-Dem democracy indices24 permits using them as quasi continuous measures,
16See, for example, Diamond (1999), p.9; Mainwaring et al. (2007), p.128; Schmitter and Karl (1991), p. 78.
17“δηµoκρατ ι´α” is a compound of δη˜µoσ - the comon people, citizens and κρα´τoσ - rule; thus literally meaning
“rule of the people”.
18See Dahl (1971), p.1.
19See Cheibub et al. (2010), p. 72.
20An anonymous referee’s comments were very helpful in substantiating this definition and are very much
appreciated.
21Munck and Verkuilen (2002) p. 13, provide an overview of such a logical organization of elements.
22Munck and Verkuilen (2002), for example, point out that the Polity IV Data’s aggregation rule suffers from
a redundancy problem, p.13.
23See for example Gleditsch and Ward (1997), p. 380, point 1; Cheibub et al. (2010), p. 75 (FHI), p. 76 (Polity
Index); Boix et al. (2013), p. 1529.
24They are aggregated using a mixture of Bayesian item response theory measurement models, addition and
multiplication (see section Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset).
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1. Data Collection Process: type of information used
• clear and transparent rules for the collection of information
• public availability of disaggregate data
• sources: subjective evaluations vs. objective facts
2. Aggregation Rule: how information is aggregated and weighted
• choice of level of aggregation
• capture of underlying theory (reflecting an accepted definition of democracy) in the
aggregation rule
• Provision and justification of the aggregation rule
- substitutability vs. complementary relations
- factoranalysis or principal component analysis
- addition, multiplication
- openness to further tests
Table 3.1: The principles of aggregation
this is not the case for Polity2 and FHI. Polity2 is defined on a scale which is not even ordinal,25
and differences between categories have no meaningful interpretation. One specific FHI score
can be the result of a variety of different underlying factors. The Freedom House aggregation
procedure using equal weighing and collapsing further contributes to its final measurement scale
at best being ordinal.
Concept-measure consistency is also essential in terms of the scale’s end points. Whether a
democracy index can take on top- or bottom values should be determined by whether the con-
cept of democracy allows for perfect democracy and autocracy endpoints. Assuming a continuous
concept the ends of the conceptual scale can be thought of as unreachable poles (one can get
infinitely close to but never reach them). Fixed endpoints imply that one believes in a state
of perfect autocracy/democracy. From the empirical point of view there is a disadvantage to
attainable top- and bottom values which becomes obvious with long time series. For example,
the increased number of democracies in the system of states after the end of the Cold War made
it impossible to examine “the societal dynamics associated with the consolidation and mainte-
nance of democratic authority patterns”26 within these states using the Polity Coding Scheme.
3.1.3 Collection, Aggregation and Weighing of Components
The question of how to adequately collect, weigh and aggregate components has been subject to
much debate.27 The most important discussion points are displayed in Figure 3.1. The validity
and reliability of a measure increase the more adequately these points are adressed.
25See section Polity Index. Cases of interregnum/anarchy, for example, are coded as 0 - the “middle” of perfect
democracy and perfect autocracy.
26See Marshall et al. (2017a), p.10.
27See for example Cheibub et al. (2010), pp 74;Coppedge et al. (2011), pp. 250; Boix et al. (2013) p. 1530;
Knutsen (2011), pp. 83; Munck and Verkuilen (2002), pp. 22.
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The first principle of aggregation acknowledges the fact that the type of information captured
in the disaggregated data is essential.28 Several democracy measures are based on components
coded using subjective inferences “and perhaps even guesses”, Cheibub et al. (2010), p. 77. In-
cluding of subjective evaluations reduces replicability and increases measurement error, but due
to democracy being a social construct a limitation to formal (and better quantifyable) indicators
leads to lower validity.29 Replicability is a key feature for a useful democracy measure. Hence,
clear and transparent rules for the information collection process and public availability of dis-
aggregate data should be considered crucial.30 This point has not been adequately addressed
by many of the existing indices, e.g. the FHI, and consequently has been frequently criticised.31
The second principle of aggregation concerns the Aggregation Rule, i.e. how the disaggregate
information is weighted and aggregated. First, a suitable level of aggregation should be deter-
mined.32 While a high level of aggregation (aggregating all components and indicators into one
democracy index) is appealing for the use of a democracy index in empirical calculations it also
entails loss of complexity, information and validity.33 Second, the underlying theory (reflecting
an accepted definition of democracy)34 should be captured in the aggregation rule.35 Third, to
increase replicability the aggregation rule should be provided and justified.36 This entails for
example a justification of choice of relation between the components: are they substitutes or
complements? A non-arbritrary aggregation rule justifies its use of addition or multiplication of
components or even the use of factor or principal component analyses. And, last but not least,
it is open to further examinations.37
Democracy as a political concept is inherently difficult to define and to capture in a quantitative
way. Yet, this paper demonstrates that the V-Dem project succeeded in constructing quanti-
tative measures excelling in the key areas mentioned above. The goal of this paper is thus to
provide a thorough overview of relevant issues to consider when choosing a democracy measure
for a statistical application. It seeks to give the reader an understanding of the differences,
weaknesses and strengths of the three democracy datasets.
The following three points distinguish this article from the existing literature comparing democ-
racy measures and their performance:
1. It is up to date: includes a discussion of the V-Dem indices which only became available
in 2014
2. It shows that the biggest differences between the democracy measures lie in their coverage,
their underlying definition, measurement scale, the justification of their aggregation pro-
cedure as well as the availability of disaggregate data and explains under which conditions
certain measures can/should not be used.
3. Gathering this information in one article reduces the search cost for scholars working with
democracy measures.
28Cf. Cheibub et al. (2010), p. 74.
29Cf. Knutsen (2011), p. 84.
30Cf. Cheibub et al. (2010), p. 74; Munck and Verkuilen (2002), Munck and Verkuilen (2002), p. 25 & 26.
31For example by Cheibub et al. (2010), pp. 75, or Munck and Verkuilen (2002), Munck and Verkuilen (2002),
p. 25.
32Cf. Munck and Verkuilen (2002), p. 23.
33Cf. Munck and Verkuilen (2002), p. 22.
34Cf. Coppedge et al. (2011), p. 250.
35Cf. Knutsen (2011) p. 83.
36See also Munck and Verkuilen (2002).
37Cf. Munck and Verkuilen (2002), p. 25.
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Index Definition Availability N Range Aggregation rule Advantages Disadvantages
includes from to
Freedom House Subjective 1972 2016 209 1 (highest) Addition, ranking - Covers a variety of - Maximalist (subjective)
Index lists of civil to 7 (lowest) (including democratic features democracy definition
liberties and collapsing variation) (civil liberties and - Definition changed over time
political rights and averaging political rights) - Aggregation rule without
justification
- Measurement problems
- Disaggregate data not
publicly available
- Unclear distinction between
de facto and de jure
aspects of a
polity and their
influence in the
democracy measures
Polity2 Index Contestation 1800 2016 195 -10 (lowest) Combination of - Broad temporal - No theory behind
of offices, to 10 (highest) weighing and & spatial scope aggregation rule
constitutional addition - Detailed coding - Definition: omission
constraints on rules of suffrage/any
head of state - Disaggregate data participation
publicly available - Factionalism categorization
- 0 coding for interregnum
- Missing values for
foreign interruption
V-Dem Electoral , 1900 2016 177 0 (lowest) Mixture of - Broad temporal - Unclear distinction between
Democracy liberal, to 1 (highest) Bayesian item & spatial scope de facto and de jure
Indices egalitarian, response theory - Weakest link argument aspects of a
deliberative, measurement included in aggregation polity and their
and models, addition procedure influence in the
participatory and multiplication - Theoretical justification democracy measures
dimension of aggregation rules
- Bridge- and Lateral-
coding
- Disaggregate data
publicly available
- Public discussion of
measurement error
- Ordinal versions of all
variables offered
in addition
N = number of countries/territories coded. Range: (lowest/highest) refers to the lowest/highest possible level of democracy
Table 3.2: Overview of the democracy measures analyzed in this paper
3.2 Democracy Indices
The number of existing democracy indices is too vast to give a detailed overview in one paper.38
Some indices, such as the V-Dem indices are available in country-event format. For the sake
of increased comparability among indices and the usability in classic time-series cross-country
studies this paper focuses on data in country-year format. Table 3.2 summarizes the three main
democracy measures discussed in this section. It displays the measurement scale, the democracy
definition, the measure’s temporal and geographical scope, its’ range, aggregation rule as well
as its’ strengths and weaknesses.
3.2.1 Polity Index
Due to its broad chronological (1800 - 2016) and geographical scope (195 countries) the Polity
Index is one of the most frequently used democracy indices in current research. When it was
first introduced in 1975 it constituted one of the first major attempts to quantify authority
patterns on a global scale over an extended period of time. These first codings were based on
the detailed theories of authority patterns put forward by Eckstein (1973) and Gurr (1974). The
first Polity data was coded with the explicit objective of answering the question whether “the
durability (persistence and adaptability) of political systems depends at all upon the nature of
their structures of political authority”.39 Said structures of political authority, i.e. the institu-
tional framework therefore form the core of the Polity Index.
38For a quick overview please refer to Coppedge et al. (2017b), Table 1; Munck (2009), Table 4.2 or Pemstein
et al. (2010), Table 1.
39See Gurr (1974), p.1482.
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Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment XRCOMP contestation
Openness of Executive Recruitment XROPEN contestation
Constraint on Chief Executive XCONST institutional constraints
Competitiveness of Political Participation PARCOMP contestation
Regulation of participation PARREG contestation
Table 3.3: Components of the Polity Index and the democratic concepts they capture
Today the data is assembled by researchers from the Polity IV Project40 at the Center for Sys-
temic Peace. The most recent version of data available is the Polity IV Dataset Version 2016,
Marshall et al. (2017b).41
The Polity Index ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) and is cal-
culated by subtracting a measure of autocracy (Autoc) from a measure of institutionalized
democracy (Democ): Polity = Democ−Autoc. Both indices, Democ and Autoc, range from 0
to 10. They are made up of scores of five different components reflecting the polity’s executive
recruitment (XRCOMP42 and XROPEN43), its’ constitutional constraints (XCONST44) and its’
political participation (PARCOMP45 and PARREG46) as presented in Figure 3.3.
Note that theses components capture the people’s participation only with respect to partici-
pation in the political process, but no suffrage requirement is included. Hence “participation”
as used by the Polity Project is not equal to the use of the term in the debates on measur-
ing democracy. Rather the participation components evaluate the extent to which oppositional
political activity is possible and regulated. The Polity Index is in fact a measure of political
contestation rather than democracy - even if one embraces the minimalist democracy definition
with contestation and participation.47
Figure 3.4 depicts the aggregation rule of Polity and the weighing scheme for Democ and Autoc.
A country-year receives a score (scale weight) for each component. The points scored for Autoc
are subtracted from the Democ index to obtain the Polity Index. Aside from a vague theory
(explaining the “logic of institutionalized democracy and autocracy”, Marshall et al. (2017a),
p. 15 and p. 16), there is no justification given for the weighing and aggregation rule. Each
of the component variables (XRCOMP, XROPEN, XCONST, PARCOMP, PARREG) is coded
using three or more categories. However, not all of the categories are taken into account when
calculating the democ/autoc and consequently the Polity Index. In a thorough examination
of the Polity aggregation procedure Goertz (2006) shows that the Polity Index suffers from
40More information on the PolityIV Project is available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.
html.
41Two types of datasets are offered: Polity IV Dataset in country-year format and the Polity IVd Dataset,
where “d” denotes the country-date format.
42“Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal oppor-
tunities to become superordinates”, Marshall et al. (2017a), p. 21.
43“Recruitment of the chief executive is “open” to the extent that all the politically active population has an
opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process”, Marshall et al. (2017a), p. 22.
44 “(...) the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decisionmaking powers of chief executives, whether
individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any “accountability groups.” (...) The concern
is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. ”, Marshall
et al. (2017a), p. 24.
45“(...) the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political
arena.”, Marshall et al. (2017a), p. 26.
46“Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political
preferences are expressed.”, Marshall et al. (2017a), p. 25.
47In the Appendix a factor analysis of the Polity Index’ components is presented. It shows that the variation
in the components can be explained by one latent factor - political contestation.
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A = Autoc,A < 0;D = Democ
Polity = Democ+Autoc
Authority Coding: Scale Weight Counted in...
Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP):
(1) Selection -2 A
(2) Transitional +1 D
(3) Election +2 D
Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN):
for DEMOC: only coded if XRCOMP is Election (3) or Transitional (2)
for AUTOC: only coded if XRCOMP is coded Selection (1)
(1) Closed -1 A
(2) Dual/designation -1 A
(3) Dual/election +1 D
(4) Election +1 D
Constraint on Chief Executive (XCONST):
(1) Unlimited authority -3 A
(2) Intermediate category -2 A
(3) Slight to moderate limitations -1 A
(4) Intermediate category +1 D
(5) Substantial limitations +2 D
(6) Intermediate category +3 D
(7) Executive parity or subordination +4 D
Competitiveness of Political Participation (PARCOMP):
(0) Not Applicable not counted in democ/autoc
(1) Repressed -2 A
(2) Suppressed -1 A
(3) Factional +1 D
(4) Transitional +2 D
(5) Competitive +3 D
Regulation of participation (PARREG): AUTOC ONLY
(1) Unregulated not counted in democ/autoc
(2) Multiple Identity not counted in democ/autoc
(3) Sectarian -1 A
(4) Restricted -2 A
(5) Regulated not counted in democ/autoc
Table 3.4: Aggregation Rule of the Polity Index. Source: Polity IV Dataset Users’ Manual,
Marshall et al. (2017a), p.15, 16 and 26
concept-measure inconsistency, i.e. the measure does not capture what the underlying concept
of democracy very well.
Since the idea behind Polity was to quantify institutional frameworks it reached the limits of
its domain in cases where there was no regular institutional setup. Years in which a country’s
central political authority is collapsed are considered as an interregnum period and coded “-77”
on Democ, Autoc and Polity. Years in which central authority is taken over by foreign powers
are considered interruption periods and coded “-66” for each index. During transition periods
in which “new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect”48 the indices
receive a “-88” coding. Of 17,228 observations in the Dataset Version 2016, this is the case for
772 observations, i.e. around 4.5% of the observations. These three categories limit the use of
the Polity Index in empirical research. To integrate these cases into the Polity scheme and make
48Marshall et al. (2017a), p. 19.
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them accessible for quantitative studies the Polity IV Project introduced Polity2. It is defined
as follows:
Polity2 :=

Polity Index, if Polity Index ∈ [−10, 10]
missing value, if Polity Index = −66 (foreign interruption)
0, if Polity Index = −77 (interregnum)
prorated across transition, if Polity Index = −88 (transition)
Even though this definition enables the inclusion of transition and interregnum cases in time
series and cross section models it creates a range of problems: First, the foreign interruption
observations are still missing. In the Dataset Version 2016 there are 233 such cases, i.e. 1.3%
of all observations. Depending on the goals of the research at hand, especially when examining
democratic transtitions/autocratic backsliding or democracy and civil conflict, these missing
cases are of particular interest. Second, a Polity2 value of “0” can occur in three different
cases.49 The most intuitive one is if a country’s Autoc score equals its Democ score as it does
for example in the case of Albania in 1996. The second reason why a country might be assigned
a Polity2 value of “0” in a given year is a transition period. If a country is undergoing such a
transition its Polity2 value is prorated across the time span of the transition. For example, if it
has a transition year in 1990 and index values of “-2” in 1989 and “2” in 1991, then 1990 will
be assigned a “0”. Both of these codings are still somewhat suitable for empirical research since
the differences between the Polity2 values remain meaningful. However, this is not true for the
third case in which a country might be assigned a value of “0”. In years in which a total collapse
of central political authority occurs the country is assigned a Polity2 value of “0”. The civil war
in Afghanistan, 1992 - 1995, is an example for such a case of “anarchy”. The meaning behind
this particular “0” is rather different from the others and it renders differences between Polity2
values impossible to interpret. This “0-coding” hence affects the measurement scale: Polity2 is
coded on a nominal (not even an ordinal!) scale limiting the usability of Polity2 in econometric
models (at least if the “0-coding” is maintained).
In the Polity III Data (a predecessor of the Polity IV Dataset) some categories of the compo-
nents on competition (PARCOMP) and regulation of political participation (PARREG) were
defined with explicit reference to conflict.50 Hence, countries experiencing severe civil conflict
were highly unlikely to be classified as high/low democracies. Rather they were categorized as
semi-democracies/anocracies leading to a number of studies51 examining why semi-democracies
seemed to be more prone to conflict than “pure” democracies/autocracies. Being aware of this
point of criticism the Polity IV Project removed the explicit references from the definitions of the
components.52 However, even though the categories do not include the explicit reference any-
more, they still capture the concept of a country undergoing conflict.53 Due to the categorization
of interregnum, interruption and transitions as described above and this coding problematic the
aggregate Polity2 should not be used in research on civil conflict.
49Gleditsch and Ward criticised a similar point, namely that each Polity Index value can be achieved by a large
number of different scores in the components and thus reflecting quite different polities in Gleditsch and Ward
(1997).
50PARCOMP, categories (0 - unregulated) and (1 - factional) were coded with reference to civil war and violent
conflict in the Polity IIId Data. Similarly, PARREG category (factional/restricted) exhibited the same problem,
see Vreeland (2008), p. 406.
51Some of the most notable ones are Hegre (2001); Vreeland (2008); Fearon and Laitin (2003), pp. 84.
52See Marshall et al. (2017a), pp. 25.
53See for example the definition of PARCOMP’s category (3 - factional competition): “Polities with parochial
or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist
agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.”, Marshall et al.
(2017a), p. 27.
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One of the strongest advantages of the Polity IV Dataset is the availability of the disaggregate
data.54 This enables the breakdown of Polity2 into its components. Once the issues mentioned
above (factionalism, missing interruption values etc.) are adequately adressed the components
can be reassembled to form a measure of political contestation that (while still not continuous)
can be employed in certain empirical models.
3.2.2 Freedom House
Freedom House is a US-based non-governmental organization dedicated to the promotion of
freedom and democracy worldwide. Founded in 1941 in the midst of WWII it has significantly
amplified it’s sphere of operation and influence with the publication of annual “Freedom in the
World” reports since 1973. The reports are based on annual surveys of global political rights
and civil liberties. The survey data is available for 209 countries and territories from 1972 to
2016. With 209 countries covered FHI is the most inclusive of the three measures studied. The
first reports and ratings were single-authored by Raymond Gastil, who argued in Inkeles (1991):
“By working alone the author has not had to integrate the judgments of a variety of people.
The hunches and impressions that are so important in a survey of this kind would be almost
impossible to keep on the same wave lengths if one had an Asianist, Africanist, and Latin Amer-
icanist to satisfy before the ratings were finalized for each year”.55 While today the reports are
produced by a team of “external analysts”56, the checklist question framework introduced by
Gastil and its inherent subjectivity remains. The FHI is not built upon any theoretical concept
of democracy or freedom, rather it is a country comparison of an undefined concept of “freedom”
based upon said “hunches and impressions”. Bush (2017) shows that these impressions corre-
spond to a large degree to the US elite’s perception of other countries systems of governance and
hence proposes taking FHI as a measure of such.57 The remainder of this section will further
illustrate this by providing a short overview of the components and aggregation procedure as
well as the most prominent points of criticism.58
The Freedom in the World Index (FHI) evaluates the freedom concept along two dimensions:
freedom of political rights and civil liberties. It is assembled in three steps. First, the Free-
dom House coders award from 0 (smallest) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom) points/scores to
27 questions. 12 of these questions regard the political rights dimension while the remaining
15 questions address the implementation of civil liberties.59 Instead of four clear cut possible
answer categories (0 - 4 points are rewarded) for each of these questions a number of subques-
tions are given to clarify the concept. The disaggregate data is not publicly available, hence
there is no way of knowing or replicating how a country achieved a certain score or of testing
the implications of the aggregation rule.60
In a second step, depending on the sum of scores obtained in the political rights and civil lib-
erties components a rating is assigned. The scores to rating conversion for both components is
presented in Table 3.5 for the Political Rights Index.61 The conversion for the Civil Liberties
54Also noted by Munck and Verkuilen (2002), p.20.
55See Inkeles (1991), p. 22.
56See Freedom House (2017a).
57See Bush (2017), p.725.
58Since these points of criticism are plenty but the number of pages is not, the critiques are discussed briefly
and the interested reader is asked to refer to the corresponding articles for further information.
59The Appendix provides a table displaying the concrete questions and respective scores.
60This has been frequently criticised, for example by Munck and Verkuilen (2002), p. 25; Munck (2009), p. 29;
Cheibub et al. (2010), p. 75.
61Note, that while Table 3.5 depicts 0 as the minimum score a country can be given “It is possible for a country’s
or territory’s total political rights score to be less than zero (between -1 and -4) if it receives mostly or all zeros for
26 CHAPTER 3. HOW (NOT) TO MEASURE DEMOCRACY
Total Scores Political Rights Rating
36 - 40 1 Greatest range of political rights implemented
30 - 35 2 Intermediate category (between 1 and 3)
24 - 29 3 Countries and territories with a rating of 3, 4, or 5 either moderately protect
almost all political rights or strongly protect some political rights while
neglecting others. The same factors that undermine freedom in countries
with a rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of
3, 4, or 5, but to a greater extent at each successive rating.
18 - 23 4
12 - 17 5
6 - 11 6 Intermediate category (between 5 and 7)
0 - 5 7 Few or no political rights (...) sometimes in combination with civil war
Table 3.5: Score to rating conversion for the Political Rights Index, Source: Freedom House
(2017b)
is carried out analogously. It is worth noting, that (due to the high number of possible ways of
obtaining a certain score rating) each of the seven categories captures numerous countries with
very distinct political rights and civil liberties.
In a third step the political rights and civil liberties ratings are averaged to form the freedom
rating. It ranges between 1 and 7. This rating is used to categorize the countries into three
groups: Free (rating between 1 - 2.5), Partly Free (rating between 3 - 5) and Not Free (rating
between 5 - 7). As mentioned above, each of the seven categories contains a wide range of coun-
tries with politically very different environments. Further categorizing them into three groups
inherently continues disguising this variation.62
One of the most criticised aspects of the Freedom House data is the compilation of components
by means of checklist questions without a theoretical justification. This is problematic in several
ways: First, the components are not ordered by level of abstraction and the relationship between
the components is not considered. This gives rise to the problem of conflation63 as criticised
by Munck and Verkuilen (2002), p. 14.; Coppedge et al. (2011), rightfully observe that “the
high inter-correlations of the Freedom House indicators coupled with their ambiguous coding
procedures suggest that these components may not be entirely independent of one another”.64
Second, as mentioned above there are no clear cut answers for the checklist questions. Since the
questions are formulated in a way as to capture highly subjective features (e.g. “Are the elec-
toral laws and framework fair?”) the lack of clear answers transmits this problem of subjectivity
further into the data. This was, for example, criticised by Cheibub et al. (2010), p. 75.
each of the 10 political rights questions and it receives a sufficiently negative score for political rights discretionary
question B. In such a case, it would still receive a final political rights rating of 7”, Freedom House (2017b). The
discretionary political rights questions (see Appendix) reduce the political rights scores without a clear rule of
application thus contributing to a further subjective bias in the data.
62“For example, those at the lowest end of the Free category (2 in political rights and 3 in civil liberties, or 3
in political rights and 2 in civil liberties) differ from those at the upper end of the Free group (1 for both political
rights and civil liberties). Also, a designation of Free does not mean that a country or territory enjoys perfect
freedom or lacks serious problems, only that it enjoys comparatively more freedom than those rated Partly Free
or Not Free (and some others rated Free)”, Freedom House (2017b).
63See section Definition of democracy.
64See Coppedge et al. (2011), p. 251.
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Another point of concern is the inappropriate aggregation rule of addition - equal weighing.
Asigning equal weights to each question asked/concept contained is disputable in light of their
content. This aggregation rule does not capture the complementarity of the concepts participa-
tion and contestation. Furthermore, it does not view them necessary conditions for a democ-
racy.65 It is also noteworthy that the measurement scale is neither continuous nor ordinal, it is
at best categorical.66
There is also concern with respect to the usage of the FHI in a time series context. A number of
studies have exposed an ideological bias in the Freedom House Data: Bollen and Paxton (2000),
p. 77, for example find evidence for a systematic downrating of Marxist-Leninist countries,
especially in Freedom House’s early years and abating around the mid 1980s. In addition, in
some years the coding rules are altered from one year to the next and previous years are not
updated. Cheibub et al. (2010), p. 75, and Munck (2009), p. 148 (footnote 15) observe that
hence, the use of Freedom House Data in a time series context is hardly justifiable.
The problem of subjectivity is also inherent in the coding of the time series. Freedom House
states: “the scores from the previous edition are used as a benchmark for the current year under
review. A score is typically changed only if there has been a real-world development during
the year that warrants a decline or improvement (e.g., a crackdown on the media, the country’s
first free and fair elections), though gradual changes in conditions, in the absence of a signal
event, are occasionally registered in the scores”.67 This benchmarking can potentially lead to
the transmission of a subjective coding bias over long periods of time.
In conclusion, Freedom House Data should be used in statistical analyses with extreme caution.
The Dataset “by Freedom House (...) exemplifys problems in all three areas of conceptualiza-
tion, measurement, and aggregation”, Munck and Verkuilen (2002), p. 28.
3.2.3 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset
The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset is assembled by a cooperation of over 50 scholars
from all over the world, co-hosted by the Department of Political Science at the University of
Gothenburg, Sweden, and the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame, USA. Several
of the scholars involved in the evolution of the V-Dem Dataset have contibuted to the literature
on democracy measurement long before the V-Dem came to life (for example Michael Coppedge,
Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell or Pamela Paxton to name a few). They were well aware of the
ongoing debate about the definition, scaling and aggregation of existing democracy measures.
As a result the V-Dem Dataset provides answers to several of the problems discussed in the
first section and is probably the most stringent and transparent Dataset on democracy available
today.
A first version of the dataset was introduced in Lindberg et al. (2014). The most recent version
of data (the one used in this paper) is Version 7.1, Coppedge et al. (2017d) The data is available
in country-year as well as in country-date format.
Numerous country experts, coordinators and research assistants code basic variables capturing
distinct features of a democratic system.68 The variables are distinguished by type: type A vari-
65As criticised by Munck and Verkuilen (2002) p. 25; Munck (2009), p. 50 - 51.
66See Cheibub et al. (2010), p. 75.
67See Freedom House (2017b).
68For more information on the variable types and coding procedure please refer to Coppedge et al. (2017a) pp.
36.
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ables are “based on extant sources and (...) factual in nature”69 while type B and C variables
are coded by country coordinators and experts. Type B variables are more factual items than
C and do not contain as much judgment. Type C variables on the other hand require a greater
amount of judgment and country specific knowledge, such as language and state of affairs. The
question of how to aggregate variables coded by multiple experts into a single “best estimate”
for each variable is quite important in this context (for example when some of the expert coded
questions are coded on an ordinal scale). Most of the (C) variables are based on questions with
answers on an ordinal scale and are thus aggregated across coders using Bayesian item response
theory models.70 Once the basic variables are aggregated into indices they are assigned type D.71
One of the main qualities distinguishing the V-Dem Dataset from others is their definition and
conceptualization of democracy: V-Dem acknowledges the fact that a democracy measure’s va-
lidity/its concept-measure consistency hinges on the proper definition of the underlying concept.
Given the multi-faceted nature of the concept of democracy, they provide disaggregate data. This
gives empirical scholars the opportunity to construct democracy measures based upon concepts
defined as needed in particular research frameworks. As a potential starting point, they propose
considering democracy as a multidimensional concept consisting of the following five distinct
dimensions:
1. The electoral dimension72
2. The participatory dimension73
3. The egalitarian dimension74
4. The deliberative dimension75
5. The liberal dimension76
In addition, V-Dem also recognizes the importance of an aggregation procedure reflecting the
theoretical relationships between the concept’s attributes for concept-measure consistency. Low
level indices (D-type) in the V-Dem Dataset are combined into several mid-level indices, which
in turn are then aggregated into high level indices reflecting these five dimensions of democracy.
In this aggregation process issues of complementarity/substitutability or family resemblance
between these dimensions are addressed. In the V-Dem definition of democracy, the electoral
dimension is circled out as the core element without which no country shall be labelled demo-
cratic.77 Hence, the Electoral Democracy Index is combined with the high level indices of
69See Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 36.
70The measurement models are described in detail in Coppedge et al. (2017e), pp. 29. Marquardt and Pemstein
(2018), further discuss item response theory models and compare their performance.
71More detailed information on the variable types can be found in Coppedge et al. (2017e), p. 17 - 18.
72“(...) embodies the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens through competition for the approval of
a broad electorate during periodic elections”, Lindberg et al. (2014), p. 160.
73“(...) embodies the values of direct rule and active participation by citizens in all political processes; it
emphasizes nonelectoral forms of political participation such as through civil society organizations and mechanisms
of direct democracy.”, Lindberg et al. (2014), p. 160.
74“(...) holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual exercise of formal rights and liberties;
hence a more equal distribution of resources, education, and health across socioeconomic groups should enhance
political equality.”, Lindberg et al. (2014), p. 161.
75“(...) enshrines the core value that political decisions in pursuit of the public good should be informed by
respectful and reasonable dialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial
interests, or coercion.”, Lindberg et al. (2014), p. 160.
76“(...) embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual and minority rights against a potential “tyranny of
the majority.” This is achieved through constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, and effective
checks and balances that limit the use of executive power.” , Lindberg et al. (2014), p. 160.
77See Lindberg et al. (2014), p. 161.
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Figure 3.1: Aggregation process for high level V-Dem Indices
dimensions 2 - 5 to create four indices of democracy.78 These five indices are considered to
embody the “varieties of democracy” (V-Dem).
Detailed information regarding V-Dem disaggregate data is given in the V-Dem Codebook,
Coppedge et al. (2017a). The basic A,B,C-type variables are aggregated into low level indices
(D-type), for example by “adding a denominator (e.g., per capita), by creating a cumulative
scale (total number of. . . ), or by aggregating larger concepts (e.g., components or indices of
democracy)”, Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 36.
The Electoral Democracy Index, Polyarchy, reflects the minimalist democracy definition of con-
testation and participation.79 To construct it, five low level indices reflecting freedom of expres-
sion, association, suffrage and free and fair elections are aggregated into two mid level indices of
electoral democracy: the additive and the multiplicative polyarchy index. The additive index is
constructed by weighted addition of the five low level indices and reflects the substitutability of
democracy’s attributes. The multiplicative polyarchy index on the other hand is constructed by
multiplying the five low level indices and captures the complementarity of the five concepts (a
very low score on one of the components will lower its’ overall multiplicative polyarchy index).
The Electoral Democracy Index, joins complementarity and substitutability by averaging the
additive and multiplicative polyarchy indices. The aggregation process for the other four high
level democracy indices is analogous. It is displayed in Figure 3.1.
The arrows represent an aggregation procedure which is averaging multiplication (complemen-
tarity) and addition (substitutability) of the two components:
democracy index = 14 · (polyarchy1.6 + component index) + 12 · polyarchy1.6 · component index
Polyarchy influences each high level democracy index to the power of 1.6.80 Setting a higher
rate of influence for Polyarchy than any of the other component indices underlines the impor-
78The Liberal Democracy Index, v2x libdem, the Participatory Democracy Index, v2x partipdem, the Deliber-
ative Democracy Index, v2x delibdem as well as the Egalitarian Democracy Index, v2x egaldem.
79The Appendix contains a figure displaying the components and aggregation rule for Polyarchy.
80The derivation of this rate is explained in the Appendix as well as in Coppedge et al. (2017e), p.10.
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tance of the electoral democracy principle. Contestation and participation should be satisfied
to a certain degree before further aspects of democracy can be employed to distinguish between
higher levels of democracy.
The V-Dem Indices are continous and range between [0,1]. Since in some instances ordinal
measures might be needed, the V-Dem Project also offers the main indices as ordinal variables
with 3, 4 or 5 categories respectively. The classification rules for the ordinal indices are also
provided, Coppedge et al. (2017a), pp. 268.
In addition to the democracy indices the V-Dem Dataset provides measures of uncertianty for
each of the indices. For each of the indices the standard deviation (index suffixed sd) as well
as the “interval in which the measurement model places 68 percent of the probability mass for
each country-year score”81 (denoted by index suffixed codelow and codehigh) are given. These
highest posterior density intervals can be seen as an indication of the skewedness of the under-
lying distribution: if the distances between the point estimate and the upper and lower bound
are not equal, the underlying posterior distribution is skewed.
The dataset is very transparent. Even the project manager, responsible for crafting a specific
variable, or the compiler is listed in the data. The number of experts coding a variable is also
given (variabled suffixed with nr). The default number of coders for the period 1900-2012 is 5
or more.
The project documentation is extensive. Aside from the Coppedge et al. (2017a), the project
for example offers documentation on methodology, Coppedge et al. (2017e), on the units of ob-
servation, Coppedge et al. (2017c), as well as on the project’s setup, Coppedge et al. (2017f).
To ensure consistency of codings accross countries and over time bridge and lateral codings are
employed.82 Bridge coding refers to one coder coding a certain questions for multiple coun-
tries over the entire time series while lateral coding refers to the coding of a variable across all
countries in a single year. Acknowledging the fundamental role of the country experts V-Dem
provides information on country expert selection processes.83 To avoid repressions the contry
experts remain anonymus.84
An important feature of the V-Dem data to note is its sensitivity due to the Bayesian item
response theory models. With addition of “new information”, for example through the addition
of a new bridge or lateral coder or the addition of a new year the point estimates for the indices
change from each dataset version to the next. As a result country scores differ between the ver-
sions. While this might seem odd at first, this sensitivity to new information is one of the biggest
strengths of the data: While Polity2 is struggling with the lack of variation in high democracies
and low autocracies (as mentioned in section Polity Index) the above mentioned sensitivity of
the V-Dem data will facilitate its adaption to new international constellations without loss of
variation. Furthermore, it highlights that the country scores are point estimates with inherent
uncertainty. This is a crucial point to keep in mind especially when creating rankings based on
democracy measures.85
One minor issue to consider with the V-Dem dataset is that their distinction between de facto
and de jure aspects of a polity (and hence their influence in the democracy measures) is not
81Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 37.
82See Coppedge et al. (2017e), pp. 25.
83See section on country expert recruitment in Coppedge et al. (2017e), p.18.
84See Coppedge et al. (2017e), p.21.
85See Høyland et al. (2012) for a thorough discussion of the pitfalls of disregarding uncertainty.
3.3. COMPARISON 31
discussed or illustrated. Polyarchy, for example, contains a suffrage requirement and thus a
measure of institutionalized enfranchisement (de jure participation). However, it is questionable
how far actual (de facto) participation is captured. The data introduced in Vanhanen (2000)
as well the Scalar Index of Polities by Gates et al. (2006), for example, measure participation
as the percentage of the population which actually voted in the most recent parliamentary or
presidential election (or both).86 Considering voter turnout as a sole measure of participation
can produce misleading results, for example if voting is mandatory. To capture a de facto as-
pect of participation Polyarchy includes an indicator on electoral violence.87 A discussion of the
inclusion of de jure/de facto criteria in the definition of democracy would be desirable.
Nevertheless, with the public availability of disaggregate and aggregate data, theoretical justi-
fication for the detailed aggregation rule and comprehensive spatial and temporal coverage, the
V-Dem dataset provides the most well-documented and well-grounded collection of democracy
measures available today.
3.3 Comparison
The previous section outlined the diverse definitions and aggregation procedures embedded in
each of the democracy measures. In addition, the three datasets vary considerably in terms of
countries and years covered. These differences in definition, in availability of disaggregate data
and country-years coded by each index are substantial and often prove decisive with respect to
the question which index to use in which framework. To assess dissimilarities in coding between
the three indices the sample is restricted to those observations available in all datasets for the
remainder of this section. This sample will be referred to as the trunk dataset.
Note that while the reduction to a trunk dataset is necessary it is also a very harsh restriction
and a considerable amount of information is disregarded. For example, restricting the sample to
countries included in the Freedom House data limits the timeline to post-1972 years. However,
Polity2 and V-Dem Data can be compared using data from 1900 on. It becomes even more
drastic when the observations left out are chosen by attribute (and not by year): In the Polity2
coding scheme observations during which a country is occupied by foreign powers constitute
missing values (which is not the case for Polyarchy and FHI). Thus, these cases are not part of
the trunk dataset.
How does this restriction affect similarities between the measures? Comparing pairwise corre-
lations88 to the correlations obtained using the trunk dataset (see Table 3.6) shows that for the
observations in the trunk dataset (top right) the indices’ correlation is larger or (almost) equal
to the pairwise comparison (displayed in the bottom left part).
Coppedge et al. (2011)89 point out that high intercorrelations between the democracy indices
are at least partly due to observations which are “perfectly” democratic/autocratic. The trunk
dataset contains 6,546 observations for 167 countries from 1972 to 2015. In comparison to the
period 1900 to 1971 the number of “perfect” democracies drastically increased after 1972, which
could explain the higher intercorrelations in the trunk data. As displayed in Table 3.7 around
21.2% of the observations in the trunk dataset are coded as perfect democracies/autocracies
86See Vanhanen (2000), p. 253, and Gates et al. (2006), p. 897.
87Election other electoral violence, v2elpeace, see Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 97.
88Note, that the V-Dem Data starts in 1900. When computing pairwise correlation coefficients thus the number
of observations is much higher than when doing so for the trunk dataset.
89See Coppedge et al. (2011), p. 252.
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Polity2 Polyarchy FHI
Polity2 1 0.9083 0.8889
(6,546) (6,546)
Polyarchy 0.8661 1 0.9219
(11,781) (6,546)
FHI 0.8892 0.9200 1
(6,580) (6,902)
Table 3.6: Pairwise correlation coefficients, bottom left: for all observations, top right: only
observations coded in all datasets. Number of observations in parenthesis below.
Number of perfect... 1900-1971 1972 - 2015
... autocracies 265 194
... democracies 1,026 1,194
Total 1,291 1,388
Table 3.7: Number of perfect democracies/autocracies (+/-10 in the Polity2 coding scheme) in
the period 1900 - 1971 and the trunk dataset (1972 - 2015)
(+/- 10 on the Polity Scale). When removing them from the sample the correlations decrease
as displayed in Table 3.8. Limiting the dataset to observations available for all three indices
thus implies obtaining a sample with a high fraction of perfect democracies/autocracies, which
in turn contributes to an intercorrelation between indices which is larger or (almost) equal to
the pairwise comparisons.
3.3.1 Summary statistics
Table 3.9 displays summary statistics for the democracy indices discussed above. Since it rep-
resents the minimalist democracy definition of contestation and participation the Polyarchy In-
dex90 was chosen from the V-Dem indices.91 For facilitated comparability the FHI was reversed
and both, FHI and Polity2 were normalized between 0 and 1.92 Due to different geographical
and temporal scopes covered by each index the number of observations for which the summary
statistics are computed are quite different.93 The summary statistics for all observations avail-
able per index are displayed on the top part of Table 3.9. The summary statistics for the trunk
dataset are displayed in the lower part of Table 3.9.94 The distributions of all three measures
are u-shaped,95 with peaks (particularly pronouced for Polity2 and FHI) at the extremes.96 As
discussed above 18.2% of the observations in the trunk dataset are coded as “perfect” democra-
cies by Polity2. This high number of perfect democracies is also reflected by a Polity2 median
90Polyarchy was used exactly how it is provided in the data, i.e. it was not rescaled or normalized.
91Summary statistics for the other V-Dem democracy indices are given in the Appendix.
92
Normalized Polity2 =
Polity2 + 11
21
, reversed and normalized FHI =
7− FHI
6
93More information on the different geographical and temporal scopes covered by Polity2 and Polyarchy can be
found in Boese and Kamin (2018c).
94The Appendix includes a list of countries and their respective years coded in the trunk dataset.
95Several studies, such as Goertz (2006), discuss how colinearity of the indicators forming the democracy indices
can contribute to to this u-shape.
96The Appendix provides a histogram as well as a table with percentiles for the three democracy measures in
the trunk data giving further insight into their empirical distribution.
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Polity2 Polyarchy FHI
Polity2 1 0.8648 0.8423
(5,158) (5,158)
Polyarchy 0.8002 1 0.8710
(9,169) (5,158)
FHI 0.8425 0.8710 1
(5,173) (5,158)
Table 3.8: Pairwise correlation coefficients for observations which are not coded “perfect”
democracies/ autocracies (10/-10) in Polity2.
Bottom left: for all observations, top right: only observations coded in all datasets. Number of
observations in parenthesis
Summary statistics for...
...all observations available per index
Variable Obs. Mean Median St. D. Min Max
Polity2 16,992 0.4724 0.35 0.3536 0 1
Polyarchy 17,036 0.3179 0.2055 0.2788 0.0086 0.9471
FHI 6,936 0.5071 0.5 0.3375 0 1
...the trunk dataset
Variable Obs. Mean Median St. D. Min Max
Polity2 6,546 0.5689 0.7 0.3647 0 1
Polyarchy 6,546 0.4545 0.4061 0.2868 0.0140 0.9471
FHI 6,546 0.5053 0.5 0.3362 0 1
Table 3.9: Summary statistics for the democracy indices
which is substantially larger than Polity2’s mean. The distributions of FHI and Polyarchy are
more even. However, FHI considers around 14% of observations in the trunk dataset as perfect
democracies and around 9% as perfect autocracies while no observation is coded as either by the
V-Dem Project. Polity2 and FHI capture very little variation in highly democratic/autocratic
systems (the US, for example, is coded as a perfect democracy from 1972 to 2015) as opposed
to Polyarchy.97 This has an important implication for the choice of measure in frameworks in
which highly democratic/autocratic countries are examined. The FHI also has a comparatively
high number (around 8.5% of the observations) of perfect autocracies, i.e. observations coded as
0. In addition, the high and low numbers of perfect democracies/autocracies have an noteworthy
theoretical implication for the future development of the respective countries’ time series: for
those countries the system of governance is not able to improve/deteriorate.
3.3.2 Examining the differences
The following section examines the differences in coding between the three democracy measures
and their implication for the country ranking within each index. The section closes with a coun-
try study exemplifying the differences in coding variation, in ranking as well as in disaggregation
possibilities.
97The Appendix includes an exemplary discussion of the within and between country variation in the Polity2
data.
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Figure 3.2: Boxplot of differences between index values for cases coded as transitions or inter-
regnum in the Polity Scheme
Difference with respect to attributes of the democracy definition
Polity2 assigns a value of 098 for observations in which a country undergoes a period of inter-
regnum/anarchy and prorates the respective country’s democracy value over the length of a
transition period (see Section Polity Index ).
The boxplot in Figure 3.2 shows that Polyarchy and FHI are both much lower than Polity2 (i.e.
the interquartile range of the differences is strictly positive) for countries in anarchy and transi-
tion periods. Interestingly, at the same time the difference in values between FHI and Polyarchy
is low for these cases (median differences of around +/ − 0.1), while the differences between
each of them and the Polity2 coding are substantial. Countries undergoing periods of anarchy
or transition appear to be systematically overrated by Polity2. In research frameworks in which
such countries play an important role FHI or V-Dem indices should therefore be preferred over
Polity2.
As mentioned in Section Polity Index the original aim of the Polity data was to capture a coun-
try’s formal institutional setup. This led to the Polity Index reaching the boundaries of its
domain in cases where there were no regular institutions, i.e. in cases of interregnum, transition
or occupation. Even though V-Dem includes several aspects beyond the formal institutions
the absence of a regular institutional framework in post WWII-Germany seems to be posing
difficulties for V-Dem as well: Germany is not coded between 1946 - 48. Since this is the only
such case the recommendation to prefer V-Dem indices or FHI whenever a share of the relevant
observations falls in categories discussed above remains valid.
Difference in coding by level of democracy
The high intercorrelations between the democracy measures discussed above show that there is
a strong relationship between them. This is to be expected, as the three indices are supposed
to measure the same thing - democracy. But, the correlations do not provide information on
the “agreement” between the indices. Agreement can be thought of as the identity line, when
two indices are plotted with respect to each other. If all observations are close to the identity
line, the indices “agree” and the differences between them are close to zero. A case with high
correlation, but limited agreement occurs, for example, if one index were to consistently code
98A Polity2 value of 0 translates into 11/21 ≈ 0.52 on the normalized polity scale (between 0 and 1).
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each country half as democratic as the other.
In the following, the general agreement between the indices is examined and systematic differ-
ences are explored. Let’s assume there was a “hypothetical democracy scale” along which all
countries could be sorted. Does one index code highly democratic/autocratic countries (on the
top/bottom of the hypothetical scale) systematically different from another index? The “hypo-
thetical democracy scale” is, of course, unknown (and given the different definitions underlying
the democracy measures it is strictly hypothetical). However, assuming the three democracy
measures are three ways of capturing very similar concepts, we can use the average of the three
measures as a proxy for the hypothetical scale. Differences between the index pairs are plotted
against this average, i.e. the “hypothetical democracy scale” in Figure 3.3. The solid line at
y=0 marks the observations for which there is perfect agreement between the indices (i.e. where
the difference between them equals zero). The dashed lines mark the 95th-percentile and the
5th-percentile, hence, 90% of the observations fall between the top and bottom dashed line.
The black line represents a linear fit (pooled OLS) of the differences in democracy measures on
“hypothetical democracy”.99
For all indices the differences get closer to zero towards the democratic/autocratic extreme. The
plot for Polity2 and V-Dem Polyarchy Index provides useful insight on the agreement between
the two indices: The fitted line is positive and increasing. In a large number of cases Polity2
rates countries more democratic than the Polyarchy Index. For the intermediate 90% of obser-
vations the difference between the two index values tends to be positive. In fact, for countries
in the upper half of the democracy scale, there is very little agreement: The difference in index
values becomes larger as the level of “hypothetical democracy” increases. The vast majority
of countries located between 0.55 and 0.8 on the hypothetical democracy scale is coded strictly
more democratic by Polity2 than by Polyarchy Index. For countries at the very low end (until
0.1) of the democracy scale, on the other hand, the two indices seem to agree to some extent:
differences are symmetrically distributed close to 0. There are comparatively few observations
for which Polyarchy is significanly larger than Polity2 (those in the 5-th percentile). They occur
for countries on the lower half (between 0.1 and 0.7) of the hypothetical democracy scale.
The plot for FHI and Polyarchy also displays an increase in difference between the two mea-
sures with rising hypothetical democracy values. The fitted line is increasing, but it is negative
for hypothetical democracy values below 0.16. Countries on the lower end of the hypothetical
democracy scale are coded slightly more democratic by Polyarchy than by FHI. However, this
is reversed for countries above the 0.18 threshold: for those FHI tends to be slightly larger than
Polyarchy and increasingly so with rising levels of democracy. Large differences (as measured by
the 10% of observations for which the absolute differences in democracy values are particularly
high) occur for countries anywhere on the democratic scale except the end points.
Polity2 and FHI’s agreement is almost consistent across hypothetical democracy values: The
fitted line is nearly horizontal, but positive. Polity2 tends to code countries slightly more demo-
cratic anywhere on the democracy scale. Examining the large differences only, FHI tends to be
larger than Polity2 only for countries in the lower half of the democratic scale.
The assessment of dis-/agreements between democracy measures concludes with testing whether
there are significant differences in coding between the indices: is the mean difference between
the indices is different from zero (H0)? The results are displayed in Table 3.10. They are in
line with the findings from Figure 3.3 above. The mean differences are positive and significantly
different from zero. On average Polity2 assigns the highest democracy values, followed by FHI.
99Detailed regression results are provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.3: Pairwise differences between indices plotted over average democracy levels, horizontal
lines at 0, the 95th-percentile and the 5th-percentile
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Difference between... Mean
Polity2 - Polyarchy 0.1144***
Polity2 - FHI 0.0636***
FHI - Polyarchy 0.0508***
***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
Table 3.10: Results of ttest of mean differences between indices
Figure 3.4: World averages of Polyarchy, Polity2 and FHI
Polyarchy on average assigns the lowest democracy values. Due to Polyarchy’s definition this
comes as no surprise: as discussed above it captures the minimalist democracy definition of
contestation and participation.
Difference by region
To examine the results from the last Section world averages from 1900 - 2016 are plotted in
Figure 3.4. Recall, that the Polyarchy Index captures the minimalist democracy definition of
contestation and participation. When examining the world averages this becomes obvious as it
is - on average - quite austere, i.e. lower than FHI or Polity2, in its coding. Interestingly, the
world averages show that FHI values fluctuate between Polity2 and Polyarchy only from 1990
onwards. Before that the FHI average is above the Polity2 one.
Figure 3.5 breaks up the dataset by geopolitical region100 and displays regional averages for
each of the democracy measures. For most regions the Polity2 values are larger or equal (almost
equidistant) to the Polyarchy values while the FHI mostly “fluctuates” between the other two.
The change in coding between FHI and Polity2 averages noted in Figure 3.4 is particularly visi-
ble in the following regions: In Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa as well
as East and South Asia the Polity2 average is below the FHI average prior to 1990, but above
it after. In addition, when examining the regional averages for Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Polity2 and Polyarchy Index show a high level of aggrement for the observations before 1990.
The Freedom House Index on the other hand codes the Eastern European observations much
less democratic than the other two indices between 1972 - 1990. This might be a reflection of the
Freedom House Index’ early ideological bias discussed in Section Freedom House. It could also
100A detailed list of countries and their respective regions can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.5: Regional averages of the three democracy measures
indicate Polyarchy values which are too high. It is the only timespan and region in which Pol-
yarchy is higher than both, Polity2 and FHI. In the following Section, the coding of the Eastern
European & Central Asian countries will be examined in more detail to shed light on this finding.
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
The regional comparison in the Figure 3.5 provides some insight into the “austereness” of each
democracy index. On average Polity2 assigns the highest and Polyarchy the lowest values while
the FHI fluctuates between the other two. The only time and region in which there seems to be
a systematic deviation from this scheme is in Eastern Europe & Central Asia (EECA) before
1990. There are 31 countries in the region.101 Albania, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Romania provide
good examples of the coding phenomenon discussed above. Hence, their coding will be studied
in more detail in the remainder of this section. The respective democracy values assigned by
Polity2, FHI and Polyarchy are displayed in Figure 3.6.102 To understand why Polyarchy codes
each country comparatively high Polyarchy is broken up into its components in Figure 3.7. The
share of population with suffrage as well as the Elected officials index103 are coded with the
highest possible value over the entire time span. This strongly contributes to the high Polyarchy
101A list of these countries is provided in the Appendix.
102The Appendix contains a Figure displaying the codings for all other countries in the EECA region. See Figure
B.5.
103The elected officials index, v2x elecoff addresses the question “Is the chief executive and legislature appointed
through popular elections?”, Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 59.
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Figure 3.6: Democracy coding by Polity2, FHI and Polyarchy for Albania, Bulgaria, Mongolia
and Romania
Figure 3.7: Components of Polyarchy for Albania, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Romania
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values in these countries prior to 1990. It is a central difference between the three indices and
their underlying definitions of democracy. As discussed above, Polity2 and FHI104 do not include
any components capturing suffrage requirements. Polity2’s categories XROPEN (“Recruitment
of the chief executive is “open” to the extent that all the politically active population has an
opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process”, Marshall et al.
(2017a), p. 22.) and XRCOMP (“Competitiveness refers to the extent that prevailing modes of
advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates”, Marshall et al.
(2017a), p. 21.) are closest in meaning to V-Dem’s elected officials index. Here a lack of detail
and organization in theoretical concept of the Polity2 scheme becomes apparent: the very defi-
nition of XROPEN mixes several important attributes, namely the regularized electoral process
(in V-Dem captured by the elected officials index), the extent to which the politically active
population is de jure allowed to participate (i.e. the share of population with suffrage) as well as
the actual de facto opportunities the population has to influence the electoral process (in V-Dem
this is covered, for example, through the clean elections index). The Polity2 categories are not
distinguishing between different attributes of the underlying concepts of the de jure electoral
process and the de facto as well as de jure participation of the population.
Section B.8 of the Appendix compares the country ranking of each of the three democracy in-
dices. It shows that the countries are ranked almost consistently across all regions except for
EECA prior to 1990. The difference in the democracy definition covered (by the inclusion of
suffrage) is a major driver behind the comparatively high values of Polyarchy in that time and
region. It ultimately also leads to a different ranking for the corresponding countries. In conclu-
sion, a closer examination of the EECA region demonstrates that differences in the underlying
democracy definition can and do lead to differing country ratings. In applications covering time
periods and regions such as EECA prior to 1990 this can potentially be a source of results vary-
ing with the democracy measure used.
United States of America
A closer examination of the timeseries of United States will illustrate differences in temporal
variation, in ranking and the disaggregation possibilities between the three indices.
Figure 3.8 displays the democracy index values and yearly rankings of the United States be-
tween 1972 and 2016. The US is coded as a perfect democracy receiving the highest possible
value throughout the entire time series by both, Polity2 and FHI. This lack of variation for the
two indices is also found in most highly democratic/autocratic countries.105 In circumstances in
which the research question at hand concerns such countries this feature needs to be kept in mind.
The differences in ranking between FHI and Polity2 are minor. However, the difference to Pol-
yarchy is rather large. From 1999 to 2001 US Polyarchy drops by about 5.8%. What caused this
sharp decrease? Plotting the components of Polyarchy for the United States over time (see Fig-
ure 3.9) shows that the clean elections index, v2xel frefair,106 is the main driving factor behind it.
104Since no disaggregate data is available for FHI and the checklist questions are vague at best, its coding of the
EECA region cannot be discussed further here.
105A table displaying the within and between country variation for Polity2 can be found in the Appendix.
106“Question: To what extent are elections free and fair? Clarifications: Free and fair connotes an absence of
registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election
violence.”, Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 58.
3.3. COMPARISON 41
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Year
Rank in Polity2 Rank in Polyarchy
Rank in FHI
Figure 3.8: Democracy index values (left) and yearly rankings (right) for the United States of
America from 1972-2016
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Further decomposing the clean elections index into its subcomponents107 (see Figure 3.10) ex-
poses EMB autonomy (v2elembaut),108 election voter registry (v2elrgstry),109 election vote buy-
ing (v2elvot-buy),110 election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg),111 and election free and fair
(v2elfrfair)112 as driving factors (see top graph).
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Figure 3.9: Components of Polyarchy for the United States over time
In sum, the drop in Polyarchy (and subsequently in the ranking of the US in comparison to
other countries in the year 2000) is due to the 2000 presidential election and is not captured by
Polity2 or FHI. This difference in the US- values and ranking for each of the indices illustrates
how Polyarchy is more sensitive than Polity2 or FHI, which is both, an advantage (higher vari-
ability, more information is included) as well as (slight) flaw of the index. As discussed in section
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset V-Dem does not provide a thorough discussion of the
de facto and de jure elements included in the democracy measure. De facto (as opposed to de
jure) indicators by nature rely more on judgement calls and inherently suffer from an increased
bias. The indicators driving the decrease in US Polyarchy values address the de facto aspect
of the United States democracy in 2000. US Polyarchy drops from around 0.88 in 1999 to 0.84
in 2000. Whether this sharp decrease is an appropriate reflection of changes in US levels of
democracy around the 2000 election or whether it might be influenced/amplified by ideologi-
cal judgements inherent in de facto indicators can be debated. It comes down to the question
“what share of the underlying democracy definition consists of de facto vs. de jure attributes of
107Note that most of these indicators only occur in election years and are then repeated over election regime
periods.
108“Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election
laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?”, Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 86.
109“Question: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?”,
Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 90.
110“Question: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?”, Coppedge et al.
(2017a), p. 94.
111“Question: In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent
and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?”, Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 95.
112“Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the postelection process into
account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?”, Coppedge et al. (2017a), p. 103.
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Figure 3.10: Subcomponents of the clean elections index for the United States of America from
1990 - 2016
a polity?”. None of the three democracy measures properly address this question.
Nevertheless, Polyarchy still outperforms the other two measures with respect to all points
discussed in the paper. Polyarchy’s increased sensitivity/variation (especially for highly demo-
cratic/ autocratic) countries can be a large advantage in a time-series cross-country setting over
the countries which are coded as 1/0 for decades by Polity2 or FH. The one thing the V-Dem
project could improve is to find a system of “checks and balances” for de facto attributes so as
to not let this sensitivity get out of hand.
3.4 Discussion
The three democracy indices studied in this paper were introduced at different times and for
different purposes. In section Definition of democracy the distinction between de facto and de
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Figure 3.11: Average regional shares of population with suffrage, 1900 - 2016. Source: V-Dem
indicator v2x suffr
jure attributes included in a democracy measure was discussed. It ties into the very definition
of the underlying concept of democracy/authority patterns. The Polity data was created to
examine the durability of institutional frameworks. Its aim was to capture the de jure frame-
work. FHI on the other hand was originally designed as a measure of civil liberties and political
rights. It therefore is is more of a de facto measure. V-Dem’s Polyarchy is situated somewhat in
between the two hypothetical de facto and de jure endpoints. There is no “optimal” partition of
de facto and de jure elements to incorporate in a democracy measure. The research question of
the project at hand and the corresponding perception of democracy should determine the levels
of de facto and de jure attributes. None of the three democracy indices are “better” or “worse”
because of their choice of partition. While the choice in itself does not affects the indices overall
validity it does affect the values coded. The country studies provided in the previous section
show that the inclusion of more or less of such de facto and de jure elements leads to different
country assessments by the three measures. The example of the coding of the United States
highlights how the inclusion of de facto attributes can be a main driver behind different ratings
across indices. Empirical researchers planning to work with democracy measures hence need to
contemplate what degree of de facto and de jure attributes is appropriate for their research.
Throughout the paper the loss of variation in particular for countries at the very top or bottom
of the scales has been discussed. The two country studies in the previous section highlighted
this for Polity2 and FHI in the United States as well as for the suffrage dimension in Eastern
Europe & Central Asia. The latter example raises the question whether suffrage today is even
an important indicator to include in a measure of democracy as there is little/no geographical
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variation. Figure 3.11 displays average shares of population with suffrage by region. The graphs
show little or no variation in the last decade of the time series but a lot of variation in the
first half of the 20th century. Thus the question posed above can be amplified in scope by ask-
ing: how should democracy measures adapt to the changing importance of certain dimensions of
democracy over time? The share of population with suffrage has been an important dimension of
democracy. It helped distinguish between different kinds of regimes and to capture some extent
of the people’s options to participate in the political process. Today, any new polity coming into
existence will find it difficult to allocate suffrage to white adult males only, for example. The
share of the population with suffrage is not as helpful in distinguishing between different polities
today as it was 50 years ago. It goes well beyond the scope of this paper to provide a solution to
the changing importance of certain democracy dimensions over time. Nevertheless, it is within
the scope of this paper to point out that V-Dem excels at providing very precise and clear
cut distinctions between a large number of dimensions. By providing the disaggregate data it
also gives the empirical researcher the opportunity to include or disregard dimensions as needed.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper compares the three most commonly used democracy datasets: the PolityIV, the
Freedom House and the V-Dem dataset. In a first step, it analyzes their respective democracy
measures’ underlying definition, their measurement scale, their data collection as well as the
theoretical justification of their aggregation procedure to assess their validity and reliability. In
addition, important strengths and weaknesses of each measure are discussed. The democracy in-
dices from the V-Dem dataset surpass the other two democracy measures in all areas mentioned
above. In a second step, this article compares the indices’ respective coding of those observations
included in all three datasets. There is a relatively high level of agreement in the country coding
as well as in the country ranking between the indices for these cases. In conclusion, the most
substantial differences between the indices lie in their coverage, the availability of disaggregate
data and the above mentioned key areas. These are the central aspects for scholars to consider
when choosing a democracy measure for their research.
Last but not least, the massive efforts undertaken and the equally enormous contributions of
each of the three data projects discussed shall be underlined. As stated in previous sections each
data project originated with quite different objectives and at different times. The first V-Dem
dataset was released about 40 years after the first Polity and Freedom House data came out. In
addition, it had been prepared by scholars familiar with the Polity and Freedom House data who
knew the caveats and pitfalls of these datsets by heart. The V-Dem project was able to build
their data on the foundations of scientific discourses about empirical democracy measurement
since the introduction of Polity and Freedom House data. By offering extensive documentation,
disaggregate data and sensitivity to new information through the Bayesian item response models
the V-Dem data is optimally equipped to become the new standard in democracy measurement
and to adapt to future challenges.
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Chapter 4
’Tis but thy name that is my enemy:
on the construction of macro panel
datasets in conflict and peace
economics
The empirical analysis of datasets covering a large number of countries and time
periods has become an integral part of conflict and peace economics. As such, numer-
ous studies examine relationships between and among macroeconomic, political, and
conflict variables and this often involves the merging of disparate datasets to combine
relevant variables for which the country unit of analysis, however, is not necessarily
the same. This article highlights difficulties in the data merging process and, by way
of example, presents detailed country coding unit comparison for two economic (UN
Comtrade and World Development Indicators), two democracy (Polity IV and V-
Dem), and two conflict datasets (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and COW
Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset). We find that merging datasets can result
in the elimination of very large numbers of observations due to unmergeable records
and that dropped observations often include the very countries or territorial entities
most of interest in conflict and peace economics.
JEL codes: F140, N400
Keywords: Comparative Economic History, International Economic History, Multicountry
Studies, Comtrade, World Development Indicators, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), PolityIV,
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict, Militarized Interstate Disputes
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4.1 What’s in a name?
In conflict and peace economics, the construction of large panel datasets nowadays forms the
basis for the majority of empirical cross-country studies. Originating from different sources,
such panel datasets contain measures on variables such as international trade, economic growth,
GDP, armed conflict, democratization, and government effectiveness.1 But bringing these vari-
ables together, that is merging them into a single dataset, hinges on the exact identification of
the country unit under study. To permit reasonable statistical inference, the country unit for
which, for example, the trade value is calculated, should respond to the same entity for which
all other variables in the dataset are coded. Unfortunately, the names, and even the physical
borders, with which countries are coded vary considerably across different data sources.2
At the core of the coding differences lies the question “What’s in a (country) name”? We argue
that there are two complementary parts to the answer. The first regards the entity under obser-
vation, the unit of analysis: What is a country? The answer depends on the research framework.
For example, the purpose of the Russett et al. (1968) state list as well as of the original Gled-
itsch and Ward (1999) state list was to capture recognized states in the international system.
This particular definition of a country is of utmost relevance in analyses of authority structures.
Nevertheless, one cannot blindly assume that the unit of analysis, that is, the country, is de-
fined along the same criteria in economic or political datasets. Unfortunately, the burden of
comparing the unit of analysis underlying different macro panel datasets lies with the scholar(s)
attempting to merge them. As a consequence, we emphasize the importance of discussing the
merging process in empirical studies in conflict and peace economics. The second part to the
“What’s in a (country) name?” question concerns the entity’s label: Numerous scholars have
presented ways to adjust for differences in country labels. For example, Hensel (2001) provides a
thorough list of alternative historical state names and Heather Ba has created Stata files allow-
ing for the mapping of country names, Correlates of War (COW) codes, and World Bank codes.3
That inconsistent country names across different data sources pose a problem is widely known
among scholars working with macro panel datasets. Major attempts to standardize worldwide
country coding already were undertaken half a century ago by Russett et al. (1968) and al-
most twenty years ago by Gleditsch and Ward (1999). Nevertheless, several problems remain
unresolved and, unfortunately—with the emergence of readily available software packages and
codes—a discussion of “what is the (country) unit of analysis” has become almost unfashionable.
In spite of its tediousness and complexity, the country merging process is generally not discussed
in academic papers (or in their supplementary materials).
The contribution of this article is hence twofold: First and foremost, it shows that in spite of
all country coding scheme standardization efforts and relevant software packages or codes, the
problem of inconsistent country coding in macro panel datasets persist. We therefore want to
re-raise awareness of this problem and encourage a discussion of it in empirical cross-country
studies in conflict and peace economics. Second, by way of illustration, in the Appendix to this
article we provide overview tables of some of the gravest discrepancies in country coding across
datasets which facilitate quick cross-dataset comparisons of country units.
1Examples of studies using such merged datasets include Hegre (2001), Blomberg and Hess (2006), Gates
et al. (2006), Martin et al. (2008), Glick and Taylor (2010), Acemoglu et al. (2019), Dunne and Tian (2015), and
d’Agostino et al. (2018).
2Hence the title of this article. ‘Tis but they name that is my enemy (Act II, Scene ii, Shakespeare (2003)).
Note: although the authors do not feel the same passion towards merging panel datasets as Juliett felt towards
merging with Romeo, they do feel strongly about inconsistent country coding and the possible loss of information
associated with it and hope that their dataset merging efforts will culminate in a different ending.
3See http://heatherba.web.unc.edu/data-code/.
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4.1.1 Typology of inconsistencies
A typology of inconsistencies Inconsistent country names are the tip of the merging iceberg. Not
only do names differ, but so does for example the period of existence for some countries. And
worse, the documentation on the country coding schemes provided by the data projects is often
sparse and contains errors.4
The following three types of inconsistencies between country units in different data sources and
coding schemes are frequently observed and examined in this article:
1. A state name exists in one dataset but not in the other
(i) Reason: different years (time series do not match and some states do not exist any-
more/yet).
• Example: when merging PolityIV with Comtrade data the Orange Free State
cannot be merged as it ceases to exist before coding of Comtrade Data starts)
• Result: country is unmergeable and drops out because it does not exist in one
dataset
(ii) Reason: different definition of statehood
• Example: some datasets do not code Palestine as they do not consider it to meet
formal requirements of statehood
• Result: country is unmergeable and drops out because it does not exist in one
dataset
(iii) Reason: different state names (labels) or entities/territories (see inconsistency 3 de-
scribed below)
• Example: Yugoslavia and its successors are coded vastly different in terms of
names and years across all datasets. How should these countries/observations be
aggregated to make them comparable across datasets and to not loose conflict
observations?
• Result: country may drop out if no action is taken
2. A country is coded under the same name, but for different years in two datasets (time
series for given country are not identical in both datasets)
(i) Reason: missing observations within time series
• Example: In V-Dem Germany, 1946-48, is not coded since the institutional frame-
work of Germany during those years does not meet the formal criteria for the
definition of their democracy indices
• Solution: depends on application and on underlying assumptions made about
reason for missingness, possibly interpolation
(ii) Reason: country starts or ceases to exist and first/last year is not coded consistently
across datasets
• Example: PolityIV codes former East Germany between 1945-1990 whereas V-
Dem codes it from 1949-1990.
• Solution: depends on application, possibly extrapolation
3. A country is coded under different names:
3A: for the same years in two datasets
3B: for different years in two datasets
4For discussion, see the sections on democracy, economic, and conflict data in this article.
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(i) Reason: it is clearly the same state only the label is different. This is often the case
for 3A - or for 3B in combination with inconsistency type 2, reason (ii).
• Example: “St.” vs. “Saint” or official vs. colloquial state names (“Plurinational
State of Bolivia” and “Bolivia”)
• Solution: use relevant Stata and R packages for renaming
(ii) Reason: the different names might refer to different underlying entities/ territories
• Example: We provide detailed overviews of these cases in Table C.3 (Democracy
Datasets) and Table C.7 (Economic Datasets) of the Appendix.
• Solution: The option 3B case is by far the most difficult case as the years do
not provide additional evidence on the actual entity captured. The question of
how these entities could be compared in a meaningful way across datasets has no
straightforward answer, rather the answer is case dependent.
Inconsistent country coding of types 1 to 3 lead to missing values in the final, merged dataset.5
In this article we show that the extent of these “missing values” (they are not really missing,
just missing due to inconsistencies) is vast and of particular relevance to empirical research in
conflict and peace economics. Most country coding schemes differ in the naming and dating of
a specific set of countries: Countries which have experienced armed conflict are less democratic
and less trade open than the consistently coded ones. As a result, a merged dataset can contain
a comparatively high share of missing values for this set of countries. Thus, it can no longer be
considered a random sample. To minimize “missings,” and to avoid losing valuable information,
the process of creating large panel datasets should therefore be done with utmost care.
In general, there are three approaches to code countries in macro panel data: By (string) coun-
try names, by numeric code, or by alphabetic code. The most common schemes include (but
are not limited to) the COW country list, the Gleditsch/Ward state list, and the ISO 3166
list of country codes.6 In theory, numeric and alphabetic codes should facilitate the merging
process. Unfortunately, several numeric and alphabetic codes schemes exist and often they are
neither implemented consistently nor are the country codes easily translatable to each other.
In R the package “countrycode” and in Stata the package “kountry” help with these issues.7
These packages map country names and codes from one kind of macro country codes to an-
other. They come with a slight disadvantage, though, as “[t]he mapping between the available
dataset names [types of country coding schemes] is not always perfect.”8 This is especially dire
when using a comparatively new dataset such as V-Dem which does not follow any of the coded
country schemes exactly. In addition, this assumes that each source dataset correctly applies
the country coding scheme it is based on. In the following sections we show that this is not
5Note the difference between missing values and missing observations. For example, on the one hand, in
the V-Dem dataset version 8 there are no observations for Germany between 1945 and 1948, leaving the panel
unbalanced. In the World Development Indicators, on the other hand, the panel provided is balanced, that is,
there is one observation for each country in each year. However, for a number of years the variable of interest
contains a missing value. Ultimately, when merging two such sources and using the final dataset for statistical
analysis, missing values and missing observations come down to the same thing: missing information. For most
regressions or other analyses, software like Stata disregards observations whenever they contain missing values.
6COW: A country coding scheme employed by several of the macro panel datasets studied in this article.
Data can be obtained from http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/cowcountry-codes. There are three
variables: numeric and alphabetic country codes and statename. The dataset covers 217 countries. The country
list includes 26 duplicate observations. Gleditsch/Ward: The Gleditsch and Ward (1999) state list builds on and
revises the COW country list. First published in 1999, a current version is available at http://ksgleditsch.
com/statelist.html. ISO: See https://www.iso.org/iso-3166-country-codes.html.
7R: See https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/countrycode/countrycode.pdf. Stata: See Raciborski
(2008).
8Quote:Raciborski (2008) (p. 392). Raciborski (2008) continues with a short overview of the most striking
inconsistencies.
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the case for several datasets. By letting Stata or R packages adjust the country names, the
renaming—and subsequently the merging process—is put into a black box, inherently making
it more vulnerable to mistakes.
We aim to take this data merging process out of its black box and use actual country names
to prevent merging mistakes. In what follows we provide a detailed comparison of six datasets
covering the indicators trade, democracy, and conflict. For each dataset a table with actual
country names and years in the data is provided (see Boese and Kamin, 2018a, 2018b). These
tables present an overview of the gravest discrepancies in country coding and allow for quick
cross-dataset comparisons of country units. In addition, this article gives an overview of the
extent of the country coding problem by comparing structural properties of the set of inconsis-
tently coded countries to those of the uniformly coded ones and by discussing missing data as
well as differences in annual coding.
On the one hand, this article provides assistance to scholars merging several source datasets.
On the other, it highlights naming inconsistencies between data documentation, such as code
books, and actual observations in the data. Such inconsistencies potentially lead to merging
problems when blindly using the Stata or R packages (and the country coding scheme specified
in the documentation) discussed above. We have the highest respect for all the data projects
discussed in this article. We therefore hope that the lists of these inconsistencies are also of
assistance to the data projects in aligning their documentation to their respective datasets.
The following three sections respectively provide thorough comparisons of two democracy, two
trade, and two conflict datasets, including detailed tables comparing the country coding units.
The article closes with a discussion of the results.
4.2 Democracy Data
This section compares the country coding units of two democracy datasets: V-Dem version 8 and
the PolityIV dataset 2016. The tables referenced in this section can be found in the Appendix
as well as in Boese and Kamin (2018a). We first discuss the countries listed in V-Dem version
8, then discuss the countries in the PolityIV dataset 2016, and then compare characteristics of
the observations listed in both datasets with those listed in only one of the datasets.
4.2.1 V-Dem Data Version 8
The V-Dem dataset used for this article is V-Dem data version 8, in country year format. The
variable of interest is the Electoral Democracy Index, v2x polyarchy. V-Dem identifies the coun-
tries either by name, alphabetical country id, or numerical country id.9 These country identifiers
do not correspond to any of the prevailing country schemes implemented in the Stata or R pack-
ages mentioned above. To facilitate the merging process, we therefore provide a detailed list of
county coding units in the data10 and compare it to the country list in the V-Dem code book
(Coppedge et al. (2018a) p. 36).
V-Dem excels in terms of transparency and provides a supplementary article on “V-Dem Coun-
try Coding Units v8” which lists and discusses all polities and countries and the respective years
for which they are coded as well as a detailed explanation of the country borders used in the
9Alphabetical country text id: “Abbreviated country names”. Numerical country id: “Unique country ID
designated for each country. A list of countries and their corresponding IDs used in the V-Dem dataset can be
found in the country table in the codebook, as well as in the V-Dem Country Coding Units document”.
10See Boese and Kamin (2018a), worksheet “V-Dem Codebook vs. Data”.
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coding.11 It also provides detailed information on years in which a country is not coded (with the
variables gapstart and gapend). However, there are several observations for which v2x polyarchy
is missing. Worksheet “Overview” in Boese and Kamin (2018a) shows the number of years for
which each country is coded in V-Dem version 8, as well as its gaps (by coding decision) and its
additional missing values.
For ten countries the names in dataset and documentation do not match.12 These name mis-
matches are by no means a purely alphabetical problem. Take, for example, Vietnam. While
there is no country named Vietnam, North or South, in the V-Dem dataset there is a “Re-
public of Vietnam” (coded from 1802–1975) and a “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” (coded
from 1945–2017). The V-Dem Country Coding Units document, however, provides a detailed
overview of the polities forming part of:
“Vietnam, South (35) Coded: 1802–1975. History: (...) Republic of Vietnam (also known as
South Vietnam) (1955–1975).” and “Vietnam, North (34) Coded: 1945– History: Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (i.e. North Vietnam) [declared] (1945); Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(1945–1949); Democratic Republic of Vietnam [independent state] (1949– ). Note: From 1976,
the polity also includes areas formerly belonging to Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).”13
Take another example. In the documentation the numerical country id (365) is coded for two
countries: Oldenburg, 1789–1867, and Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, 1809–1867. In the dataset, how-
ever, only Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach is assigned country id 365 while Oldenburg is assigned code
364.
4.2.2 Polity IV
A second dataset, capturing political authority patterns worldwide and over long periods of
time, is the PolityIV project’s dataset on “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions,
1800–2016” (for short, the PolityIV dataset).14 In the dataset countries are identified by their
name, an alphabetic country code, or a numeric code.15 These identifiers supposedly follow the
COW country coding scheme.16 Table 4.1 displays the results from merging the PolityIV data
with the COW country list, finding that 13 percent of the countries are unmergeable when merg-
ing by country name, 6 percent when merging by numeric code, and 10 percent when merging
by alphabetic code.17 The unmergeable groups largely consist of countries of particular interest
in conflict and peace economics such as the Koreas, Congos, Germanies, and Serbias. As a
consequence, when merging the PolityIV data using a software package taking the dataset to be
11See Coppedge et al. (2018b).
12They are: Democratic Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, German Democratic Republic,
Mecklenburg Schwerin, North Korea, Republic of Vietnam, Republic of the Congo, South Korea, Sa˜o Tome´ and
Pr´ıncipe, and Timor-Leste.
13V-Dem Country Coding Units, p. 27.
14See Marshall et al. (2017b).
15Alphabetic: The variable scode (“Alpha Country Code: Each country in the Polity IV dataset is defined
by a three-letter alpha code, derived from the Correlates of War’s listing of members of the interstate system”
(Marshall et al. (2017a), p. 12). Numeric: ccode (numerical, “Numeric Country Code: Each country in the Polity
IV dataset is defined by a three-digit numeric code, derived from the Correlates of War’s listing of members of
the interstate system” (Marshall et al. (2017a), p. 11).
16Supposedly: See Marshall et al. (2017a) (p. 11).
17To be clear, the share of unmergeable countries is calculated as: number of unmergeable countries/ total
number of countries in PolityIV (i.e., 26/195 ≈ 13.3%, 11/194 ≈ 5.7%, and 19/194 ≈ 9.8%. Note that the rows
are labeled correctly although one could in fact omit “and COW” from the second row since, if countries are
mergeable in a merge between COW and PolityIV, they must exist in both datasets. In the first row, however,
are unmergeable countries only, i.e., those which exist only in the PolityIV dataset.
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Merging by Country name Numeric code Alphabetic code
Unmergeable countries in PolityIV 26 11 19
Mergeable countries in PolityIV & COW 169 183 177
Table 4.1: Number of (un)mergeable countries in a merge of the PolityIV Dataset with the
COW country list
Dataset A: V-Dem B: PolityIV
total number of observations 26,537 17,228
total number of nonmissing observations 24,115 16,992
number of countries 201 195
number of years 1789-2017 1800-2016
Table 4.2: Description of democracy datasets
in “COW coding scheme” these countries may not be properly dealt with.
It is worth noting that country names and alphabetic and numeric codes are not coded con-
sistently over time within the PolityIV dataset, i.e., there are 195 different country names, but
only 194 different alphabetic and numeric codes. This is not due to a single country having
different names and only one code, but to a number of countries and several code/label con-
stellations. Examples include Yugoslavia (either ccode 345 and scode YUG or ccode 347 and
scode YGS; that 347 and YGS also are used for Serbia and Montenegro in the dataset further
complicates matters), Ethiopia (either ccode 529 and scode ETI or ccode 530 and scode ETH),
Pakistan (either ccode 769 and scode PKS or ccode 770 and scode PAK). Further, ccode 860
and scode ETM is used for East Timor and Timor Leste, and ccode 255 and scode GMY is used
for Germany and Prussia. Additionally, in the PolityIV dataset we note duplicate observations
for Yugoslavia in 1991 and for Ethiopia in 1993. This further complicates the merging process
as the scholar is forced to decide how to proceed with the duplicates.
4.2.3 Comparison of the democracy data
Table 4.2 describes both democracy datasets. The variable of interest in each dataset is a democ-
racy index: v2x polyarchy for the V-Dem data and polity2 for the PolityIV data.18 The total
number of nonmissing observations refers to the number of observations for which the respective
variable of interest contains nonmissing values.
When merging the datasets by country name and year, observations of inconsistency types 1 to
3 cannot be merged. Table 4.3 shows the number of mergeable and unmergeable observations by
source dataset. As discussed, even though an observation might be listed, the variable of inter-
est can contain a missing value. Hence the lower half of Table 4.3 proves the same information
for all observations with nonmissing values. To make the number of observations comparable
across datasets in Table 4.3, only observations from the time period covered by both datasets
are considered (that is, V-Dem observations before 1800 as well as the year 2017 were left out to
match the PolityIV time series). Around 41 percent of the V-Dem and around 9 percent of the
PolityIV observations cannot be merged. To assess whether the unmergeable observations are
systematically different from the mergeable ones we calculated the average levels of democracy
for each group. Table 4.4 shows the results of two t-tests, one for V-Dem, one for PolityIV.
18V-Dem’s v2x polyarchy: Range 0 to 1 (most democratic). PolityIV’s polity2: Range –10 to +10 (most
democratic).
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Merging A: V-Dem B: PolityIV
unmergeable observations only in A 10,929 -
unmergeable observations only in B - 1,619
mergable observations in both: 15,609
non-missing observations only in A 9,380 -
non-missing observations only in B - 1,571
non-missing mergeable observations in both: 14,736 15,421
Table 4.3: Merging V-Dem and PolityIV data
Dataset: A: V-Dem B: PolityIV
average level of democracy unmergeable group 0.1377 -0.4495
average level of democracy mergeable group 0.3428 -1.5493
difference in average democracy levels between groups 0.2051 *** 1.0998 ***
Table 4.4: Two sample ttests of average level of democracy.
Democracy variable V-Dem: v2x polyarchy, range: 0 (most autocratic) to 1 (most democratic)
Democracy variable PolityIV: polity2, range: -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic)
Note: *** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
In both datasets, the unmergeable group had a significantly lower average level of democracy
(To be clear, the t-tests were carried out only on the nonmissing observations noted in Table 4.3).
4.3 Economic data
UN Comtrade19 and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)20 contain economic
data. We first discuss the countries listed in the UN Comtrade data, then those in the WDI,
and then compare the country coding schemes of both datasets. The tables and worksheets
referenced to in this section can be found in the Appendix as well as in Boese and Kamin
(2018b).
4.3.1 UN Comtrade
The indicator taken from UN Comtrade is total exports in current U.S. dollars from each country
to the rest of the world. The Comtrade dataset is an unbalanced panel as it only contains years
for which countries have reported trade. Hence, time series differ from country to country. The
first year for which some countries reported trade is 1962, the last year is 2017 (few observations
are available for the start and end years of the time series). Comtrade offers data coded accord-
ing to two different systems for international trade statistics: The Harmonized System (HS),
introduced in 1988, and the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), introduced in
1962, with the latter being less detailed than the former. To obtain the longest possible time se-
ries, we concatenated SITC classification export data, 1962–1987, with HS classification export
data, 1988–2017.
In addition to gaps in the time series caused by missing observations (as discussed above) the
export variable contains missing values for several observations. Missing information primarily
19See “United Nations Comtrade Database” (2018).
20See The World Bank (2017b).
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indicates that trade was not reported and is not to be equated with zero trade flows.21 This is
crucial concerning the tackling of zero trade flows and appropriate model choice.22
The country name abbreviations of the official UN country list23 correspond to the country
names used in the Comtrade data with the exception of Coˆte d’Ivoire and Re´union, which con-
tain spelling errors in the downloaded Comtrade dataset (“C
√
Yte d’Ivoire” and “R
√
c©union”).
4.3.2 World Development Indicators
The economic indicator taken from the World Bank’s WDI is trade openness, defined as the
percentage share of trade of each country’s GDP, that is, (imports+exports)/GDP. Starting in
1960, the time series runs to 2016. The distinction between zero trade and missing data in the
WDI is equivalent to the one in UN Comtrade. In contrast to Comtrade, however, the WDI
data is a balanced panel with one observation for each country and year. Nevertheless, trade
openness contains missing values for several observations due to missing information on GDP,
exports, or imports. In addition to countries, WDI provides aggregated information on country
groups (such as “Europe & Central Asia” or “Low & Middle Income”). These where taken out
of the list to facilitate reading (the full list of country groups removed is available in Boese and
Kamin, 2018b, worksheet “Disregarded Country Groups”).
To our knowledge, the World Bank does not provide an explicit country coding scheme upon
which WDI data are based. However, the World Bank does provide a list of countries upon
which the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data are based.24 It is unclear whether this
list also forms the basis of the WDI dataset. Of 15,048 observations in the WDI dataset used
in this article, 30 percent (4,560 observations) do not match the WITS list. Several of them are
due to naming inconsistencies such as, for example, “Bahamas, The” versus “Bahamas”.
4.3.3 Comparing the economic data
In a comparison of the economic datasets25 the sheer number of naming inconsistencies26 and
single appearances of countries (that is, they appear in one, but not in the other dataset)27
stands out. Additional cases, difficult to handle when merging datasets, are countries that
started and ceased to exist, yielding different country names for different or the same territories
and for different years (inconsistency type 3). While WDI refers to each country under one
name continuously for the entire time series, this is not the case for the UN Comtrade data.
In Comtrade, countries are coded by different names and years. Table C.728 displays the cases
where this kind of inconsistency is in place. The table shows that Comtrade distinguishes the
underlying country entities in much more detail. There is, for example, only one “Germany” in
the WDI data as opposed to “Germany”, “Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany” and “Fmr Dem. Rep.
of Germany” in the UN Comtrade data.
21For a discussion of missings in trade data see, for example, Keshk et al. (2010) (Section 3.3, p. 10), Barbieri
et al. (2009) (p. 476), and Boehmer et al. (2011).
22See, for example, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
23The UN provides a list of country codes and names at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/
Knowledgebase/50377/Comtrade-Country-Code-and-Name.
24https://wits.worldbank.org/wits/wits/witshelp/content/codes/country codes.htm.
25See Boese and Kamin (2018b), worksheet “Overview”.
26See Table C.4 or Boese and Kamin (2018b), worksheet “naming inconsistencies” for inconsistency type 3,
reason (i) (one country coded with different names but for the same year and years).
27See Tables C.5 and C.6 or Boese and Kamin (2018b), worksheet “existence asymmetry” for inconsistency
types 1 and 3.
28Also see Boese and Kamin (2018b), worksheet “inconsistency type 3”.
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Dataset A: Comtrade B: WDI
total number of observations 12,768 15,048
total number of nonmissing observations* 6,790 10,643
number of countries 228 264
number of years 1962-2017 1960-2016
Table 4.5: Description of trade datasets
Note: *The total number of nonmissing observations refers to the number of observations for
which the respective variable of interest contains nonmissing values.
Merging A: Comtrade B: WDI
unmergeable* observations only in A 3,803 -
unmergeable observations only in B - 6,083
mergable observations in both: 8,965
non-missing observations only in A 1,449 -
non-missing observations only in B - 3,765
non-missing mergeable observations in both 5,341 6,878
Table 4.6: Merging Comtrade and WDI data
Note: *When merging both datasets by country name and year those observations of
inconsistency types 1-3 are unmergeable.
Assuming that the ending of one state and the beginning of a new one are coded in detail through
the year variable by WDI, can the country coding units be supposed to be the same across the
two datasets? The sparsity of country coding unit documentation renders it impossible to an-
swer this question. There is no information on whether territories changed, and on whether or
how much this change was incorporated in the coding. This becomes a severe drawback to the
data when complementary variables for the analysis of trade flows, such as country size, GDP,
measures of distance and—most importantly—borders are taken into account.29
The case of Sudan (see Table C.7)30 illustrates the problem: WDI codes “South Sudan” and
“Sudan”. For the latter, the measure of trade openness is available for the whole time series
(1960–2016). For “South Sudan”, the indicator is available from 2008–2015. UN Comtrade
codes “Sudan” (2012–2015) and “Former Sudan” (1963–2011, with gaps). Hence, WDI takes
2008 as the year of birth for “South Sudan”, while Comtrade (implicitly, because it does not
code “South Sudan” as a country)31 codes a new state “Sudan” from 2012 onward. Similar cases
are Serbia (with or without data for Kosovo or Montenegro) and China (with or without data
for Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan).32
The country name by itself does not allow for an exact indication of the territory coded. In
a statistical analysis only of trade, it might not matter whether Sudan or South Sudan is in-
cluded. In conflict and peace economics, however, where relationships among conflict, politics,
and economics are of high interest, such lack of accuracy effectively becomes an impediment to
an appropriate econometric analysis.
29Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), for example, demonstrated that national borders are a highly important
impediment to trade.
30Boese and Kamin (2018b), worksheet “inconsistency 2.0”, rows 36–38.
31The fact that no “South Sudan” is included in the UN Comtrade data is itself somewhat astonishing since
trade data is available (otherwise WDI would not be able to code it).
32See World Bank (2017, p. XVII).
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Dataset: A: Comtrade B: WDI
average level of trade variable unmergeable group 2.72 · 1014 66.16
average level of trade variable mergeable group 3.98 · 1013 76.14
difference in average total export & −2.32 · 1014*** 9.98***
trade openness levels btwn both groups
Table 4.7: Two sample ttests of average level of trade and trade openness.
Trade variable Comtrade: total exports, TradeValueUS, range: US$ 37, 310 to US$ 2.34 · 1016
Trade variable WDI: trade openness, tradeop, range: 0 to 860,8 (in %)
Table 4.5 describes both trade datasets. For Comtrade, the variable of interest is total exports
in current U.S. dollars (TradeValueUS); for the WDI data, it is trade openness as a percentage
of GDP (tradeop). Table 4.6 shows the number of mergeable and unmergeable observations by
source dataset. As discussed, even though an observation might be listed the variable of interest
can contain a missing value. Hence the bottom half of Table 4.6 provides the same information
for all observations with nonmissing values. To make the number of observations comparable
across datasets in Table 4.6 only observations from the time period covered by both datasets
are considered, i.e., 1962–2016. About 30 percent of the Comtrade observations, and about
40 percent of the WDI observations, cannot be merged.33 To assess whether the unmergeable
observations are systematically different from the mergeable ones, we calculated average levels
of total exports and trade openness for each group. Table 4.7 shows the results of two sample
t-tests: For Comtrade, the average export level is statistically significantly higher (given the
exponent) in the unmergeable than in the mergeable group. For WDI, the unmergeable country
group had a significantly lower level of average trade openness.
Looking at the naming inconsistencies (see Table C.4 of the Appendix) confirms this “higher-
lower” difference: The high levels of export values in the unmergeable group in Table 4.7 are
driven by observations from the U.S., Germany, Macao, and Hong Kong.34 Table 4.7 hence
provides a good intuition to the effects of inconsistent country coding: Either the cases of high
export levels or of low trade openness are lost due to merging problems. Either one is prob-
lematic in terms of statistics and, depending on the analytic aim, might lead to biased estimates.
4.4 Conflict data
In theory, the datasets for economic and political variables code each variable for all years during
which a country exists. The conflict datasets, however, are fundamentally different: By design,
they only code conflict variables for years in which a conflict occurred in a given country and
which surpassed some conflict criteria (for example, 25 battle-related deaths). Consequently,
time series and cross-section data dimensions contain gaps for country-years without armed
conflict.
The UCDP Armed Conflict dataset version 18.1 (Pettersson and Eck (2018); also see Gleditsch
et al. (2002); UCDP, 2018) studies armed conflict above a yearly threshold of 25 battlerelated
deaths. The Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) B dataset version 4.2 (Palmer et al. (2015))
captures militarized interstate disputes which can involve, for example, a display of force with-
out incurring any battle deaths. Therefore, the gaps in the datasets will be very different,
and merging them by country and years coded does not provide insights on, or a comparison
33Again, to be clear: 3, 803/(3, 803 + 8, 965) ≈ 29.7% and 6, 083/(6, 083 + 8, 965) ≈ 40.4%.
34This is shown in Boese and Kamin (2018b), worksheet “Unmergeable Outliers Comtrade”. It contains all
unmergeable Comtrade observations sorted by export values
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Merging by Numeric code Alphabetic code
Unmergeable countries in MID B 4 4
Mergeable countries in MID B & COW 191 191
Table 4.8: Number of (un)mergeable countries in a merge of the MID B Dataset with the COW
country list
of, country coding units. Nevertheless, both datasets acknowledge the importance of defining
country coding units. In the remainder of this section, we show that even within each of these
datasets there are inconsistencies between the country coding units as defined by the respective
data project and the actual observations in the data. As a result, these observations are either
dropped, potentially falsely matched, or have to be manually adjusted when using Stata or R
commands for merging countries.
4.4.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset version 18.1
The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset acknowledges the importance of a precise descrip-
tion of country coding units35 and dedicates an entire section of its code book36 to the exact
definition of country coding units. It includes a country table with numerical and alphabetical
country codes, state names, and start and end years for the countries that form part of the in-
ternational system of states. Tables C.8 to C.12 list the countries coded in the actual data and
compares them to the system membership table from the UCDP/PRIO code book. The system
membership table must include more observations since, by definition, it also includes countries
without armed conflict. But Tables C.8 to C.12 show that even when restricted to countries
with armed conflict there are inconsistencies in the country names (for example “Burkina Faso”
and “Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)”, “DR Congo (Zaire)” and “Congo, Democratic Republic of
(Zaire)”, and “Ivory Coast” and “Cote D’Ivoire”).
4.4.2 MID B version 4.2
The MID B version 4.2 dataset includes one observation per participant to a militarized dispute,
1816 –2010, with countries taken from the Correlates of War (COW) list. The MID B dataset
itself does not contain (string) state names. Instead, countries are coded with a three-digit
numerical code (ccode) and with an alphabetical code (stabb). Before joining variables from the
MID B dataset with any other macro panel data, such as WDI, a first step therefore is to merge
MID B with COW, but four countries cannot in fact be merged (Table 4.8. The three-digit
alphabetic codes for these countries are RUM, USR, VTM, and ZAI.
This is a perfect example of the difficulties associated with merging by country as it is hardly
possible to determine with certainty which underlying entity (territory) is exactly covered, for
example, by USR or VTM. This also illustrates why, for this article, we chose to employ merging
by country (string) names, not codes. VTM could stand for (Democratic) Republic of Vietnam,
Vietnam North, Vietnam South, or Vietnam. While the exact entity coded remains unclear, it
is very clear that this case contains information relevant for studies of conflict. That the MID B
dataset states that it follows the COW country list convention when in fact it does not, makes
it effectively impossible to determine for some observations which actual underlying entity is
considered a country during which period of time.
35“The definition of a state is crucial to the UCDP/PRIO conflict list” (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook, 2018, p.13).
36See Section 4: “System Membership Description” (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Themne´r
(2018), p. 13).
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4.5 Discussion and conclusion
Large-scale cross-country datasets are frequently merged in quantitative studies in conflict and
peace economics. We find that the coding of country units overlaps across datasets only for
a relatively small proportion of countries. Discrepancies in country naming or other forms of
country identification such as numerical or alphabetical country IDs are frequent among coun-
tries splitting up or (re)uniting during the time period studied. Examples include Yugoslavia,
Germany, Vietnam, and Sudan. If the names are not adjusted, these inconsistencies render such
observations unmergeable and, when joining variables from several data sources, ultimately re-
sult in missing values. When these missing values then are dropped from an analysis, important
information is lost. This loss of information is of particular severity in conflict and peace eco-
nomics as countries which split up or reunite often do so accompanied by armed conflict and
thus contain valuable information.
The dataset comparisons made in this article demonstrate that inconsistencies in country coding
across macro panel datasets remain a relevant challenge in cross-national studies. They show
that for economic datasets as well as democracy datasets the unmergeable group is of a large size
(up to about 40 percent of all observations) and significantly differs from the group of mergeable
observations. In particular, the group of unmergeable countries is on average less democratic
than the mergeable group. Depending on the economic measure analyzed (and, with it, the
country naming scheme applied), a group of countries with high exports or another group of
countries with low trade openness cannot be merged.
These discrepancies can be attributed, in part, to differences in country labels. Several projects,
such as Hensel (2001) and the aforementioned software codes and packages can help adjust them.
However, another part of the inconsistent country coding is due to different perceptions and def-
initions of the unit of analysis. The exercises carried out for this article show that the actual
entity captured can differ by source dataset. While this makes creating merged panel datasets
consisting of economic, political, or armed conflict factors challenging in its own right, proper
merging might be a necessary condition for analysis. For an armed conflict dataset, relevant
state units might differ significantly from datasets on democracy or trade flows (the coding of
Palestine, Hong Kong, or Macao are examples). As a result, the burden of discussing the unit
of analysis studied and of ensuring that countries correspond to the same entity across merged
datasets, lies with the individual scholar or team. This article encourages scholars to discuss
the merging process in their academic papers (or supplementary materials) and to not take the
problem of inconsistent country names lightly. This is particularly the case in conflict and peace
economics, where relevant information is systematically lost when unmergeable observations are
discarded.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that country names are not the only dimension of macro panels
to be carefully compared across datasets before merging. It goes well beyond the scope of this
article to additionally compare the actual time periods covered. However, we point out that
the time dimension underlying the calendar year coding of macro panels does not necessarily
coincide with the actual calendar year. To quote from the World Bank: “In most economies the
fiscal year is concurrent with the calendar year ... Most economies report their national accounts
and balance of payments data using calendar years, but some use fiscal years” (The World Bank
(2017a), p.117). Time inconsistencies, then, are another potential source of erroneous inference,
in particular when studying the effect of conflict on the economy or the political system, or vice
versa.
Last, but not least, we pay tribute to the creators of the datasets discussed in this article: As-
sembling and maintaining these datasets is a Herculean task. The challenges associated with
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inconsistent country names and units across datasets can, however, lead to serious consequences
in conflict and peace economics. Unfortunately, while an easy solution to the noted problems is
not likely to exist, given the different purposes each of the source datasets is created for, we hope
that our comments here increase broader awareness and discussion of these problems and that
our tables in the Appendix (and online) facilitate quick cross-dataset comparisons of country
coding.
Chapter 5
Heterogeneity matters:
on the dynamic interactions of trade,
development, democracy and conflict
The past decade has witnessed a return to protectionist measures as well as a
global rise in nationalist movements. Understanding the economic and political ef-
fects of such changes in trade policies or levels of democracy has gained renewed
importance. There is a vast amount of literature studying the bilateral relationships
between international trade flows, democracy, development and conflict. While it
finds strong evidence for correlations between the four factors so far no conclusive
evidence has been presented as to the direction of causal links between the factors.
This paper employs a country specific vector autoregressive model allowing for en-
dogenous dynamic interactions between trade, democracy, development and conflict.
More specifically, it analyzes how shocks in one of these variables affect the others
over time to investigate “what causes what”. The dataset used covers 68 countries
and the years 1960 to 2016. Results confirm the presence of simultaneous effects
from all variables on one another. In addition, effect size and sign is substantially
heterogeneous across countries providing strong evidence against the validity of the
homogeneous slope parameter assumption.
JEL codes: F14, F51, N40, O5, P45
Keywords: international trade, democracy, development, international conflict, panel vector
autoregression, endogeneity
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5.1 Introduction
The study of each of the bilateral relationships between democracy, development, trade openness
and armed conflict1 constitutes and entire field of research. In each of these fields there is no
consensus about the direction of the causal link. If there is one thing to be taken away from
this literature it is that democracy, development, trade openness and armed conflict have shown
to be endogenous to each other. This endogeneity should also be accounted for in statistical
models. Until now the literature has usually used two types of models to examine the bilateral
relationships: either (dynamic) panel data models, usually estimated with system or difference
GMM approaches, but not accounting for the indirect effects these four variables have on each
other, or simultaneous equation models which can take into account the indirect effects but
do not contain autoregressive parameters. However, when it comes to factors like democracy,
development, trade or conflict a country’s state in the last period is of high importance in de-
termining its current state.
At the same time, the past ten years have seen a global rise in nationalism and protectionism
on the one hand, and an erosion of democratic norms in several countries on the other hand.
With it an understanding of the role of economic interdependence and democracy for a peaceful
interconnected world gains renewed importance: how does the international system respond to
changes in trade or in governance systems?
This paper employs a vector autoregressive (VAR) model that allows to control for theses indi-
rect effects. It models the dynamic relationships between democracy, development, trade and
conflict in a globalized world. More specifically, it analyzes how shocks in one of these variables
affect the others over time and examines the direction of effects for each bilateral relationship.
Impulse response functions are used to examine the effects. These impulse response functions
allow for contemporaneous correlation of errors and thereby control for endogenous effects be-
tween the four factors.
The results provide two major insights: firstly, they confirm that all variables affect each other.
Therefore, indirect effects must be accounted for in any project examining the effect of one factor
on another. Secondly, there is substantial heterogeneity in effect size and direction across coun-
tries. This suggests that the homogeneity of slope parameters assumption frequently employed
in classic fixed effects models in cross-country analysis is inappropriate for capturing the effects
of one of the variables on the others.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the mechanisms relevant to the
identification of effects in this paper. Variables and data used are introduced in Section 5.3.
Section 5.4 states the hypothesis to be tested and describes model and identification strategy.
Central findings are presented in Section 5.5. Model robustness is assessed in Section 5.6. The
findings are discussed in Section 5.7 and a conclusion can be found in Section 5.7.
5.2 Why endogeneity matters
The interactions between democracy, development, trade and conflict are depicted graphically
in Figure 5.1: the right-hand side displays what is best described as a “political cycle” evolving
around democracy, while on the left-hand side the “economic cycle” evolves around trade. Both
1For readability and for brevity, this paper might refer to trade openness as “trade” and to armed conflict as
“conflict”. However, note that the underlying definitions of these terms correspond to how they have been defined
in Section 5.3.
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Figure 5.1: Mapping the endogenous interactions of trade, democracy, development and conflict
cycles show how closely the four factors are interrelated. Economic and political science literature
have studied the endogeneity and causal bilateral relationships between each possible pair of the
four factors. The most important findings are described in the following.
Trade and Development
Frankel and Romer (1999) point out the endogenous relationship between trade and develop-
ment. Using income per capita, the authors find that trade raises income. Others have assessed
the distributional consequences of trade: Helpman et al. (2010) find that aggregate inequality in-
creases when countries are nearly symmetric due to reinforced within-sector effects, while Egger
and Kreickemeier (2012) introduce intergroup-inequality and find that while aggregate welfare
increases, so does inequality within as well as between the groups. The mechanism at work
can be described as follows. Increasing trade makes a broader selection of goods and services
accessible for the population which also leads to knowledge transfer, increased human capital
and higher levels of development. In turn, human capital is a crucial factor for trade, both in
terms of imports as well as exports: increased human capital on the labor market leads to a rise
in production possibilities concerning export goods, while increasing income will boost spending
capacity and demand for imported goods, Yanikkaya (2003).
Trade and Conflict
Conflicts affect trade through different channels: Resources are redirected towards defense ex-
penditures (known as the guns vs. butter trade-off, (see e.g. Anderton and Carter (2009),
Anderson and Marcouiller (2002)), resources and goods are destroyed and production possibili-
ties shrink due to conflict, and future and present economic activities are disrupted (e.g. capital
flight, increase in transport costs, etc.) which leads to a decrease of material well-being (see e.g.
Long (2008)). Overall, opportunity costs are rising if trade gains are lost: utility and income
decrease if consumption shifts away from preferred goods and production shifts away from areas
of comparative advantage. Empirical studies have found mixed results depending on conflict
data used. Trade as well affects conflict: according to the liberal theory trade promotes peace.
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While the majority of empiric literature supports liberal theory (Blomberg and Hess (2006),
Martin et al. (2008), Keshk et al. (2010)), realists argue that trade may also spark conflict (see
e.g. Barbieri and Levy (1999), Barbieri et al. (2009)).
Conflict and Development
Greed or vertical economic inequality may spur conflict (see Collier and Hoeffler (2004)). Fur-
thermore, in conflict infrastructure is destroyed and water and sanitation points deteriorate.
Goods and services are not available in the same way as in times of peace. Living conditions
deteriorate, accompanied by an increase in diseases and malnutrition. If such conditions persist,
the gap between elites and population can widen and the society can wind up in a conflict trap
(Collier (2003)).
Democracy and Development
Lipset (1959) describes democracy as a system that forms a political culture of negotiation and
compromise. Within that framework, democracy acts as a system of redistribution of income
but also of increased education. This stimulates human capital accumulation as well as labor
productivity which in turn act as an engine for economic growth (see e.g. Acemoglu et al.
(2014), Boucekkine et al. (2016), Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000)). A stable and growing economy
with increasing income will itself lead to a more educated population demanding increased
participation, redistribution of power, rights and income. As such, socio-economic development
has been shown to be both outcome and determinant of democracy (see Acemoglu et al. (2019),
Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu (2008), Madsen et al. (2015), Narayan et al. (2011).)
Democracy and Conflict
The vast democratic peace literature (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), Oneal et al.
(1996), Gates et al. (1996), Mitchell et al. (1999)) has shown that democracy is a system for
the peaceful resolution of conflict. Hegre (2014) gives a good overview on this part of the
literature. Conflicts in turn affect democracies with the impact being determined by the type
conflict. Boese (2015) shows for example, that revolutionary conflict over the past 50 years has
had a positive effect on democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) show that the distribution
of power between elites and population play a critical role in the development of a state towards
democracy or dictatorship.
Trade and Democracy
The liberal theory suggests that democracies trade more (Mansfield and Snyder (2002)): On
the one hand, elites have less opportunities to extract protectionist rents, as democracies tend
to support rather the preferences of the greater part of the consumers than those of a few
producers (Tavares and Wacziarg (2001)). Free trade in turn consolidates democracy. It reduces
protectionist rents and thereby reduces the incentives for authoritarian groups to seek power.
With increasing democracy, both exporter and importer signal compliance with the rule of
law, reliability in business processes and a higher product quality (Liu and Ornelas (2014) and
Yu (2010)). However, groups that benefit from protectionism often try to impair politics via
lobbying (Tavares and Wacziarg (2001)).
Why democracy, development, trade and conflict?
The dynamic interactions between trade, development, democracy and conflict form central pil-
lars of the literature outlined above. In addition, Subramanian and Satyanath (2004) find that
trade openness, conflict and democracy are strongly (positively) correlated with macroeconomic
5.2. WHY ENDOGENEITY MATTERS 65
stability. Rodrik et al. (2004) model the interactions between trade openness, democracy, ge-
ography and income to assess the relative impact of the three former variables in determining
income levels. The theoretical logic underlying their paper is very close to the one applied here.
The model used in our paper considers the same endogenous variables and (due to the substan-
tial effects of conflict found in the democratic and liberal peace literature) adds conflict as an
endogenous variable.2
Endogeneity
Given the amount of findings on any of these bilateral relationships two points suggest them-
selves: first, the presence of simultaneous bilateral effects and second (through said simultaneous
direct effects) the presence of indirect effects. Both, in consequence lead to interaction structures
such as those in Figure 5.1. Several scholars have noted both, indirect effects, e.g. Persson and
Tabellini (2009), Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) Rodrik et al. (2004), Baum and Lake (2003),
and simultaneous effects, e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2009), Rodrik et al. (2004), Russett and
Oneal (2001). However, this article is the first systematic study that acknowledges both points
and that allows for a) all four factors being jointly determined, b) the factors to simultaneously
affect each other and c) indirect effects in their econometric specification.
2Since geography is a time-invariant characteristic it is captured in each country’s intercept in our model.
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5.3 Data and descriptive statistics
In this paper V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index, v2x libdem, is used as a measure of democ-
racy.3 Bernhard et al. (2017) show that the operationalization of democracy affects the results.
A major drawback of the vast amount of empirical literature carried out on the interrelation-
ships between democracy and other variables is that several studies use similar measure(s) of
democracy (see Altman et al. (2018), p. 14), most notably the Polity2 and Freedom House
Index. Boese (2019) provides a comprehensive introduction into quantitative democracy mea-
surement and a detailed overview of the empirical analyses these two indices should not be
employed for. She concludes that the comparatively new democracy indices by the Varieties
of Democracy Institute (V-Dem)4 were created to answer to most of the problems posed by
“classic” democracy measures, such as Polity2 and Freedom House Index. Consequently, they
substantially outperform them in terms of measure validity and reliability (this includes, for
example, their underlying definition of democracy, their measurement scales or the theoretical
justification of their respective aggregation procedures). Therefore, V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy
Index is employed in this paper. Its democracy definition includes the dimensions participation,
contestation and constraints on the executive decision making authority.5
This paper uses the armed conflict categorization provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram (UCDP). A conflict is coded as such once a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths is reached.
Armed conflict has four conflict sub-categories: Extra-systemic armed conflict, interstate armed
conflict, internal armed conflict and internationalized internal armed conflict.6 Furthermore,
the armed conflict category provides information on conflict involvement of different sides to a
conflict. To include all conflict observations a binary variable was created that is equal to one
once a country is involved in any type of conflict. Thus, all conflict involvements - no matter on
which side of the conflict a country stands - are included.
Against the background of the country-level of analysis, economic interdependence is opera-
tionalized as trade openness. Trade openness has been widely used as a measure of economic
integration (see e.g. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000)). Trade as percent of GDP is taken from the
World Bank Indicators, who define the indicator as follows: “Trade is the sum of exports and
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.” Data is available
as weighted average and on annual level.
Literature including variables on socio-economic development often uses GDP per capita. Since
this study includes trade openness as measure for economic interdependence and hence as an eco-
nomic measure, we abstract away from including a “socio-economic” quantification, but rather
introduce a measure for development. We quantify development by using the World Develop-
ment Indicator “Life expectancy at birth, female”. The indicator is defined as “the number of
years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were
to stay the same throughout its life.” Data is available as weighted average and on annual level.
Mortality rates mirror the health conditions of a country and are therefore a commonly used
indicator for development.
3v2x libdem is taken from the V-Dem Dataset Version 7.1, Coppedge et al. (2017d).
4The V-Dem indices are available since Lindberg et al. (2014).
5For a detailed introduction into democracy measurement as well as explanations of the concepts of participa-
tion, contestation and constraints see for example Boese (2019).
6The exact UCDP definitions of conflict types are provided in the Appendix
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Liberal Democracy Index 40.84 29.76 1.22 90.34
Trade Openness 65.63 50.42 4.92 441.60
Life Expectancy, Female 66.49 12.58 29.28 87.14
Armed Conflict 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
Table 5.2: Summary statistics for pooled estimation sample
Variable Std. Dev. Min Max
country means
Liberal Democracy Index 26.46 4.41 87.62
Trade Openness 46.32 19.14 330.71
Life Expectancy, Female 11.13 45.12 80.52
Armed Conflict 0.24 0.02 0.89
Table 5.3: Variation between country means
Variable Std. Dev. Min Max
Liberal Democracy Index 13.98 -56.67 37.12
Trade Openness 20.70 -101.52 192.82
Life Expectancy, Female 6.00 -22.72 20.03
Armed Conflict 0.39 -0.89 0.98
Table 5.4: Within country variation. The minimum (maximum) column refers to the lowest
(highest) deviation a country exhibited from its respective panel mean.
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics
The dataset used in the analysis covers 68 countries and the time perid 1960 to 2016, i.e. 3,876
observations (57 observations per country). The dataset is balanced.7 Table 5.2 provides the
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables in the estimation sample.
Instead of taking the pooled sample as a basis, Table 5.3 examines the panel means of each
country’s time series. The variation between country means is quite substantial, especially for
trade openness: the highest country mean is around 330 units whereas the country with the
lowest mean displayed average trade openness levels of around 19. Since the armed conflict
variable is a dummy equal to one in conflict years the minimum (maximum) value in Table 5.3
shows the minimum (maximum) percent of years in the time series a country was involved in
armed conflict. The country with the lowest number of years involved in conflict was involved
2% of the 57 years, i.e. one year. The country with the highest number of years in armed conflict
was involved during 89% of its time series (equivalent to 51 years).
How did the country values vary within the panels over time? Table 5.4 shows that the within
variation for each country is substantially lower than the variation between the country averages
for three of four variables (democracy, trade and development). In other words, the countries
in this sample differ from each other (in terms of their trade, democracy or development levels)
than each country’s values vary over their respective time series. This heterogeneity of countries
is remarkable and will be captured by the model used in this paper.
7A detailed list of countries and the respective regions included in the sample can be found in the Appendix
(see Table D.1).
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5.4 Model and Estimation
Findings of previous studies provide a starting point for this study: they suggest the presence
of simultaneity, i.e. that trade, democracy, development and conflict each affect one another
bilaterally. For each bilateral relationship, studies exist showing that “A causes B” as well as “B
causes A”. Note, the four factors bilaterally affect each other both directly as well as indirectly
through the other variables. The model used in this paper allows trade, democracy, development
and conflict to be jointly determined and captures the indirect effects. As such it provides a
suitable econometric framework to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Development, democracy, trade and conflict simultaneously affect each other
Econometric implications of this hypothesis are the following: First, to avoid omitted vari-
able bias a model needs to include each of these factors. Second, imagine four separate “one
equation”-models of each of these variables with regressors consisting of lags and current val-
ues of the other variables. In each of these equations neither the simultaneity nor the indirect
effects that the variables have on each other through a third or fourth variable are accounted
for. The errors are contemporaneously correlated across the four equations. By examining or-
thogonalized shocks, this model allows for such a contemporaneous correlation of error terms.
Examining these shocks will show whether there are simultaneous effects from each variable
on all others (once we account for indirect effects) or whether there are bilateral relationships
for which the effects solely run “from A to B” (and not vice versa). Is there a chronological
order in which these factors affect each other? We assume that development and democracy
are slow changing variables whereas trade and conflict react to shocks much faster in comparison.
Two limitations imposed by the dataset are worth noting. First, the 68 countries used in this
study constitute but a part of the global system of states. For reasons of data availability it is
not possible to include further countries. Data availability, however, is correlated with some of
the four variables, most prominently conflict. Afghanistan, for example, could not be included
as it’s trade openness time series exhibited missing values for 25 of the 57 years used in the
analysis. Nevertheless, the estimation sample consists of 68 countries from all regions of the
world and as such is “as representative as possible”. The second limitation is measure relia-
bility. Socio-economic development is a latent factors difficult to measure. As such it is often
measured in vastly differing ways. While we cannot adjust data availability, we do control for
different specifications of development in the robustness checks section. Our main results are
robust to these changes.
5.4.1 Reduced form VAR
The model used in this paper assumes that development, democracy, trade and conflict are
jointly determined. To test whether there are simultaneous effects between each other the
following reduced form VAR(4) model is estimated for each country i:
yi,t = Ai,1yi,t−1 + ...+Ai,4yi,t−4 + κi + ϵi,t, (5.1)
i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 68}, t ∈ {1, 2, ..., 57}
where yi,t = (developmenti,t, democracyi,t, tradei,t, conflicti,t)
′ is a 4x1 vector of dependent
variables, Ai,1, ..., Ai,4 are 4x4 matrices of lag coefficients to be estimated and ϵi,t is a 4x1 white
noise process. To keep the model parsimonious the 4x1 vector κi is the sole exogenous regressor
(this permits a nonzero mean E[yi, t]). With this model specification all current period measures
of democracy, development, conflict and trade are a function of past values of each other. Hence,
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the total reduced-form effect that a past increase in, for example, democracy had on each of the
other dependent variables can be calculated and orthogonalized effects can be examined over
time.
The number of lagged values to include in the equation deserves some attention. The data used
in this paper is in annual format. Including one lag hence is equivalent to adding an entire year
of information to the model (in light of the slow changing nature of variables such as democracy
or development this is a fair amount of time). To make sure that even a more volatile measure
such as trade openness is appropriately captured in the VAR model a lag length of 4 years is
selected.8 From a theoretical perspective, four years is an appropriate lag length choice as it is
the average electoral period length in the countries under study. Standard Information Criteria
(AIC, adjusted R2) presented in Section 5.6 confirm this choice of lag length.
The following three assumptions one the error term are central for this model:
E[ϵi,t] = 0, E[ϵi,tϵ
′
i,t] = Σ and E[ϵi,tϵ
′
i,s] = 0, for t ̸= s
Through the non-singular matrix Σ the error terms are allowed to be contemporaneously cor-
related. However, they must be uncorrelated with their lags and lead values as well as all
right-hand side variables of the model.
Given the high amount of variation across countries (rather than within each countries time
series)9 the VAR(4) model is estimated country by country. This permits the slope parame-
ters to be heterogenous across countries. In most cross-country analyses using panel data slope
parameters are assumed to be homogenous across countries and systematic differences between
countries are assumed to be captured through country specific fixed effects. Through estimating
our model country-by-country it provides the slope parameters with the possibility to differ (i.e.
the coefficients have the option to differ as much as to be homogenous across countries) while
including a country specific intercept, κi. In that sense the model is an extension of above
mentioned panel data models.
Using impulse response functions the dynamic relationships between democracy, development,
economic interdependence and conflict can be depicted graphically. To derive them, it is useful
to transform model (5.1) in its Vector Moving Average, VMA(∞), Representation:
yi,t = Ai,1yi,t−1 + ...+Ai,4yi,t−4 + κi + ϵi,t
= Ai,1Lyi,t + ...+Ai,4L
4yi,t + κi + ϵi,t
(I −Ai,1L− ...−Ai,4L4)yi,t = κi + ϵi,t
Let the lag polinomial Φi,4(L) := I −Ai,1L− ...−Ai,4L4 then
yi,t = Φi,4(L)
−1κi +Φi,4(L)−1ϵi,t (5.2)
For Φi,4(L)
−1 to exist, |Φi,4(L)| ̸= 0. Φi,4(L)−1κi = µi where E[yi,t] = µi (there is no t-subscript
as the process is stationary)
yi,t = µi +
∞∑
s=0
θsϵi,t−s (5.3)
8Robustness checks with up to ten lags can be found in the Appendix. The results do not change.
9See Section 5.3.1.
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where θ0 = I ans θs is a function of Φi,4(L). This Vector Moving Average, VMA(∞), Represen-
tation is the basis upon which impulse response functions are created. The effect of the shocks
ϵi,t on Yi,t are now captured by
δyi,t
δϵi,t−s
= θsi (5.4)
and can be interpreted as the effects of a shock in one variable on the others over time. Note
that yi,t and ϵi,t−s are 4x1 vectors. This allows us to calculate the response of the n− th element
in y to a shock in the m− th element.
The impulse response functions depict the following situation: in the first period there is a one
period (in this framework: one-year) positive shock with a magnitude of one standard devia-
tion in the impulse variable. All other/response variables are set to their mean values in the
first period. The impulse response graphs (see for example Figure 5.3 or Section D.3 of the
Appendix) show the response variable’s deviation from its mean in each year after the positive
shock of the impulse variable in the first period. The solid line represents the point estimate
of the response. The dashed lines highlight a 95 percent confidence band around that estimate.
This paper focuses on responses to shocks over a ten year period.
5.4.2 Structural VAR
Given that the error terms are contemporaneously correlated in model (5.1) the estimated pa-
rameter values therein are impossible to interpret and further identifying assumptions are nec-
essary. These assumptions in our case are that development and democracy are (in comparison
to trade and conflict) slow changing variables, i.e. a shock in development or democracy will
have an effect on trade and conflict in the same period while democracy and development will
take time in responding to a shock in trade or conflict. Therefore, we assume the following
ordering: development, democracy, conflict and trade.10 That means development affects all
other factors contemporaneously, but is not contemporaneously affected by shocks in the other
variables. Democracy affects conflict and trade contemporaneously and is affected only by con-
temporaneous shocks of development and so on.
From an econometric perspective implementing these assumptions means model 5.1 needs to be
orthogonalized (to obtain a variance-covariance matrix of error terms with orthogonalized zero
off-diagonal elements). This paper uses a Choletsky decomposition, i.e.:
Cyi,t = CAi,1yi,t−1 + ...+ CAi,4yi,t−4 + Cκi + Cϵi,t, (5.5)
where Cϵi,t = ui,t and V ar[ui,t] = Σu = σ
2
uiI.
This structual VAR(4) model is then transformed into its VMA(∞) Representations and the
impulse response functions are calculated as discussed above. The next section summarizes the
main findings from these orthogonalized impulse response functions.
5.5 Results
The hypothesis to examine is that simultaneous effects from variable A to variable B as well as
from B to A are present. As there are four endogenous variables, there are 6 bilateral relation-
ships to examine: 1. trade and democracy, 2. trade and development, 3. trade and conflict, 4.
10As Robustness Checks results for a different orderings are reported in Section 5.6.
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development and democracy, 5. development and conflict and 6. democracy and conflict. Each
bilateral relationship consists of two parts: A affects B and B affects A. If the impulse response
functions display significant effects for both of these parts simultaneous effects are present and
the hypothesis can be accepted.
The VAR(4) model is estimated and impulse response functions are calculated for each country,
i.e. 68 times. There is one impulse response function for every country (68) and every bilateral
relationship part (6 ·2 = 12), i.e. per model specification 68 ·12 = 816 impulse response functions
are calculated. The question of how to aggregate the information contained in these functions
to a displayable level is not trivial. To test our hypothesis, for each part of the bilateral relation-
ship, the number of countries exhibiting a significant effect is of immediate interest. Therefore,
Figure 5.2 displays the number of countries with significantly positive and negative (and no)
results for each impulse-response combination. Each cell of the table constitutes one part of a
bilateral relationship.11
Figure 5.2 provides two fundamental insights: First, it suggests the hypothesis is true - simulta-
neous effects between all variables exist. For all combinations of variables “A affects B” as well
as “B affects A”. This is crucial. Any model estimating the effect of one of these variables on
another has to account for the simultaneous relationships as well as the indirect effects. Second,
for all impulse-response combinations there are positive as well as negative responses, i.e. the
effects that these variables have on one another are far from homogeneous across countries. For
each part of the bilateral relationships the responses differ across countries in terms of effect sign,
magnitude and timing. Section D.3 of the Appendix contains the impulse response functions
(as well as a discussion thereof) for countries with significant responses ordered by bilateral
relationship. In fact, the responses are not even homogeneous within regions. Section D.2 of
the Appendix shows that aggregating the impulse response functions on even a regional level
disguises the variations contained within the country responses. A similar effect would occur
had this model been estimated under a homogeneous slope parameter assumption.
11Note, that the question “how does a variable respond to shocks in itself?” is not part of this analysis. The
corresponding impulse response combinations are reported in Figure 5.2 solely for the sake of completeness.
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The sole part of a bilateral relationship for which there is an overwhelmingly positive effect
is that of development on trade openness. There are three countries for which a one period
one standard deviation positive shock in development leads to negative responses: the Central
African Republic, Uruguay and Nicaragua (see Figure 8). The substantial magnitude of the
negative effect suggests that cross-country heterogeneity in responses cannot be neglected for
this bilateral relationship either.
As depicted in Figure 3, even within one country the effect of a shock can be heterogeneous over
time. In Kenya, for example, a one period one standard deviation positive shock in development
leads to a significant positive effect for trade openness within the first three periods but switches
to a significant negative and lasting effect in period six. For Portugal, a shock in development
has the reverse effect: within the first three periods, trade is affected negatively, but switches
to a positive effect in period six. These switches can be observed across regions and in the
bilateral relationships between conflict and trade, development and democracy, and conflict and
democracy.
5.6 Robustness Checks
How sensitive are these results to the identifying assumption and the model specification? To
answer this question the model was re-estimated with six different specifications all of which are
discussed in the remainder of this section.
In any VAR model the choice of lag length deserves attention. The baseline model of this paper
was run with a lag length of four years since this approximately equals the average electoral
period. To determine whether this lag selection is appropriate, several avenues were pursued:
first, standard autocorrelation tests, such as the LM-test (Null hypothesis: no serial correlation
of order 1-4) were consulted. As to be expected in a cross country setting such as this one auto-
correlation is present in some of the countries. Eyeballing the residual plots for these countries
(provided in Section D.5) suggest no systematic presence of heavy autocorrelation. Nevertheless,
to make sure autocorrelation is negligible the VAR(4) model was re-estimated in first differences.
Although the number of countries displaying significant results is smaller (see Figure D.26 of
the Appendix) the same simultaneous effects as well as country specific heterogeneity in ef-
fect magnitude, timing and sign are visible. Comparing standard goodness-of-fit criteria for
the baseline VAR(4) model in levels (Table5.7) and in first difference (Table 5.5) confirms the
VAR(4) specification in levels. In the presence of autocorrelation an alternative option is to
increase lag length. Therefore, the model was re-estimated as a VAR(8) and VAR(10) model.
The responses remain heterogeneous across countries and the effects still appear simultaneously
for both parts of each bilateral relationship (see Figure D.30 for VAR(8) and Figure D.31 for
VAR(10)). Comparing model fit across these three lag specifications (see Table 5.6) suggests
that longer lag specification yield better fits. However, with increasing lag length four countries
must be dropped from the analysis because of colinearity in the variables. To include the highest
number of countries possible and since the results remain robust the lag length of four remains
the preferred specification.
By choosing female life expectancy as a measure of development this paper deviates slightly
from common approaches to measuring development, namely by GDP-related variables. As
robustness checks the model was re-estimated using once GDP per capita growth and once
logged GDP per capita as measures of development. Before discussing the results it it worh
remembering (see Section 5.3) that GDP is included in the measure of trade openness used in
this paper:
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Figure 5.3: Impulse response functions for Kenya and Portugal displaying a switch from a
significant positive effect of democracy on trade to a significant negative effect and vice versa.
tradet =
(exportst + importst)
GDPt
This implies that
δtradet
δGDPt
= −(exportst + importst)
GDP 2t
< 0, if exportst + importst > 0 and GDPt ̸= 0
as well as
δGDPt
δtradet
= −(exportst + importst)
trade2t
< 0, if exportst + importst > 0 and tradet ̸= 0
GDP per capita growth and logged GDP per capita are defined as
growtht =
GDPpct −GDPpct−1
GDPpct−1
and lnGPDpct = ln(GDPpct)
Assuming that GDPpc is a function positively increasing in GDP the shocks examined in this
paper would (ceteris paribus) and by pure definition of variables be expected to have the following
effects:
A positive shock in development, measured by growtht or lnGDPpct, would correspond to an in-
crease in GDP per capita (and consequently in GDP) leading to a decrease in tradet. Conversely
a shock in trade openness implies a reduction in GDP and with it a reduction in lnGDPpct
and growtht, respectively. Interestingly, for both specifications (using growtht or lnGDPpct)
positive responses to shocks in trade as well as to shocks in development are clearly visible. The
number of countries with trade values responding negatively to shocks in development increases
substantially in comparison to the VAR(4) model, which was to be expected given the definition
of the variables. The number of countries exibiting signifcant results is smaller when the GDP
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model in first differences
Dep. Var. Obs. adj. R2 AIC
development 68.00 0.71 -4.92
(0.43) (3.71)
democracy 68.00 0.11 4.51
(0.23) (1.71)
conflict 68.00 0.20 0.40
(0.22) (0.78)
trade 68.00 0.07 -1.64
(0.17) (0.88)
Overall -1.86
(3.19)
Table 5.5: Model fit for model in first differences. “Obs.” refers to the number of countries in the
analysis. Values reported for adjusted R2 and AIC by equation are pooled averages. Standard
deviations are reported below each cell.
Baseline VAR(4) Lag length 8 Lag length 10
Dep. Var. Obs. adj. R2 AIC Obs. adjusted R2 AIC Obs. adjusted R2 AIC
development 68 1.00 -5.02 64 0.13 -5.26 64 1.00 -6.27
(0.01) (3.75) (0.19) (3.91) (0.01) (3.94)
democracy 68 0.90 4.34 64 0.89 4.05 64 0.92 3.03
(0.11) (1.69) (0.11) (1.79) (0.10) (1.93)
conflict 68 0.45 0.22 64 0.39 0.09 64 0.58 -0.90
(0.29) (0.74) (0.35) (0.86) (0.37) (1.48)
trade 68 0.83 -1.79 64 0.82 -1.96 64 0.87 -2.80
(0.13) (0.85) (0.14) (0.83) (0.15) (0.94)
Overall AIC -2.48 -3.69 -9.09
(3.23) (3.73) (4.63)
Table 5.6: Comparing model fit across different lag specifications. “Obs.” refers to the number
of countries in the analysis. Values reported for adjusted R2 and AIC by equation are pooled
averages. Standard deviations are reported below each cell.
per capita growth specification is employed, which is also unsurprising since it is a growth rather
than a levels variable (the response of development to a shock in trade, for example is closer to
the baseline VAR(4) result for the lnGDPpct specification than for the growtht specification).
According to the information criteria presented in Table 5.7 across different specifications of
development baseline VAR(4) remains the preferred specification.
The ordering of the variables in the Choletsky decomposition represents a central identify-
ing assumption of the structural VAR. To assess the model’s sensitivity to this assumption a
Choletsky-decomposition was employed and impulse response function were calculated using
the alternative ordering: democracy, development, trade and conflict.12 The results (see Figure
D.27) remain very similar.
12The two slow changing variables were switched and so were the two fast changing variables. Deviating from
the slow- and fast-changing setup (i.e. ordering the variables with trade (or conflict) as first or second variable in
the VAR) would imply that the a slow changing variable like democracy or development responded to a shock in
trade (or conflict) within that same period, which seems unreasonable.
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Baseline VAR(4) GDP p.c. growth log GDP p.c.
Dep. Var. Obs. adj. R2 AIC Obs. adj. R2 AIC Obs. adj. R2 AIC
development 68 1.00 -5.02 67 0.13 8.02 68 0.97 -1.35
(0.01) (3.75) (0.19) (0.76) (0.05) (0.75)
democracy 68 0.90 4.34 67 0.89 4.41 68 0.90 4.35
(0.11) (1.69) (0.11) (1.73) (0.10) (1.70)
conflict 68 0.45 0.22 67 0.39 0.29 68 0.40 0.25
(0.29) (0.74) (0.35) (0.75) (0.34) (0.74)
trade 68 0.83 -1.79 67 0.82 -1.74 68 0.83 -1.77
(0.13) (0.85) (0.14) (0.84) (0.15) (0.84)
Overall AIC -2.48 10.72 1.20
(3.23) (2.75) (2.71)
Table 5.7: Comparing model fit across different specifications of development. “Obs.” refers to
the number of countries in the analysis. Values reported for adjusted R2 and AIC by equation
are pooled averages. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses below each cell.
5.7 Discussion & Conclusion
This paper estimates the simultaneous effects of trade openness, democracy, armed conflict and
development on each other by employing a VAR model. The previous section confirms that the
results are robust to a number of different model specifications and that standard information
criteria confirm the model choice. The two central findings obtained are: i. the prevalence of
simultaneous effects between development, democracy, trade and conflict and ii. the substantial
heterogeneity in responses across and even within countries. These findings partially explain
as to why the literature so far displayed findings in favor of each direction: first, because the
effects are mixed and impacts run both ways of each bilateral relationship. Second, the contem-
poraneous determination of the four factors needs to be accounted for econometrically. Third,
heterogeneity of responses across countries and over time needs to be allowed for.
A large part of the literature has accounted for simultaneity in the bilateral study of each of
the four factors by, e.g. the use of lags, fixed effects, simultaneous equation models or IV ap-
proaches (see e.g. Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) and Martin et al. (2008)). However, the present
study proves that solely examining bilateral relationships without controlling for time-varying
other influences is not enough (as, e.g. seen in Frankel and Romer (1999) and Acemoglu et al.
(2019). Simultaneous effects of more than two factors have to be accounted for.
Furthermore, the results of this paper strongly advocate against the widely assumed homo-
geneity of slope parameters. Section D.3 of the Appendix thoroughly discusses the variation of
effects across countries. This is especially important in the study of these four factors, as a lot of
research tries to establish “one result fits all” findings. In this regard, the present study has to
disagree with recent aggregate findings such as that democracy causes growth (Acemoglu et al.
2019), democracy does not cause growth (Pozuelo et al. 2016) or trade promotes peace (Hegre
et al. 2010). Additionally, this finding touches upon ideological grounds: institutions like the
World Bank as well as OECD and other advocates for the liberal cause untiringly and unceas-
ingly insist that trade aids development, reduces conflict and helps to establish democracy (see
e.g. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000)). This paper finds that they are all right, but at the same
time, they are all wrong: all depends on the country you are looking at.
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This finding of heterogeneous effects is in line with the results of the studies that relax the
homogeneous slope parameter assumption (to different degrees),13 most notably Cervellati et al.
(2014). Cervellati et al. (2014) replicate a seminal study, Acemoglu et al. (2008), which finds a
robust null-effect of development (income) on democracy once country fixed effects are included.
In their replication Cervellati et al. (2014) find that once the effects of income on democracy are
allowed to differ across countries there is substantial heterogeneity in slope parameters. They
conclude that this heterogeneity (and with it the wide range of point estimates of slope parame-
ters across countries) can provide a plausible reason for the null-result in Acemoglu et al. (2008)
or any model assuming homogeneity of slope parameters in this context.
Additionally, hetereogeneity is not limited to the cross-section, but also is important on the
within-country level - as discussed in Section 5.5 and shown in Figure 3. This finding is another
valid argument against the homogeneous slope parameter assumption on the one hand, but as
well for the incorporation of heterogeneity over time.
Certain limitations to the model are worth noting. First, in the interest of parsimony no exoge-
nous control variables are added. The number of possible extensions to this model is limited by
page-restrictions only. In future research, an interesting approach would be, for example, to ex-
pand on the conflict dimension. The conflict category used in this paper consists of several quite
different forms of conflict. This aggregate measure hides the heterogeneous effects of different
conflict types (see Kamin (n.d.)). Such conflict types could be added to the model one by one
as well as a location variable indicating whether a given country was the location of a conflict
in a given year or not. Secondly, for a better understanding of bilateral trade and bilateral con-
flict, the country-year format employed in this paper could be extended into a country-pair-year
format. Bilateral trade and conflict heavily depend on country pair characteristics. Including
such information in the model would be an interesting extension.
13See for example Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), Narayan et al. (2011).
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Appendix A
Viva la revolucio´n
A.1 Composition of the Pol Index
This paper analyzes the development of and changes in the governing structures of roughly 140
countries over the past 60 years. Hence, a measure of “system of governance” was needed. Due
to its broad chronological and geographical scope the Polity2 Index1 was the most suitable one
for our purpose. It ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic) and is
calculated by subtracting a measure of autocracy (AUTOC) from a measure of institutionalized
democracy (DEMOC).2 In this paper democratization thus refers to an “upwards” move on the
Polity2 scale.
Examining changes in the system of governance it is essential that the democracy measure is
coded on an interval scale. The Polity2 Index, however, is not: an index value of “0” can occur in
three different cases. The most intuitive one is if a country’s AUTOC score equals its DEMOC
score. The second reason why a country might be assigned a Polity2 Index value of “0” in a
given year is a transition period. The Polity Project codes years of transition during which “new
institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect” resulting in new polities.3 If
a country is undergoing such a transition its Polity2 Index is prorated across the time span of
the transition. For example, if it has a transition year in 1990 and index values of “-2” in 1989
and “2” in 1991, then 1990 will be assigned a “0”. Both of these codings are suitable for our
research since the differences between the Polity2 Index values remain meaningful. However,
this is not true for the third case in which a country might be assigned a value of “0”. In years
in which a total collapse of central political authority occurs the country is assigned a Polity2
Index value of “0”. The civil war in Afghanistan, 1992 - 1995, is an example for such a case
of “anarchy”. The meaning behind this particular “0” is rather different from the others and
it renders the differences impossible to interpret. Consequently, the category “complete loss of
central political authority” was included for such cases and they were coded separately. The
question where to place this category on the scale of measure of “governing structures” is not an
easy one to answer since it implies a rating. The Polity2 Index is coded using an “institutional
approach” to governing structures. When coding AUTOC and DEMOC the PolityIV Project
evaluates a number of factors, namely the openness and competitiveness of executive recruit-
ment, constraints on the chief executive and the competitiveness of political participation. When
a country falls into anarchy, its institutions cease to function. Hence, it was positioned at the
very bottom of the scale. Another limitation to the Polity2 Index which needed to be changed
in our framework is the following: The Polity Project regards years as an interruption during
1Retrieved from Marshall et al. (2013).
2For a detailed discussion of the components and limitations of the Polity2 index confer to the Polity IV
Project Dataset User’s Manual, Gurr et al. (2013), pp.13-20.
3See Polity IV Project Dataset User’s Manual, Gurr et al. (2013), p.19.
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which “a country is occupied by foreign powers during war, terminating the old polity, (...)
until an independent polity is reestablished” after the end of foreign occupation.4 Such years
are coded as system missing. This is an avoidable loss of information. Since the central political
authority of the respective country ceases to function as before, the “interruption” cases are
captured in the “complete loss of central political authority” category. In order to differentiate
between interruption and anarchy a variable stating whether the central political authority was
a) in the hands of the corresponding country, b) collapsed or c) in the hands of foreign powers
to our analysis was added. I labelled this redefined Polity2 Index Pol Index. In the following pi,t
will denote the Pol Index of country i at time t. Then ∆pi,[t,t+k] := pi,t+k − pi,t is the change in
Pol Index for country i between the years t and t+ k. In the analysis, this paper examines how
a number of factors in the base year t are connected to the level of the Pol Index 2, 5 and 10
years later. It focuses on the periods k = 2, 5, 10 representing the short, intermediate and long
run.
4See Polity IV Project Dataset User’s Manual, Gurr et al. (2013), p.19.
Appendix B
How (not) to measure democracy
B.1 Factor Analysis of the Polity2 Index components:
Coppedge et al. (2008) carry out a factor analysis for four of the components (parcomp, xropen,
xrcomp and xconst) as well as several other measures of democracy. They find evidence for two
latent factors - contestation and participation. In their analysis xropen contributes to the inclu-
siveness/participation factor while the other components are associated with the contestation
factor. The results of their analysis might be misleading insofar as Democ, Autoc and Polity
Index are not made up of the actual values of the respective components. Due to the intricate
weighing and aggregation scheme the indices are sums of the scores on each the components cat-
egories. Hence, I created score variables capturing the actual value which is contributed to the
Polity Index and carried out an exploratory factor analysis on them. The results for the factor
analysis using the score variables are displayed in Table B.1. One latent factor explains 95.86%
of the variation the Polity Index’s components - contestation (or, as Munck and Verkuilen put
it: the procedure by which the executive office is filled). These findings in combination with
the absence of any suffrage/inclusiveness requirement suggest that the Polity Index in fact is a
measure of political contestation rather than democracy - even if one embraces the minimalist
democracy definition with contestation and participation.
Table B.1: Factor analysis results for the score variables of Polity’s five components
Factor Eigenvalue Proportion
1 3.56 0.9586
2 0.36 0.0981
3 -0.01 -0.0038
N= 17,228
Variable: Factor Loadings Uniqueness KMO
scores of... (Factor 1)
...xrcomp 0.8969 0.1955 0.7771
...xropen 0.8337 0.3050 0.7778
...xconst 0.8039 0.3537 0.9209
...parcomp 0.8504 0.2768 0.7833
...parreg 0.8314 0.3087 0.7925
Overall: 0.8055
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B.2 Checklist of questions and respectives scores for the com-
ponents of the Freedom House Index
Table B.2: Checklist for the Freedom House Index. Source: Freedom House Methodology
Website, Freedom House (2017b)
 Score Political Rights Score Civil Liberties 
 0–12 points A. Electoral Process  
1. Is the head of government or other chief national authority 
elected through free and fair elections? 
2. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free 
and fair elections? 
3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair? 
 
0–16 points D. Freedom of Expression and Belief  
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural 
expression?  (Note: In cases where the media are state controlled but offer 
pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.) 
2. Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and 
express themselves in public and private? 
3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive 
political indoctrination? 
4. Is there open and free private discussion? 
 0–16 points B. Political Pluralism and Participation  
1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political 
parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, 
and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing 
parties or groupings? 
2. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic opportunity 
for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through 
elections? 
3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the 
military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious 
hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group? 
4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full 
political rights and electoral opportunities? 
0–12 points E. Associational and Organizational Rights  
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 
2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations?  (Note: This includes 
civic organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc., with an emphasis on 
those engaged in human rights– and governance-related work.) 
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is 
there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other 
private organizations? 
 
 0–12 points C. Functioning of Government  
1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative 
representatives determine the policies of the government? 
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption? 
3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between 
elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency? 
 
0–16 points F. Rule of Law  
1. Is there an independent judiciary? 
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters?  Are police under 
direct civilian control? 
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or 
torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there 
freedom from war and insurgencies? 
4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various 
segments of the population? 
  
(0-4 points) 
 
 
 
(–4 to 0 points) 
Additional Discretionary Political Rights Questions 
A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral 
process, does the system provide for genuine, meaningful 
consultation with the people, encourage public discussion of 
policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?  
B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the 
ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a 
culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?  
Note: For additional discretionary question A, a score of 1 to 4 may 
be added, as applicable, while for discretionary question B, a 
score of 1 to 4 may be subtracted, as applicable (the worse the 
situation, the more points may be subtracted).  
0–16 points G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights  
1. Do individuals enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, 
or institution of higher education? 
2. Do individuals have the right to own property and establish private 
businesses?  Is private business activity unduly influenced by government 
officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized 
crime? 
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of 
marriage partners, and size of family? 
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?  
Total 0 - 40 points With the two discretionary questions the highest possible score 
remains 40, but the lowest possible score is -4.  
0 - 60 points  
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B.3 Setup of V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (Polyarchy)
Table B.3: Setup of the Electoral Democracy (Polyarchy) Index. The information displayed
here is gathered from the V-Dem Codebook, Coppedge et al. (2017a), p.49 - 59 and p. 435-436.
High-Level Indicies: 
 
Electoral Democracy Index, v2x_polyarchy, 
Question: To what extent are rulers responsive to citizens?(...) [It is] achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s 
approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are 
clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the 
country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on 
matters of political relevance.  
The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl’s sub-components (with the one exception of the non-electoral component). The index 
is aggregated using this formula: 
              
 
 
        
 
 
        
 
 
 
Mid-Level Indices: 
 
Additive Polyarchy Index, v2x_api Multiplicative polyarchy index, v2x_mpi 
Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved? 
Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens 
through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil 
society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief 
executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections. 
         
 
 
                   
                 
 
 
                                            
                 
 
 
                 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
           
                                                       
                ...                       
 
 
 
Low-Level Indices: 
 
Freedom of expression 
index 
, v2x_freexp_thick 
 
Freedom of 
association 
index, 
v2x_frassoc
_thick 
Clean elections 
index, 
v2xel_frefair 
Elected official index,  
v2x_elecoff 
Share of 
population 
with 
suffrage, 
v2x_suffr 
Type A (factual), B and C (expert coded) variables 
Government 
censorship effort of 
media, Harassment of 
journalists,  
Media self-censorship, 
Media bias, 
Print/broadcast media 
critical, 
Print/broadcast media 
perspectives;  
Freedom of discussion 
for men; 
 Freedom of discussion 
for women;  
Freedom of academic 
and cultural 
expression) 
 Party ban, 
Barriers to 
parties, 
Opposition 
parties 
autonomy, 
Elections 
multiparty, 
civil society 
entry and 
exit, civil 
society 
repression 
 
EMB autonomy, 
EMB capacity, 
Election voter 
registry,   
Election vote 
buying,  
Election other 
voting 
irregularities, 
Election 
government 
intimidation, 
Election other 
electoral 
violence, 
Election free 
and fair 
Legislature bicameral,  
Lower chamber elected, Upper chamber 
elected, Legislature dominant chamber,  
head of state(HOS) selection by 
legislature in practice, HOS 
appointment in practice,  
HOG selection by legislature in practice,  
HOG appointment in practice,  
HOS appoints cabinet in practice,  
HOG appoints cabinet in practice,  
HOS dismisses ministers in practice,  
HOG dismisses ministers in practice, 
HOS = HOG?  
Chief executive appointment by upper 
chamber,  
Chief executive appointment by upper 
chamber explicit approval 
 Percent of 
population 
with 
suffrage 
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B.4 Derivation of the Polyarchy Index’ rate of influence
democracy index =
1
4
· (polyarchy1.6 + component index) + 1
2
· polyarchy1.6 · component index
(B.1)
The polyarchy index influences each high level democracy index to the power of 1.6. The
intuition behind this rate is explained in the V-Dem Methodology V7 paper, Coppedge et al.
(2017e), p.10: “when a country has a polyarchy score of .5 (in practice, this is a threshold on the
Electoral Democracy Index beyond which countries tend to be considered electoral democracies
in a minimal sense) and its HPC1 is at its maximum (1), the high level index score should be
.5”.
0.5 =
1
4
· (0.5x + 1) + 1
2
· 0.5x · 1→ x ≈ 1.6 (B.2)
This benchmark case is shown in equation 1. Solving for x yields a rate of close to 1.6. Intu-
itively, setting a higher rate of influence for polyarchy than any of the other component indices
reflects a notion of democracy being a question of kind before one of degree. The principles of
contestation and participation should be satisfied to a certain degree before further aspects of
democracy can be employed to distinguish between regime types.
B.5 Summary statistics for the V-Dem democracy measures
Summary statistics for...
Democracy ...all observations available per index
Index: Obs. Mean Median St. D. Min Max
Polyarchy (Electoral) 17,036 0.318 0.206 0.279 0.009 0.947
Liberal 17,035 0.260 0.151 0.246 0.009 0.916
Participatory 17,035 0.192 0.105 0.193 0.005 0.814
Deliberative 17,035 0.209 0.068 0.262 0.000 0.913
Egalitarian 17,036 0.242 0.148 0.232 0.011 0.890
...the trunk dataset
Index: Obs. Mean Median St. D. Min Max
Polyarchy (Electoral) 6,546 0.455 0.406 0.287 0.014 0.947
Liberal 6,546 0.354 0.260 0.279 0.010 0.916
Participatory 6,546 0.279 0.212 0.210 0.007 0.814
Deliberative 6,546 0.330 0.236 0.294 0.001 0.913
Egalitarian 6,546 0.356 0.260 0.249 0.032 0.890
Table B.4: Summary Statistics for V-Dem democracy measures for all observations available
(left) and observations in the trunk dataset (right).
1HPC refers to High Principle Component (here: component index).
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B.6 Regression of difference between democracy measures on
“hypothetical democracy”
Dep. Var.: Polity2 - Polyarchy Polity2 - FHI FHI-Polyarchy
Coeff. Coeff Coeff
hypothetical democracy 0.2326*** 0.0857*** 0.1469***
(0.0055) (0.0064) (.0049)
constant -0.0040 0.0120*** -0.0241***
(0.0033) (0.0038) (.0029)
R2 0.2175 0.0266 0.1252
N 6,546 6.546 6,546
***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
Table B.5: Regression results for regression of difference between democracy measures on “hy-
pothetical democracy”. Pooled OLS, standard deviation in parenthesis below.
Independent variable: “hypothetical democracy”:= (Polity2+FHI+Polyarchy)3
88 APPENDIX B. HOW (NOT) TO MEASURE DEMOCRACY
B.7 Description of the democracy measures’ distribution
Figure B.1: Histogram of the normalized democracy measures in trunk dataset
Table B.6: Percentiles for Polity2 (normalized between 0-1), Polyarchy and FHI (reversed and
normalized between 0-1) in trunk dataset
Polity2 Polyarchy FHI
Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest Percentiles Smallest
1% 0 0 0.0257 0.0140 0 0
5% 0.05 0 0.0858 0.0140 0 0
10% 0.1 0 0.1069 0.0140 0.0833 0
25% 0.15 0 0.1911 0.0140 0.2500 0
50% 0.7 0.4061 0.5
Largest Largest Largest
75% 0.95 1 0.7380 0.9335 0.8333 1
90% 1 1 0.8725 0.9357 1 1
95% 1 1 0.8912 0.9448 1 1
99% 1 1 0.9103 0.9471 1 1
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Figure B.2: Boxplot of differences in democracy measures by geopolitical region
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B.8 Examining differences in regional codings and rankings
To examine the distribution of the differences between the index values a boxplot by region is
provided in Figure B.2. Polity2 mostly assigns higher values than the other indices, followed by
the FHI. The inter quartile range of the differences between Polity2 and the other two indices is
non-negative for all regions exept MENA and South Asia (for Polity2 - FHI). There is a very high
level of agreement between all indices for Western Europe and North America (the differences
are mostly positive but close to 0). All indices also display a high level of agreement for East
Asia. The picture for differences between FHI and Polyarchy is mixed, although the FHI mostly
assigns larger values than the Polyarchy Index (median differences are positive for all regions,
interquartile range non-negative for Latin America & the Caribbean, Western Europe & North
America).
B.8.1 Ranking
While the differences discussed above provide some information regarding the general ”austere-
ness” of each index they do not give any information on how the countries are coded in each
year with respect to each other. When ranking all countries according to their democracy index
value in a given year is each country ranked consistently accross the three measures? In the
following the country rankings will be compared across the three democracy measures. Note,
that this exercise has its limitations due to the uncertainty embedded in each measure. For an
excellent discussion of this see Høyland et al. (2012). For each year, all countries were ranked
according to their democracy index values obtaining a rank in Polity2 values, a rank in FHI
values and a rank in Polyarchy values. The regional average democracy values from Figure 3.5
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Figure B.3: Regional average ranks based on the yearly values coded by each of the democracy
indices
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Table B.7: Kendall’s τb (upper right side) and Spearman’s ρ (bottom left side)
Rank Polity2 Rank Polyarchy Rank FHI
Rank Polity2 - 0.6903*** 0.6909***
Rank Polyarchy 0.8735*** - 0.7303***
Rank FHI 0.8729*** 0.8993*** -
***p < 0.01,**p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
are thus reproduced as regional average ranks in Figure B.3. A rank of 1 corresponds to the
lowest possible democracy index value. The ranks are coded keeping the overall sum constant.
Note that the ranking should only be compared within single years but not over time as one
country’s ranking can change when other countries are coded as democratic.
Western European & North American, Sub-Saharan African and East Asian countries are ranked
very similarly by the indices. The difference in values for Eastern Europe & Central Asia
translates into the most pronounced difference in rankings. Hence, in research frameworks in
which countries of that time period and region are considered it is very likely that the results
will vary with the index used. Therefore, using the FHI in such cases is inadvisable. Further
notable differences in rankings occur before 1990 in the MENA region and South Asia. In these
cases, FHI assigns higher average democracy values than the other two indices.
Figure B.4 displays a boxplot of the differences between index rankings by region. The difference
in ranks has the highest variability for Polity2-Polyarchy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Figure B.4
shows that the medians for the difference in ranges are in most cases close to and the interquartile
ranges centered around 0. This suggests that the differences in index values do not translate
into difference in ranks.
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Figure B.4: Boxplot of differences in yearly country rankings between indices by region
-100
-50
0
50
100
-100
-50
0
50
100
East. Europe & Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean Middle East & North Africa Sub-Saharan Africa
West. Europe & N. America East Asia South-East Asia South Asia
Rank: Polity2 - Polyarchy Rank: Polity2 - FHI
Rank: FHI - Polyarchy
Lastly, the similarities of the rankings are compared using Kendall’s τ2 and Spearman’s ρ. A
τ or a ρ close to 1 implies a strong association between the rankings. Spearman’s ρ “accepts”
small differences in ranking from time to time and is very sensitive to large errors (even if they
occur only once). Kendall’s τ on the other hand is relatively insensitive to large errors occurring
just once. The rank correlation coefficients are displayed in Table B.7. Both, Kendall’s τ and
Spearman’s ρ, point to a very strong agreement with respect to the ranking for all variables.
The nullhypothesis of independent rankings is rejected in all pairwise comparisons. In sum, the
vast majority of country years is ranked consistently across all indices.
2To include ties we used τb .
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B.9 Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA)
Figure B.5 displays the country codings by Polity2, FHI and Polyarchy for each country in the
EECA region with more than 7 years of data available in the trunk dataset (Kosovo and Bosnia
and Herzegovina did not meet this criterion and were thus left out, see Table B.10).
Figure B.5: Democracy coding by Polity2, FHI and Polyarchy for selected countries in Eastern
Europe & Central Asia
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B.10 Countries and their respective geopolitical regions
Table B.8: Countries and their respective geopolitical regions as coded in section Comparison.
Region Countries
1 East. Europe & Central Asia Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia
and Herzegowina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, German
Democratic Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan
(31 countries)
2 Latin America & Caribbean Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad
and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela
(24 countries)
3 Middle East & North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen
(18 countries)
4 Sub-Saharan Africa Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South
Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
(47 countries)
5 West. Europe & North America Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States
(21 countries)
6 East Asia China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea,
Taiwan(5 countries)
7 South-East Asia Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Democratic
Republic of Vietnam, Fiji, Indonesia, Laos,
Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Republic of Vietnam, Singapore, Solomon
Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste
(14 countries)
8 South Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka(7 countries)
94 APPENDIX B. HOW (NOT) TO MEASURE DEMOCRACY
B.11 Slow changing level of democracy in Polity2 Index
When using the Polity2 Index in time series and/or cross section models one factor to keep in
mind is the slow changing nature of the level of democracy. In most years the level of a country’s
previous democracy index is the best predictor for its’ current value. Gleditsch and Ward (1997)
examined these changes in the Polity II Data (one of Polity IV’s predecessors) with the help of
Markov transition matrices. They show that much of the variation in the polity index is cross
sectional rather than temporal. Table B.9 examines the variation in the Polity2 Index more
closely.
Table B.9: Examining variation in the Polity2 Index
Overall Between Within
polity2 Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Percent
-10 1354 7.97 33 17.01 42.54
-9 1144 6.73 62 31.96 23.75
-8 512 3.01 50 25.77 13.32
-7 1,884 11.09 107 55.15 25.44
-6 1297 7.63 82 42.27 13.80
-5 586 3.45 64 32.99 8.92
-4 715 4.21 65 33.51 12.41
-3 1,166 6.86 67 34.54 15.27
-2 324 1.91 48 24.74 9.03
-1 540 3.18 48 24.74 10.93
0 415 2.44 69 35.57 9.66
1 379 2.23 37 19.07 10.77
2 464 2.73 52 26.80 9.72
3 282 1.66 37 19.07 6.84
4 535 3.15 49 25.26 13.73
5 441 2.60 58 29.90 11.08
6 547 3.22 58 29.90 14.62
7 549 3.23 61 31.44 12.59
8 773 4.55 65 33.51 15.25
9 645 3.80 48 24.74 18.53
10 2,440 14.36 43 22.16 46.71
Total 16,992 100.00 1,203 620.10 16.13
(n=194)
For the overall part the unit of observation is a country-year. There are 1,354 observations
in which a country in a given year obtained a polity index value of -10. In the between part
the unit of observation is a country instead of a country-year; 33 of the countries ever had a
Polity2 value of -10 and a total of 1203 countries was categorized. Due to the fact that the data
only includes 194 countries, it follows that some countries switched between the categories. The
within percent indicates the percentage of the time a country has the specified Polity2 value.
Conditional on a country ever having a Polity2 value of -10, 42.54% of that same country’s
observations have the same index value. Interestingly, this percentage increases for both “high”
democracies and autocracies. Conditional on a country ever having obtained a Polity2 value
of 10, 46.71% of that country’s observations have the same index value. This fraction is much
smaller (around 10%) for Polity2 values between -2 and 2.
B.12. COUNTRIES AND YEARS INCLUDED IN THE TRUNK DATASET 95
B.12 Countries and years included in the trunk dataset
Table B.10: Countries (A-F) and years included in the trunk dataset
country first year last year # years in sample # of missing years
Afghanistan 1972 2015 21 23
Albania 1972 2015 44 0
Algeria 1972 2015 44 0
Angola 1975 2015 41 0
Argentina 1972 2015 44 0
Armenia 1991 2015 25 0
Australia 1972 2015 44 0
Austria 1972 2015 44 0
Azerbaijan 1991 2015 25 0
Bangladesh 1972 2015 44 0
Belarus 1991 2015 25 0
Belgium 1972 2015 44 0
Benin 1972 2015 44 0
Bhutan 1972 2015 44 0
Bolivia 1972 2015 44 0
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993 1994 2 0
Botswana 1972 2015 44 0
Brazil 1972 2015 44 0
Bulgaria 1972 2015 44 0
Burkina Faso 1972 2015 44 0
Burma/Myanmar 1972 2014 43 0
Burundi 1972 2015 44 0
Cambodia 1972 2015 35 9
Cameroon 1972 2015 44 0
Canada 1972 2015 44 0
Cape Verde 1975 2015 41 0
Central African Republic 1972 2015 44 0
Chad 1972 2015 44 0
Chile 1972 2015 44 0
China 1972 2015 44 0
Colombia 1972 2015 44 0
Comoros 1975 2015 41 0
Costa Rica 1972 2015 44 0
Croatia 1991 2015 25 0
Cuba 1972 2015 44 0
Cyprus 1972 2015 44 0
Czech Republic 1972 2015 44 0
Democratic Republic of Congo 1972 2015 44 0
Democratic Republic of Vietnam 1972 2015 44 0
Denmark 1972 2015 44 0
Djibouti 1977 2015 39 0
Dominican Republic 1972 2015 44 0
Ecuador 1972 2015 44 0
Egypt 1972 2015 44 0
El Salvador 1972 2015 44 0
Equatorial Guinea 1972 2015 44 0
Eritrea 1993 2015 23 0
Estonia 1991 2015 25 0
Ethiopia 1972 2015 44 0
Fiji 1972 2015 44 0
Finland 1972 2015 44 0
France 1972 2015 44 0
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Table B.11: Countries (G-N) and years in trunk dataset continued
country first year last year # years in sample # of missing years
Gabon 1972 2015 44 0
Gambia 1972 2015 44 0
Georgia 1991 2015 25 0
German Democratic Republic 1972 1988 17 0
Germany 1972 2015 44 0
Ghana 1972 2015 44 0
Greece 1972 2015 44 0
Guatemala 1972 2015 44 0
Guinea 1972 2015 44 0
Guinea-Bissau 1974 2015 42 0
Guyana 1972 2015 44 0
Haiti 1972 2015 44 0
Honduras 1972 2015 44 0
Hungary 1972 2015 44 0
India 1972 2015 44 0
Indonesia 1972 2015 44 0
Iran 1972 2015 44 0
Iraq 1972 2015 37 7
Ireland 1972 2015 44 0
Israel 1972 2015 44 0
Italy 1972 2015 44 0
Ivory Coast 1972 2015 44 0
Jamaica 1972 2015 44 0
Japan 1972 2015 44 0
Jordan 1972 2015 44 0
Kazakhstan 1991 2015 25 0
Kenya 1972 2015 44 0
Kosovo 2009 2015 7 0
Kuwait 1972 2015 43 1
Kyrgyzstan 1991 2015 25 0
Laos 1972 2015 44 0
Latvia 1991 2015 25 0
Lebanon 1972 2015 29 15
Lesotho 1972 2015 44 0
Liberia 1972 2015 44 0
Libya 1972 2015 44 0
Lithuania 1991 2015 25 0
Macedonia 1992 2015 24 0
Madagascar 1972 2015 44 0
Malawi 1972 2015 44 0
Malaysia 1972 2015 44 0
Mali 1972 2015 44 0
Mauritania 1972 2015 44 0
Mauritius 1972 2015 44 0
Mexico 1972 2015 44 0
Moldova 1991 2015 25 0
Mongolia 1972 2015 44 0
Montenegro 2006 2015 10 0
Morocco 1972 2015 44 0
Mozambique 1978 2015 38 0
Namibia 1990 2015 26 0
Nepal 1972 2015 44 0
Netherlands 1972 2015 44 0
New Zealand 1972 2015 44 0
Nicaragua 1972 2015 44 0
Niger 1972 2015 44 0
Nigeria 1972 2015 44 0
North Korea 1972 2015 44 0
Norway 1972 2015 44 0
B.12. COUNTRIES AND YEARS INCLUDED IN THE TRUNK DATASET 97
Table B.12: Countries (O-Z) and years in trunk dataset continued
country first year last year # years in sample # of missing years
Oman 2000 2015 16 0
Pakistan 1972 2015 44 0
Panama 1972 2015 44 0
Papua New Guinea 1975 2015 41 0
Paraguay 1972 2015 44 0
Peru 1972 2015 44 0
Philippines 1972 2015 44 0
Poland 1972 2015 44 0
Portugal 1972 2015 44 0
Qatar 1972 2015 44 0
Republic of Vietnam 1973 1975 3 0
Republic of the Congo 1972 2015 44 0
Romania 1972 2015 44 0
Russia 1972 2015 44 0
Rwanda 1972 2015 44 0
Saudi Arabia 1972 2015 44 0
Senegal 1972 2015 44 0
Serbia 1972 2015 30 14
Sierra Leone 1972 2015 44 0
Singapore 1972 2015 44 0
Slovakia 1994 2015 22 0
Slovenia 1991 2015 25 0
Solomon Islands 1978 2015 37 1
Somalia 1972 2015 43 1
South Africa 1972 2015 44 0
South Korea 1972 2015 44 0
South Sudan 2012 2015 4 0
South Yemen 1972 1989 18 0
Spain 1972 2015 44 0
Sri Lanka 1972 2015 44 0
Sudan 1972 2011 40 0
Suriname 1975 2015 41 0
Swaziland 1972 2015 44 0
Sweden 1972 2015 44 0
Switzerland 1972 2015 44 0
Syria 1972 2015 44 0
Taiwan 1972 2015 44 0
Tajikistan 1991 2015 25 0
Tanzania 1972 2015 44 0
Thailand 1972 2015 44 0
Timor-Leste 2002 2015 14 0
Togo 1972 2015 44 0
Trinidad and Tobago 1972 2015 44 0
Tunisia 1972 2015 44 0
Turkey 1972 2015 44 0
Turkmenistan 1991 2015 25 0
Uganda 1972 2015 43 1
Ukraine 1991 2015 25 0
United Kingdom 1972 2015 44 0
United States 1972 2015 44 0
Uruguay 1972 2015 44 0
Uzbekistan 1991 2015 25 0
Venezuela 1972 2015 44 0
Yemen 1972 2015 43 1
Zambia 1972 2015 44 0
Zimbabwe 1972 2015 44 0
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Appendix C
’Tis but thy name that is my enemy
The tables in this Appendix are also online (see Boese and Kamin, 2018a, 2018b, which provide
a much more detailed overview of which countries and years actually contain nonmissing values
in each of the datasets).
C.1 Democracy Datasets Comparison
See Boese and Kamin (2018a) for a very detailed listing of all countries and their respective time
series covered. Countries for which only the names/labels differ are listed in Table C.1 (that is,
countries of inconsistency type 3, reason 1.) In the worksheet “Overview” (Boese and Kamin,
2018a), these countries are highlighted in grey.
V-Dem Version 8 Polity IV, Version 2016
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia
Burma/Myanmar Myanmar (Burma)
Democratic Republic of Congo Congo Kinshasa
German Democratic Republic Germany East
North Korea Korea North
Piedmont-Sardinia Sardinia
Republic of Vietnam Vietnam South
Republic of the Congo Congo Brazzaville
Slovakia Slovak Republic
South Korea Korea South
South Yemen Yemen South
United Arab Emirates UAE
United States of America United States
Wu¨rtemberg Wuerttemburg
Table C.1: Countries for which only the names/labels differ (democracy datasets)
Countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match in the other dataset are listed in
Table C.2. A “perfect match” refers to a counterpart in terms of names and years (and poten-
tially borders). This includes countries of inconsistency types 1 and 3. Countries representing
the same or similar historical units are grouped.
Countries unmergable due to name and time inconsistencies are listed in Table C.3. This includes
countries of inconsistency type 3. Note: # obs=number of observations; N=total number of
available observations in data; missing=number of missing years/observations for given country
between its first and last year.
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V-Dem Version 8 Polity IV, Version 2016
Barbados
Brunswick
Colombia Colombia
Gran Colombia
Czech Republic Czech Republic
Czechoslovakia
Democratic Republic of Vietnam Vietnam North
Vietnam
German Democratic Republic Germany East
Germany Germany
Prussia
Germany West
Guatemala United Province of CA (Central America)
Hamburg
Hanover
Hesse-Darmstadt
Hesse-Kassel
Hong Kong
Iceland
Ivory Coast Ivory Coast
Cote D’Ivoire
Maldives
Mecklenburg Schwerin
Nassau
Oldenburg
Orange Free State
Palestine/British Mandate
Palestine/Gaza
Palestine/West Bank
Russia USSR
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach
Serbia Serbia
Serbia and Montenegro
Yugoslavia
Seychelles
Somaliland
South Korea Korea South
Korea
South Sudan South Sudan
Sudan Sudan
Sudan-North
Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe
Timor-Leste Timor Leste
East Timor
Vanuatu
Yemen Yemen
Yemen North
Zanzibar
Table C.2: Countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match in the other dataset
(Democracy Datasets)
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V-Dem Version 8, 201 countries Polity IV, Version 2016, 195 countries
year # obs. in data year # obs. in data
country first last N missing country first last N missing
Bosnia and 1992 2017 26 0 Bosnia 1992 2016 25 0
Herzegovina Yugoslavia 1921 2002 83 -1
Colombia 1789 2017 229 0 Colombia 1832 2016 185 0
Gran Colombia 1821 1832 12 0
Czech Republic 1918 2017 100 0 Czech Republic 1993 2016 24 0
Czechoslovakia 1918 1992 75 0
Democratic Republic 1945 2017 73 0 Vietnam North 1954 1976 23 0
of Vietnam Vietnam 1976 2016 41 0
Germany 1789 2017 225 4 Germany 1868 2016 105 44
Prussia 1800 1867 68 0
Germany West 1945 1990 46 0
Ivory Coast 1900 2017 118 0 Ivory Coast 1960 2015 56 0
Cote D’Ivoire 2016 2016 1 0
Russia 1789 2017 229 0 Russia 1800 2016 148 69
USSR 1922 1991 70 0
Serbia 1804 2017 213 1 Serbia 1830 2016 102 85
Serbia and 2003 2006 4 0
Montenegro
South Korea 1789 2017 229 0 Korea South 1948 2016 69 0
Korea 1800 1910 111 0
Sudan 1900 2017 118 0 Sudan 1956 2011 56 0
Sudan-North 2011 2016 6 0
South Yemen 1900 1990 91 0 Yemen South 1967 1990 24 0
Yemen 1789 2017 162 67 Yemen 1990 2016 27 0
Yemen North 1918 1990 73 0
Timor-Leste 1900 2017 118 0 Timor Leste 2016 2016 1 0
East Timor 2002 2015 14 0
Table C.3: Countries unmergeable due to name and time inconsistencies (democracy datasets)
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C.2 Economic Datasets Comparison
Table C.4 is a listing of unmergeable names/labels in the UN Comtrade and WDI datasets, due
to inconsistency type 3, and shows a large share of countries with high export levels (Boese and
Kamin, 2018b, contains the list sorted by total exports; worksheet “Unmergable Outliers Com-
trade”. The spreadsheet also provides a list of country groups/regions which were not included
in the comparison; worksheet “Disregarded Country Groups”).
Tables C.5 and C.6 show countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match in the
other dataset. A “perfect match” refers to a counterpart in terms of names and years (and
potentially borders). This includes countries of inconsistency types 1 and 3. Countries repre-
senting the same or similar historical units are grouped.
Table C.7 shows countries unmergable due to name and time inconsistencies. This includes
countries of inconsistency type 3 (N=total number of available observations in data).
UN Comtrade exports WDI trade openness
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Bolivia
Bosnia Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina
Cabo Verde Cape Verde
Cayman Isds Cayman Islands
Central African Rep. Central African Republic
China, Hong Kong SAR Hong Kong
China, Macao SAR Macao SAR, China
Congo Republic of the Congo
Czechia Czech Republic
Coˆte d’Ivoire Ivory Coast
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Democratic Republic of Congo
Dominican Rep. Dominican Republic
FS Micronesia Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Faeroe Isds Faroe Islands
Gambia The Gambia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Laos
Myanmar Burma/Myanmar
Rep. of Korea South Korea
Rep. of Moldova Moldova
Russian Federation Russia
Saint Kitts and Nevis St. Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia St. Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe
Solomon Isds Solomon Islands
TFYR of Macedonia Macedonia
Turks and Caicos Isds Turks and Caicos Islands
US Virgin Isds Virgin Islands (U.S.)
USA United States of America
United Rep. of Tanzania Tanzania
Viet Nam Vietnam
Yemen Yemen, Rep.
Table C.4: Countries for which the names/labels differ (economic datasets)
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C.3 Conflict Dataset
Tables C.8 to C.12 provide a comparison of country coding units in the UCDP/PRIO Armed
Conflict dataset 18.1 to the coding units supplied in the relevant code book. Countries with
inconsistent labels are written in blue; countries which only exist in the dataset but not in code
book are written in red.
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UN Comtrade exports WDI trade openness
American Samoa
Belgium Belgium
Belgium-Luxembourg
British Virgin Islands
Channel Islands
Cook Isds
Curacao
Czechia Czech Republic
Czechoslovakia
East and West Pakistan
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia Ethiopia
Fmr Ethiopia
Fmr Tanganyika
Fmr Yugoslavia
French Guiana
Germany Germany
Fmr Dem. Rep. of Germany
Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany
Gibraltar
Guadeloupe
Guam
India India
India, excl. Sikkim
Isle of Man
Kosovo
Liechtenstein
Marshall Islands
Mayotte
Monaco
Montserrat
Nauru
Neth. Antilles
Neth. Antilles and Aruba
Niue
North Korea
Northern Mariana Islands
Panama Panama
Fmr Panama, excl.Canal Zone
Peninsula Malaysia
Puerto Rico
Re´union
Table C.5: Countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match in the other dataset,
A-R (economic datasets)
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UN Comtrade exports WDI trade openness
Sabah
Saint Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
San Marino
Serbia and Montenegro
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
State of Palestine
St. Martin (French part)
Sudan Sudan
Fmr Sudan
South Sudan
USA United States of America
USA (before 1981)
Uzbekistan
Viet Nam Vietnam
Fmr Rep. of Vietnam
Yemen Yemen, Rep.
Fmr Arab Rep. of Yemen
West Bank and Gaza
Table C.6: Countries for which the underlying entity has no perfect match in the other dataset,
S-Z (economic datasets)
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UN Comtrade exports years available WDI tradeopenness years available
(coded and non-missing) (coded and non-missing)
country year N country year N
first last first last
Belgium 1999 2017 19 Belgium 1960 2016 57
Belgium-Luxembourg 1962 1998 30
Bosnia Herzegovina 2003 2017 15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994 2016 23
Czechia 1993 2017 24 Czech Republic 1990 2016 27
Czechoslovakia 1968 1987 20
Pakistan 1972 2017 31 Pakistan 1967 2016 50
East and West Pakistan 1962 1971 10
Ethiopia 1995 2016 21 Ethiopia 2011 2016 6
Fmr Ethiopia 1962 1987 21
Fmr Yugoslavia 1962 1987 26
Germany 1991 2017 27 Germany 1970 2016 47
Fmr Dem. Rep. of Germany 1985 1987 3
Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany 1962 1990 29
India 1975 2017 43 India 1960 2016 57
India, excl. Sikkim 1962 1974 13
Panama 1978 2016 32 Panama 1960 2016 57
Fmr Panama, excl.Canal Zone 1962 1977 16
Serbia 2005 2017 13 Serbia 1995 2016 22
Serbia and Montenegro 1992 2004 9
State of Palestine 2007 2016 10
West Bank and Gaza 1994 2016 23
Sudan 2012 2015 2 Sudan 1960 2016 57
Fmr Sudan 1963 2011 37
South Sudan 2008 2015 8
Viet Nam 2000 2016 17 Vietnam 1986 2016 31
Fmr Rep. of Vietnam 1963 1973 11
Yemen 2004 2015 12 Yemen, Rep. 1990 2016 27
Fmr Arab Rep. of Yemen 1975 1981 6
Table C.7: Countries unmergeable due to name and time inconsistencies (economic datasets)
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Countries coded as state actors in side A or B of the System Membership Table (Table 3),
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook p.15-20
year year
country first last # obs. State Name first last
Afghanistan 1978 2017 47 Afghanistan 1946 2012
Albania 1946 1946 2 Albania 1946 2012
Algeria 1963 2017 30 Algeria 1962 2012
Angola 1975 2017 36 Angola 1975 2012
Argentina 1955 1982 8 Argentina 1946 2012
Armenia 1991 2012
Australia 2003 2003 2 Australia 1946 2012
Austria 1946 2012
Azerbaijan 1991 2017 15 Azerbaijan 1991 2012
Bahamas 1973 2012
Bahrain 1971 2012
Bangladesh 1975 2017 21 Bangladesh 1971 2012
Barbados 1966 2012
Belarus (Byelorussia) 1991 2012
Belgium 1946 2012
Belize 1981 2012
Benin 1960 2012
Bhutan 1949 2012
Bolivia 1946 1967 3 Bolivia 1946 2012
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 1995 9 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 2012
Botswana 1966 2012
Brazil 1946 2012
Brunei 1984 2012
Bulgaria 1946 2012
Burkina Faso 1985 1987 3 Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) 1960 2012
Burundi 1965 2015 19 Burundi 1962 2012
Cambodia (Kampuchea) 1967 2011 42 Cambodia (Kampuchea) 1953 2012
Cameroon 1960 2017 10 Cameroon 1960 2012
Canada 1946 2012
Cape Verde 1975 2012
Central African Republic 2001 2013 8 Central African Republic 1960 2012
Chad 1966 2017 43 Chad 1960 2012
Chile 1973 1973 1 Chile 1946 2012
China 1946 2008 45 China 1946 2012
Colombia 1964 2016 53 Colombia 1946 2012
Comoros 1989 1997 2 Comoros 1975 2012
Congo 1993 2016 6 Congo 1960 2012
Table C.8: Comparison of country coding units in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset 18.1
and the coding units supplied in the relevant code book, A-Co
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Countries coded as state actors in side A or B of the System Membership Table (Table 3),
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook p.15-20
year year
country first last # obs. State Name first last
DR Congo (Zaire) 1960 2017 30 Congo, Democratic 1960 2012
Republic of (Zaire)
Costa Rica 1948 1948 1 Costa Rica 1946 2012
Ivory Coast 2002 2011 4 Cote D’Ivoire 1960 2012
Croatia 1992 1995 3 Croatia 1991 2012
Cuba 1953 1961 5 Cuba 1946 2012
Cyprus 1974 1974 2 Cyprus 1960 2012
Czech Republic 1993 2012
Czechoslovakia 1946 1992
Denmark 1946 2012
Djibouti 1991 2008 7 Djibouti 1977 2012
Dominican Republic 1965 1965 1 Dominican Republic 1946 2012
East Timor 2002 2012
Ecuador 1995 1995 2 Ecuador 1946 2012
Egypt 1948 2017 29 Egypt 1946 2012
El Salvador 1969 1991 16 El Salvador 1946 2012
Equatorial Guinea 1968 2012
Eritrea 1997 2016 12 Eritrea 1993 2012
Estonia 1991 2012
Ethiopia 1960 2016 131 Ethiopia 1946 2012
Fiji 1970 2012
Finland 1946 2012
France 1946 1962 55 France 1946 2012
Gabon 1964 1964 1 Gabon 1960 2012
Gambia 1981 1981 1 Gambia 1965 2012
Georgia 1991 2008 8 Georgia 1991 2012
German Democratic Republic 1949 1990
German Federal Republic 1949 2012
Ghana 1966 1983 3 Ghana 1957 2012
Greece 1946 1949 4 Greece 1946 2012
Grenada 1983 1983 2
Guatemala 1949 1995 34 Guatemala 1946 2012
Guinea 2000 2001 2 Guinea 1958 2012
Guinea-Bissau 1998 1999 2 Guinea-Bissau 1974 2012
Guyana 1966 2012
Haiti 1989 2004 3 Haiti 1946 2012
Honduras 1957 1969 3 Honduras 1946 2012
Hungary 1956 1956 2 Hungary 1946 2012
Hyderabad 1947 1948 4
Iceland 1946 2012
India 1948 2017 220 India 1947 2012
Indonesia 1950 2005 52 Indonesia 1946 2012
Iran 1946 2017 62 Iran (Persia) 1946 2012
Iraq 1948 2017 78 Iraq 1946 2012
Table C.9: Comparison of country coding units in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset 18.1
and the coding units supplied in the relevant code book, Co-Ira
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Countries coded as state actors in side A or B of the System Membership Table (Table 3),
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook p.15-20
year year
country first last # obs. State Name first last
Ireland 1946 2012
Israel 1948 2014 86 Israel 1948 2012
Italy/Sardinia 1946 2012
Jamaica 1962 2012
Japan 1946 2012
Jordan 1948 2016 6 Jordan 1946 2012
Kazakhstan 1991 2012
Kenya 1982 2017 4 Kenya 1963 2012
Kosovo 2008 2012
Kuwait 1990 1991 2 Kuwait 1961 2012
Kyrgyz Republic 1991 2012
Laos 1959 1990 22 Laos 1954 2012
Latvia 1991 2012
Lebanon 1948 2017 17 Lebanon 1946 2012
Lesotho 1998 1998 1 Lesotho 1966 2012
Liberia 1980 2003 7 Liberia 1946 2012
Libya 1987 2017 8 Libya 1951 2012
Lithuania 1991 2012
Luxembourg 1946 2012
Macedonia, FYR 2001 2001 1 Macedonia (FRY) 1991 2012
Madagascar 1971 1971 1 Madagascar (Malagasy) 1960 2012
Malawi 1964 2012
Malaysia 1958 2013 15 Malaysia 1957 2012
Maldives 1965 2012
Mali 1985 2017 18 Mali 1960 2012
Malta 1964 2012
Mauritania 1975 2011 6 Mauritania 1960 2012
Mauritius 1968 2012
Mexico 1994 1996 2 Mexico 1946 2012
Moldova 1992 1992 1 Moldova 1991 2012
Mongolia 1946 2012
Montenegro 2006 2012
Morocco 1963 1989 17 Morocco 1956 2012
Mozambique 1977 2016 18 Mozambique 1975 2012
Myanmar (Burma) 1948 2017 275 Myanmar (Burma) 1948 2012
Namibia 1990 2012
Nepal 1960 2006 14 Nepal 1946 2012
Netherlands 1946 1962 5 Netherlands 1946 2012
New Zealand 1946 2012
Nicaragua 1957 1990 13 Nicaragua 1946 2012
Niger 1991 2017 10 Niger 1960 2012
Nigeria 1966 2017 20 Nigeria 1960 2012
North Korea 1949 1953 10 North Korea 1948 2012
Norway 1946 2012
Oman 1957 1975 8 Oman 1946 2012
Table C.10: Comparison of country coding units in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset 18.1
and the coding units supplied in the relevant code book, Ire-O
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Countries coded as state actors in side A or B of the System Membership Table (Table 3),
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook p.15-20
year year
country first last # obs. State Name first last
Pakistan 1948 2017 55 Pakistan 1947 2012
Panama 1989 1989 3 Panama 1946 2012
Papua New Guinea 1990 1996 6 Papua New Guinea 1975 2012
Paraguay 1947 1989 3 Paraguay 1946 2012
Peru 1965 2010 24 Peru 1946 2012
Philippines 1946 2017 104 Philippines 1946 2012
Poland 1946 2012
Portugal 1961 1974 36 Portugal 1946 2012
Qatar 1971 2012
Rumania 1989 1989 1 Rumania 1946 2012
Russia (Soviet Union) 1946 2017 44 Russia (Soviet Union) 1946 2012
Rwanda 1990 2016 17 Rwanda 1962 2012
Saudi Arabia 1979 1979 1 Saudi Arabia 1946 2012
Senegal 1990 2011 10 Senegal 1960 2012
Serbia (Yugoslavia) 1991 1999 5 Serbia 2006 2012
Yugoslavia (Serbia) 1946 2006
Sierra Leone 1991 2001 11 Sierra Leone 1961 2012
Singapore 1965 2012
Slovakia 1993 2012
Slovenia 1992 2012
Solomon Islands 1978 2012
Somalia 1964 2017 32 Somalia 1960 2012
South Africa 1966 1988 30 South Africa 1946 2012
South Korea 1949 1953 5 South Korea 1948 2012
South Sudan 2011 2017 9 South Sudan 2011 2012
Spain 1957 1991 11 Spain 1946 2012
Sri Lanka 1971 2009 27 Sri Lanka 1948 2012
Sudan 1963 2017 49 Sudan 1956 2012
Suriname 1987 1987 1 Surinam 1975 2012
Swaziland 1968 2012
Sweden 1946 2012
Switzerland 1946 2012
Syria 1948 2017 27 Syria 1946 2012
Taiwan 1949 1958 4 Taiwan 1949 2012
Tajikistan 1992 2011 10 Tajikistan 1991 2012
Tanzania 1978 1978 2 Tanzania/Tanganyika 1961 2012
Thailand 1946 2017 32 Thailand 1946 2012
Tibet 1946 1950
Togo 1986 1986 1 Togo 1960 2012
Trinidad and Tobago 1990 1990 1 Trinidad and Tobago 1962 2012
Tunisia 1961 2016 3 Tunisia 1956 2012
Turkey 1974 2017 41 Turkey/Ottoman Empire 1946 2012
Turkmenistan 1991 2012
Table C.11: Comparison of country coding units in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset 18.1
and the coding units supplied in the relevant code book, P-T
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Countries coded as state actors in side A or B of the System Membership Table (Table 3),
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 18.1 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
Codebook p.15-20
year year
country first last # obs. State Name first last
Uganda 1971 2017 41 Uganda 1962 2012
Ukraine 2014 2017 7 Ukraine 1991 2012
United Arab Emirates 1971 2012
United Kingdom 1946 2003 56 United Kingdom 1946 2012
United States of America 1950 2017 23 United States of America 1946 2012
Uruguay 1972 1972 1 Uruguay 1946 2012
Uzbekistan 1999 2004 3 Uzbekistan 1991 2012
Venezuela 1962 1992 3 Venezuela 1946 2012
Vietnam (North Vietnam) 1965 1988 24 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 1954 2012
South Vietnam 1955 1975 32 Vietnam, Republic of 1954 1975
Yemen (North Yemen) 1948 2017 27 Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen) 1946 2012
South Yemen 1972 1986 5 Yemen, People’s Republic of 1967 1990
Zambia 1964 2012
Zanzibar 1963 1964
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1967 1979 9 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1965 2012
Table C.12: Comparison of country coding units in UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset 18.1
and the coding units supplied in the relevant code book, U-Z
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Appendix D
Heterogeneity matters
D.1 List of countries and regions included in the analysis
region country
Latin America Argentina , Bolivia , Chile, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
Middle East & North Africa Algeria, Iran, Morocco, Turkey
Sub-Saharan Africa Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal,
South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda
Western Europe, Australia & North America Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom, United States of America
Asia China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri
Lanka, Thailand
Table D.1: Countries and regions included in the analysis
113
114 APPENDIX D. HETEROGENEITY MATTERS
D.2 Regional Impulse Response Functions
The regional impulse response functions were computed as follows: In a first step the VAR-model
is estimated separately for each country. This has the advantage of allowing for heterogeneous
slope parameters across countries (as opposed to estimating a panel model with fixed effects).
Secondly, for each country the given Cholesky-decomposition is employed and impulse response
functions are calculated. Third, regional impulse response functions are derived by taking the
average of the corresponding countries’ point estimates. Confidence bands, however, may not
be pooled accross countries by using averages since they are based on non-linear quantiles. Av-
erages over confidence bands would yield unclear coverage, i.e. it would be unclear whether
the confidence bands coverage retains its nominal size of 95%. Regional confidence bands are
therefore computed employing the following variance decomposition:
For each forecasting step (s = 1, 2, ..., 10) the regional variance that consists of within and
between variance:
σ2s,regional = σ
2
s,within + σ
2
s,between, (D.1)
with
σ2s,within =
1
N
N∑
i=1
variancei,s,
where i = 1, 2, ..., N is the number of countries in the regional group and variancei,s =
standarderror2i,s · τ . τ refers to the degrees of freedom adjusted lengths of each country’s
timeseries, i.e. τ = T −L−L ∗K − 1, where T = 57 years, lag length L = 4, number of control
variables K = 4, and −1 for the intercept. Therefore, τ = 57− 4− 4 ∗ 4− 1 = 36.
For the regional between variance the heterogeneity of the point estimates is exploited. It is
computed using the folllowing formula:
σ2s,between =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[IRFi,s − 1
N
N∑
i=1
IRFi,s]
2
where IRFi,s are the point estimates obtained for each step s = 1, 2, ..., 10 and each country i
in the region (N =total number of countries in the region).
Once σ2s,regional is computed regional confidence bands for each step can be calculated as upper
(lower) 95%: IRFs+(−) σ2s,regional ·1, 96, where IRFs is the simple regional average of the point
estimates.
Since the heterogeneity of responses is substantial across countries the regionally aggregated
impulse response functions in Figure D.1 display no effect. Note that this result is solely driven
by the regional heterogeneity of effects, not by their inexistence.
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Figure D.1: Regional impulse response functions for Asia. “ac” stands for “armed conflict”,
“dev” for development, and “dem” for democracy
D.3 Impulse response functions - Baseline model
This section displays and discusses the impulse response function of the baseline model: VAR(4),
ordering: development, democracy, conflict and trade.
For the sake of space only impulse response functions for countries with significant effects are
shown. The impulse response functions are grouped by bilateral relationship.
Trade openness and development
Trade openness seems to have a negative effect on development only in a handful of countries.
However, in these countries the effect is strong and persistent. Affected countries are exclusively
African or Latin American. Nevertheless, the largest positive impacts of trade openness on de-
velopment can as well be seen in Africa: the biggest effect is displayed by Ivory Coast. Smaller,
but significant positive results are seen for Asian countries. Interestingly, the largest advocate
for free trade profits from it: the US show a significant development effect from a positive shock
in trade openness.
Development only has a negative result for three countries: Central African Republic, Nicaragua
and Uruguay, with the biggest effect for Nicaragua. In turn, development has a positive effect
on trade openness for a huge number of countries: across all regions countries trade openness is
affected positively by a positive shock in development, with the largest impacts in Rwanda and
Suriname, followed by the US, Algeria, Republic of the Congo and Senegal.
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Figure D.2: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of trade on
development during at least one step.
Summary: Development causes rise in trade openness in a large number of countries, while
negative effects are rare. Trade openness does not necessarily cause rise in development: positive
effects are rarely large. However, the same applies to negative effects of trade openness.
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Figure D.3: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of trade
on development during at least one step.
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Figure D.4: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of develop-
ment on trade during at least one step.
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Figure D.5: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of devel-
opment on trade during at least one step.
Trade openness and democracy
The highest positive effects of a shock in trade openness on democracy can be seen in Chile and
Turkey. Especially Latin American countries display positive responses. While only 9 countries
show positive results, 19 countries show negative responses in democracy after a positive shock
in trade openness. This group is very heterogeneous and represents all 5 regions. Negative
results are largest for Republic of Congo, South Korea and Niger.
Compared to the results seen before, responses for each direction are more balanced in this
group. Trade openness is negatively affected by a shock in democracy in 15 countries of all
regions, most notably Rwanda and Iran. Interestingly, especially China’s trade openness profits
from positive shocks in democracy. Other substantial effects of democracy on trade can be seen
for Suriname, Republic of the Congo and Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Summary: The responses to a shock are heterogeneous in both parts of the bilateral relationship
between trade openness and democracy.
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Figure D.6: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of trade on
democracy during at least one step.
Trade openness and conflict
Overall a shock in trade openness leads to very heterogeneous responses across all countries.
Interestingly, for this shock regional homogeneity is present to some extent. Four western states
out of 13 countries show a positive response in armed conflict to a shock in trade. In Latin Amer-
ica, the only significant effects are negative deviations (of substantial magnitude, e.g. Nicaragua
-.2) from the country means in 3 of 10 countries. All other regions contain countries with hetero-
geneous responses, which suggest conflict location as a potentially important variable to include
in further research.
Overall, as well as in the reverse case, the responses of trade openness to a shock in armed
conflict are heterogeneous across countries and regions. From the MENA region, only one coun-
try displays a significant response, which is Turkey, and the response is positive. However, no
general result for this relationship can be stated.
Summary: Trade and conflict simultaneously affect each other. The effects are heterogeneous
across countries, although there is some slight regional homogeneity.
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Figure D.7: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of trade
on democracy during at least one step.
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Figure D.8: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of democ-
racy on trade during at least one step.
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Figure D.9: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of democ-
racy on trade during at least one step.
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Figure D.10: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of trade
on conflict during at least one step.
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Figure D.11: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of trade
on conflict during at least one step.
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Figure D.12: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of conflict
on trade during at least one step.
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Figure D.13: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of conflict
on trade during at least one step.
Democracy and development
In line with the slow moving and slow reacting nature of the two variables, democracy and
development, observed effects of democracy on development mostly appear after 5 periods (i.e.
in the long run) and they are long lasting (e.g. Ghana, Gabon, CAR, Senegal), that is they last
for several periods in a row. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 of 21 countries show significant responses
and all of them are positive. In Asia, only Sri Lanka shows an effect (positive between periods
4-9) In Western States 2 of 19 countries show a positive effect. Here, the effect is short (one
or at most two periods) and occurs right after the shock (or within the first 5 periods). No
effect is visible in any MENA country. On average democracy has mostly positive effects on
development in this sample, if any. Over all regions the only countries which show a negative
effect are three countries in Latin America. (Chile, Honduras and Mexico). These display long
lasting negative effects of democracy on development.
The IRFs mostly provide evidence for positive effects of development on the level of democracy.
In Sub-Saharan Africa and Western States the significant effects were entirely positive. However,
there are two notable negative responses: in Indonesia a shock in development leads to a very
strong negative response (up to -3 deviation from its country mean and over the first 7 periods).
In Argentina, democracy also responds negatively (with deviations from its democracy average
of up to -4.5 points) during periods 2 to 6. Morocco is an interesting case as there, democracy
first responds negatively to a shock in development, but then adjusts and responds positively in
periods 7-9. It is worth noting, though, that Morocco’s response is rather small in magnitude,
i.e. its democracy value never deviates more than +/-.3 from its average.
Summary: In total the impulse response functions point towards mutual positive effects of
democracy on development and vice versa. There are, however, a few notable exceptions where
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Figure D.14: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of devel-
opment on democracy during at least one step.
negative responses occur. Due to the magnitude of these responses they should not be overlooked.
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Figure D.15: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of devel-
opment on democracy during at least one step.
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Figure D.16: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of democ-
racy on development during at least one step.
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Figure D.17: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of democ-
racy on development during at least one step.
Conflict and development
There are comparatively few countries in which a shock of armed conflict has significant effects
on development. None of the countries in the MENA region, for example, show any significant
effect. When there are effects they are mostly positive and appear only after 5 periods (for
example in Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay). In Sub-Saharan Africa this pattern is particularly
pronounced for the Republic of Congo and Rwanda. In the Central African Republic on the
other hand, conflict has a strong negative impact over the last three periods. Interestingly, the
only country with a similar pattern is Austria. The Netherlands are a notable case as a shock
in conflict there leads to up to +.18 positive deviation from its country average in development.
In this model, both armed conflict and democracy have mostly positive effects on development.
The magnitude of these effects is higher after shocks in democracy than in armed conflict.
Development has comparatively smaller effects on armed conflict than democracy, i.e. the re-
sponses are on average of a smaller magnitude (most of the countries deviate less than .1 points
from their conflict average over the entire 10 periods) and they occur in a smaller number of
countries. In several countries a positive shock in development leads to a positive response of
armed conflict. In Western states this effect is very short lived and only visible in the first pe-
riod. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan are most
notable examples: their conflict values deviate around +0.12 over at least two periods after a
positive shock in development. There are 7 countries for which a positive shock in development
leads to a negative deviation from their country means in armed conflict. Once more conflict
location suggests itself as an important factor to include in further research especially regarding
the effects of conflict.
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Figure D.18: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of conflict
on development during at least one step.
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Figure D.19: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of conflict
on development during at least one step.
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Figure D.20: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of devel-
opment on conflict during at least one step.
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Figure D.21: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of devel-
opment on conflict during at least one step.
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Democracy and conflict
The effects of armed conflict on democracy are very heterogeneous across countries, in terms
of magnitude as well as timing. There are positive and negative responses across all regions.
Significant responses occur at all steps. There is no striking similarity or difference. The positive
impact of armed conflict on democratization is especially striking in Central America: Mexico,
Nicaragua and Panama display some of the largest significant results in the whole shock group,
while results for regions 4, 5, and 6 show mixed results. In region 2, Turkey is the only country
showing a significant result, which as well as in Central America shows that armed conflict in-
creases democratization. Overall, timing of these shocks is very diverse.
The effects of a shock in democracy on conflict are highly heterogeneous across countries. For
example, there is a significant negative effect at some point in the first five years in all MENA
countries, particularly strong in Iran A strong significant positive effect on the other hand is
visible in India and Malaysia within the first five periods. These are the only countries in Asia
displaying any response. In general most reactions seem to happen in the first five periods.
Responses after that mostly occur in Western States (Australia) or are very small (eg Togo, or
Suriname)
Although some countries in region 5 show positive results, these results are very small (Norway,
Netherlands, Spain, UK). A striking but as well intuitive result is that the biggest negative re-
sponses of armed conflict to a positive shock in democratization are seen in the western countries
(Australia, Canada, Portugal): conflict involvement decreases the more democratic a country
becomes.
The reverse is true for regions 4 and 6, where a positive shock in democratization leads to more
Armed Conflict.
Summary: The impulse response functions show evidence for both armed conflict affecting
democracy levels and vice -versa. In general the responses of democracy occur over longer peri-
ods of time whereas conflict reacts rather punctually (few steps at a time). There is evidence of
simultaneity in a wide range of countries (e.g. Morocco: democracy has a negative impact on
armed conflict and armed conflict has a negative impact on democracy; or India and Malaysia
where during the first five steps democracy has a positive effect on armed conflict and so does
armed conflict on democracy). This simultaneity can at times take counterintuitive forms, e.g.
in South Africa: armed conflict has a negative effect on democracy in the long run. In the short
run democracy has a positive effect on armed conflict.
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Figure D.22: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of conflict
on democracy during at least one step.
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Figure D.23: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of conflict
on democracy during at least one step.
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Figure D.24: Impulse response functions for countries with significant positive effects of democ-
racy on conflict during at least one step.
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Figure D.25: Impulse response functions for countries with significant negative effects of democ-
racy on conflict during at least one step.
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D.4 Robustness Checks
On the following pages tables with the number of countries responding with positive, negative
or no changes to a given shock are presented for all model specification discussed in Section 5.6:
1. VAR(4) model in first difference
2. VAR(4) model with alternative ordering (democracy, development, trade and conflict)
3. VAR(4) model with GDP per capita growth instead of female life expectancy
4. VAR(4) model with logged GDP per capita instead of female life expectancy
5. VAR(8) model
6. VAR(10) model
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D.5 Examining residual autocorrelation
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Figure D.32: VAR(4): residual plots for countries with LM-test p-values between .01-.05
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Figure D.33: VAR(4): residual plots for countries with LM-test p-values below .01
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